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Thesis Abstract  
Introduction 
Psychological flexibility has been considered to be an important ingredient of good 
psychological health for the last five decades or so. It has been suggested that 
psychological flexibility predominantly refers to a number of dynamic processes which 
determine a person’s interactions with their environment. 
For the purpose of this research, the model of psychological flexibility associated 
with Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT) has been adopted. From an ACT 
perspective, psychological flexibility consists of six interlinked processes: present 
moment awareness, acceptance, cognitive defusion, self-as-context, committed action 
and values. ACT founders argue that psychological flexibility is a change process in ACT. 
The evidence suggests that psychological flexibility is a trans-diagnostic process, 
meaning that an increase in psychological flexibility is associated with a decrease of 
distress across a range of diagnoses. It is less clear, however, whether psychological 
flexibility is also trans-theoretical, meaning that it is unclear whether other successful 
therapies also operate through the process of psychological flexibility. 
Aims 
The primary aims of this study were (1) to examine whether psychological 
flexibility processes can be detected in client talk during therapy that does not overtly 
target psychological flexibility as a change process and (2) to examine whether changes 
in detected levels of psychological flexibility are related to clinical outcomes.  
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Method  
A secondary data analysis was conducted in this study. The second, fourth and last 
sessions of Cognitive Behavioural Therapy (CBT) recordings from three participants 
were analysed in order to examine whether psychological flexibility could be identified 
in their speech. Additionally, a panel of judges (blinded to the actual clinical outcomes of 
the participants) made predictions about the therapy outcomes based on the analysed data.   
Results 
The results showed that the psychological flexibility process can be reliably 
identified in the talk of participants who engage in CBT. It is unclear, however, whether 
accurate outcome predictions can be made based on the identified patterns of 
psychological flexibility.  
Discussion 
There is a large body of research supporting the notion that a number of well-
established psychological treatments produce similar outcomes across different 
presentations and populations, which have led some authors to conclude that some 
therapeutic processes contributing to achieving therapeutic change are common across all 
psychological treatments. It has been argued that psychological flexibility is an important 
process of psychotherapeutic change, and the results of this study show that its 
components can be identified in CBT which does not explicitly target psychological 
flexibility. This finding provides a platform for future research into the role of 
psychological flexibility in facilitating psychotherapeutic change. However, whether 
accurate outcome predictions can be made based on the identified patterns of 
psychological flexibility remains unclear. 
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Given that there are many similarities between ACT and CBT, it would be valuable 
to examine whether psychological flexibility can be also detected in therapies which do 
not have cognitive and behavioural roots, such as psychodynamic therapy. Additionally, 
further research should analyse the talk of participants whose clinical outcomes are more 
varied in order to examine the relationship between patterns of psychological flexibility 
identified in text and participants’ clinical outcomes. 
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Abstract 
Every year, deliberately set fires result in many fatalities, serious injuries and have a large 
economical cost. Despite the serious consequences, there is a relatively limited amount 
of research that attempts to explore psychological processes associated with firesetting 
behaviour. This paper details a systematic review of peer –reviewed quantitative and 
qualitative articles that reported motivational factors for setting fires as their primary data. 
Motivation has been considered an important factor in understanding why people behave 
in a certain way.  Consequently, many classifications of firesetters are based on the 
motivational factors. Although the quality of the articles included in this review vary 
significantly, some conclusions related to motivations for firesetting have been drawn. 
The findings suggest that firesetters form some distinct groups based in the demographic 
characteristics (e.g. age, legal status, cognitive ability), and that the motivations reported 
by those groups of firesetters seem to differ. These findings are discussed in relation to 
clinical implications and possible directions for further research. 
Keywords: Firesetting, motivations, arson, firesetter
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Introduction  
Every year deliberate firesetting leads to numerous deaths, injuries and damage to 
property. The Department for Communities & Local Government (DCLG; 2015) reported 
22,000 deliberate fires in Great Britain in 2013-14 accounting for 70 deaths and 1,330 
non-fatal casualties. The latest published figures suggest that in 2008 the financial cost of 
arson was £1.7bn, which does not include the environmental and social costs resulting 
from arson (DCLG, 2011). Notwithstanding this significant human and economic cost, 
theoretical understanding of firesetting, including the motivation for setting fires, is still 
underdeveloped (Gannon & Pina, 2010). 
A term ‘deliberate firesetting’ is frequently used interchangeably with ‘arson’ to describe 
the act of setting fire. It is important to note however that in the UK, ‘arson’ is defined by 
the Criminal Damage Act 1971 as ‘to destroy or damage property intending thereby to 
endanger the life of another, or being reckless as to whether the life of another would 
thereby be endangered’ (The Crown Prosecution Service, 2014). Consequently, 
‘arsonists’ are a group of offenders who have been convicted for arson. Many research 
papers (e.g. Barrowcliffe & Gannon, 2015; Kolko & Kazdin, 1994) have acknowledged 
that a significant number of people who set deliberate fires have never been apprehended. 
Consequently, following Gannon and Pina (2010) recommendations, in this review the 
term ‘firesetting’ will be used to describe all deliberate acts of setting fire, and individuals 
who set deliberate fires will be referred to as ‘firesetters’.  
Motivation for Firesetting 
It has been suggested that motivation plays an important function in understanding the 
processes behind firesetting behaviour (Prins, 1994). For the purpose of this review, 
motivation will be defined broadly as ‘the cause, reason, or incentive that induces or 
prompts specific behaviour’ (Rider, 1980, p.11). It has been suggested that firesetters 
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have been the most frequently categorised in relation to their motivation underlying 
firesetting behaviour (Doley, 2003; Gannon & Pina, 2010).   
The earliest attempts to categorise firesetters began in the 1950s, with Lewis and Yarnell 
(1951) proposing five categories of firesetters who set fires for ‘mental reasons’: 
accidental or unintentional, delusional, erotically-motivated, revenge motivated, and 
child fire play. Any instance of firesetting for financial gain were excluded. Since then, 
many other typologies based on motivation for firesetting have been developed. 
After examining the records of all paroled firesetters released from the New York State 
prison between 1961 and 1966, Inciardi (1970) suggested six categories of firesetters: 
revenge, excitement, institutionalised, insurance claim, vandalism, and crime concealers. 
He reported that the largest group of firesetters were represented by those motivated by 
revenge, followed by excitement seeking. Even though Inciardi’s (1970) work is 
considered to be one of the most extensive attempts to categorise firesetters (Gannon & 
Pina, 2010; Rix, 1994) it is flawed by its poor conceptual clarity. This is because the 
individuals could be categorised according to motive (i.e., insurance claim) or 
demographic characteristics (i.e., residing in a psychiatric hospital). Many other 
classifications have been developed since 1970 (e.g., Dennett, 1980; Icove & Estepp, 
1987, Koson & Dvoskin, 1982) but none of these classifications seem to be flawless 
(Geller, 1992), and many authors emphasised the complexity of individuals’ motivations 
for firesetting (Prins, Tennent, & Trick, 1985;). It has also been recognised that most of 
the firesetters report more than one motivation for setting fire, which made some of the 
authors question the utility of categorising firesetters solely on the basis of their 
motivations for setting fires (Doley, 2003; Prins, 1994, Rider, 1980).  
The most recently developed theory of firesetting, The Multi-Trajectory Theory of Adult 
Firesetting (M-TTAF; Gannon, Ó Ciardha, Doley, & Alleyne, 2012), considers 
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motivational factors for behaviour as a part of prototypical trajectories associated with 
firesetting. This theory was developed by incorporating broad theoretical components 
from various areas of forensic psychology, firesetting taxonomies and clinical experience 
(Gannon et al., 2012). 
The aim of this review is to ascertain what firesetters report as their motivation for setting 
fires. This knowledge may contribute to the further development of existing theories, and 
also help to inform clinical practice.  
Method 
Information Sources and Search Criteria 
A summary of the literature selection process is outlined in Figure 1. The following online 
databases were searched (with period covered): Academic Search Complete (1984 – 
2017), AMED (1985-2011), CINAHL (1982-2017), MEDLINE (1919-2011), 
PsycARTICLES (1908 – 2014), PsycINFO (1893- 2017).   
Key terms used were: ‘fire raiser’, ‘fire starting’, ‘fire starters’, ‘fire starter’, ‘fire raisers’, 
‘fire raising’, ‘fire setter’, ‘fire setters’, ‘fire setting’, arson*, fire set*, fire set, desire*, 
rational*, motiv*, urge*, justification*, reason*. Terms were searched individually in the 
first instance, and then in conjunction as appropriate (see Appendix A for more details). 
The search was completed on the 27th of, July 2017. The reference lists of included articles 
were also searched.  
Selection Criteria 
To ensure a minimum quality of the papers, only peer-reviewed journal articles were 
included in this review. The included papers were qualitative and quantitative studies 
available in English reporting motivational factors as their primary data to minimise 
biases associated with secondary reporting. Given the limited number of papers in the 
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area, inclusion criteria were purposefully broad. Papers were included only if data related 
to motivational factors were reported independently or if extractable.  
Study Selection  
Four hundred and sixty two papers were identified as potentially relevant for the review 
in the initial search. The Refworks reference software was used to remove duplicates. 
Titles and abstracts were scanned by the primary author in line with inclusion/exclusion 
criteria, which resulted in 44 papers being identified as potentially relevant and accessed 
in full-text.  
The reference lists of the selected papers were hand-searched by the primary author and 
14 other suitable articles were identified, of which 2 met criteria for inclusion within the 
review. 
After examining full-text articles in line with exclusion/inclusion criteria, 45 papers were 
removed; therefore, 13 articles are included in this review. 
Data Abstraction 
Studies were categorised according to two groups: (a) children participants, (b) adult 
participants. The general characteristic and key findings were extracted from all studies 
and tabulated in Table 1.  
Assessment of Methodological Quality 
Various standardised tools exist that can be used to evaluate the methodological quality 
of published research, although their value in systematic reviews is debated due to their 
limited reliability (e.g. Juni, Witschi, Bloch, & Egger, 1999). The Newcastle-Ottawa 
Scale (NOS; Wells et al., 2009) was adapted for this review to assess the methodological 
quality of quantitative papers (Table 2). To assess the quality of qualitative studies, 
criteria shaped by Tracy’s (2010) recommendations were applied (see Table 3). 
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Synthesis of Results 
A frequency analysis was utilised when appropriate data was available. The narrative 
framework was used when the ‘frequency data’ was not reported. 
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Results 
Methodological Characteristics 
Quantitative Studies  
Six studies included in the review used a quantitative methodology, (Barrowcliffe & 
Gannon, 2015; Barrowcliffe & Gannon, 2016; Clare, Murphy, Cox, & Chaplin, 1992; 
Gannon & Barrowcliffe, 2012; Murphy & Clare, 1996; Taylor, Robertson, Thorne, 
Belshaw, & Watson, 2006).  
The quality of papers was varied. For example, while the data regarding participant 
demographics was satisfactorily reported in all studies, sample representativeness ranged 
from good (i.e. the sample included confirmed firesetters; Clare et al., 1992; Murphy & 
Clare, 1996; Tylor et al., 2006) to moderate (i.e., the sample included self-reported 
firesetters; (Barrowcliffe & Gannon, 2015; Barrowcliffe & Gannon, 2016; Gannon & 
Barrowcliffe, 2012). Also, sample sizes ranged from 1 (i.e., lacking generalisability) to 
40, with a total of 93 participants across all studies2. Inclusion and exclusion criteria were 
made explicit in the majority of the studies, with only one deemed ‘moderate’ in this 
domain (Tylor et al., 2006). 
 
Three studies (Clare et al., 1992; Murphy & Clare, 1996; Taylor et al., 2006) did not 
specify whether the participants were recalling information related to an event that had 
happened in childhood, or how recent it was. The remaining papers (Barrowcliffe & 
Gannon, 2015; Barrowcliffe & Gannon, 2016; Gannon & Barrowcliffe, 2012) did report 
whether the firesetting had taken place in childhood, adulthood, or both. This is important 
as ‘recall bias’ may have affected the results relating to childhood fires reported by adult 
                                            
2 Only the number of firesetters taking part in the studies are reported here.  
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participants. It should be noted that this issue is further complicated for those participants 
who may have set multiple fires, in both childhood and adulthood.  
Other potential methodological biases were identified. For example, all of the studies 
gathered data retrospectively, which may have decreased reliability of the participant’s 
recall (Dohrenwend, 2006; Jenkins, Hurst, and Rose, 1979). Three studies used 
statements describing potential reasons for firesetting as an inclusion criteria (i.e., a 
person would only be considered to be a firesetter if they answered yes to any of the 
statements (Barrowcliffe & Gannon, 2015; Barrowcliffe & Gannon, 2016; Gannon & 
Barrowcliffe, 2012). Gannon and Barrowcliffe (2012) and Barrowcliffe & Gannon (2016) 
recruited their participants via a combination of university and community forums, social 
media, the University Research Participation Scheme, and snowballing techniques which 
potentially led to self-selected sample biases.  
All studies used measures that were appropriate for deriving the data regarding the 
motivation for firesetting, but did not provide information regarding psychometric 
properties of the measures they used. Finally, the single-case study reported by Clare and 
Chaplin (1992) provides useful information for clinical practice, but cannot be 
generalised to all firesetters.
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Table 1.  General characteristics and key findings of studies reporting the motivation for firesetting. 
Author(s) and 
location 
Methodology Sample 
characteristics*** 
                Summary points and key findings**** 
1. Clare, 
Murphy, Cox 
& Chaplin 
(1992)  
      The UK 
Quantitative 
Questionnaire:  
The Fire 
Assessment 
Interview (FAI) 
 
Analysis  
Descriptive 
statistics 
employed to 
analyse set of 
data of interest to 
this review  
Number of 
participants:  
N = 1 
 
Gender 
Male 
 
Age 
23 
 
Cognitive functioning 
Mild Intellectual 
Disability 
 
Setting 
Inpatient 
- The cognitions/feelings prior and after the event are 
retrospectively self-reported by the participant as ‘motives’. 
 
Firesetting Motivation  
 
- The main feeling/cognition experienced by the participant 
prior to firesetting was the anxiety. 
 
- Setting fire did not reduce anxiety.  
 
- The other important contributing factor was his perception 
that people weren’t listening to his wishes or paying 
attention to him. 
 
- Anger, sadness, and boredom were other contributing 
factors. 
 
- The main effects of setting a fire were gaining attention and 
feeling less sad.  
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Table 1.  General characteristics and key findings of studies reporting the motivation for firesetting. 
Author(s) and 
location 
Methodology Sample 
characteristics*** 
                Summary points and key findings**** 
 
2. Murphy & 
Clare  
(1996) 
The UK 
Quantitative  
Questionnaires: 
 
The Firesetting 
Assessment 
Schedule (FAS),  
 
 
 
Analysis 
Descriptive 
statistics 
employed to 
analyse set of 
data of interest to 
this review  
Number of 
participants:  
N = 20 (firesetters n = 10 
and control group n = 
10) 
 
Gender (index group) 
Males (n =7) 
Females (n = 3) 
 
Age 
Average age: 26.4 (range 
18 to 38) 
 
Cognitive functioning 
IQ ranging from 61 to 
78, mean: 68.4 
 
- Participants completed the Fire Assessment Schedule which 
explores the events, feelings, and thoughts before and after 
setting the fire.  
 
Firesetting Motivation 
 
- The most common emotion reported as present before 
setting the fire was: anger (n = 6), followed by not being 
listened to (n = 5), feeling sad/depressed (n = 4), 
boredom/needing stimulation (n = 3), feeling anxious and 
tense (n = 2), and having auditory hallucinations (n = 1).The 
participants reported that the following outcomes of/from 
setting the fire: feeling less angry (n = 5), feeling listened to 
(n = 3), feeling less anxious (n = 2), feeling excited/less 
bored (n = 2). 
 
- None of the participants listed ‘feeling less sad/depressed’, 
‘reducing auditory hallucinations’, ‘increased peer 
approval’, or ‘avoidance of task/situation’ as an outcome of 
the firesetting behaviour.  
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Table 1.  General characteristics and key findings of studies reporting the motivation for firesetting. 
Author(s) and 
location 
Methodology Sample 
characteristics*** 
                Summary points and key findings**** 
Setting 
Inpatient 
 
3. Tylor, 
Robertson, 
Thome, 
Beslaw & 
Watson 
(2006) 
The UK 
Quantitative 
 
Fire-Setters 
Assessment 
Schedule (FSAS, 
Murphy & Clare, 
1996). 
 
 
Analysis 
Descriptive 
statistics 
employed to 
analyse set of 
data of interest to 
this review 
Number of 
participants:  
N = 6 
 
Gender  
Females (n = 6) 
 
Age 
Average age: 34.4 years 
(range 20 to 48) 
 
Cognitive functioning 
WAIS-R full scale IQ 
ranging from 64 to 82, 
mean: 74 
 
- The FSAS (which explores the events, feelings and thoughts 
before and after setting the fire) was administered at the 
beginning of the treatment program.  
 
     Firesetting Motivation  
 
- The most common emotion/event prior to the firesetting 
reported by the participants was feeling of anger (mean 
FSAS rating 2.5), followed by ‘low social attention’ (2.3), 
‘feeling sad/depressed’ (1.8), ‘feeling anxious/tense’ (1.2), 
‘feeling bored/need for stimulation’ (1), ‘auditory 
hallucinations’ (1), ‘wanting to avoid a task or situation’ 
(0.3).  
 
- The participants reported that the following outcomes of 
setting the fire: ‘feeling less angry’ (mean FSAS rating 1.3), 
‘feeling listened to’ (1.3), ‘feeling less sad/depressed’(1.2), 
‘feeling less anxious/tense’ (1.2), ‘feeling less bored/more 
stimulated (0.8), ‘increased peer approval’ (0.7), ‘reduced 
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Table 1.  General characteristics and key findings of studies reporting the motivation for firesetting. 
Author(s) and 
location 
Methodology Sample 
characteristics*** 
                Summary points and key findings**** 
Setting 
Inpatient 
 
auditory hallucinations’ (0.3), and ‘avoided task or situation’ 
(0.3). 
 
4. Coid, 
Wilkins & 
Coid 
(1999) 
The UK 
Qualitative 
Clinical 
interviews 
 
 
Analysis 
Not stated 
Number of 
participants:  
N= 136 
 
Gender 
Female (with history of 
self-harm and firesetting, 
 n = 25)3 
Female (with history of 
self-harm but no 
firesetting, 
 n= 49) 
Female (without history 
of self-harm, n= 62) 
 
- Participants were asked about various motivating factors that 
were related to the incidents of setting fire. They were also 
asked about the presence of symptoms and 
phenomenological variables that preceded and accompanied 
incidents of firesetting, and about any associated activities 
and experiences after the event. The item sheet allowed for 
multiple coding of motives.  
 
Firesetting Motivation  
 
- Displaced aggression was the most common motivation 
reported by participants (n =20, 80%) followed by revenge 
(n = 8, 32%), excitement (n = 4, 16%), suicidal intention (n 
= 3, 12%), and seeking attention (n = 3, 12%). Three 
women (12%) claimed the fire to be an accident.  
 
- Eight women (32%) reported that the firesetting was pre-
planned.  
 
                                            
3 Only information provided by this group will be analysed as it provides data of interest for this review. 
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Table 1.  General characteristics and key findings of studies reporting the motivation for firesetting. 
Author(s) and 
location 
Methodology Sample 
characteristics*** 
                Summary points and key findings**** 
Age 
Average age: 23.3 years  
(for women with history 
of self-harm and 
firesetting; range not 
stated)  
 
Cognitive functioning 
Not reported 
 
Setting 
Prison 
- Participants reported that prior to setting the fires, they were 
experiencing distressing symptoms/feelings of anxiety (n = 
17, 68%), dysmorphia (n = 17, 68%), anger (n = 15, 60%), 
depersonalisation (n = 3, 12%), and emptiness (n = 2, 8%).  
 
- 19 (76%) women reported the experience of “symptom build 
up” and 13 (52%) women stated that the urge to set a fire 
became irresistible once they had decided to do it. 
 
- A reduction of symptom intensity, or a “sense of relief”, 
following the firesetting behaviour was reported by 15 
(60%) women 
 
5. Rix (1994) 
The UK 
Qualitative  
Interviews 
 
 
Analysis 
Not stated 
 
Number of 
participants:  
N= 153 (firesetters) 
 
Gender 
Female (n = 24) 
Male (n =129) 
- Some participants identified more than one motive for 
setting a fire, especially when they had gone on to set more 
than one fire in the future. 
 
Firesetting Motivation  
 
- The most common motive reported by participants was 
revenge on specific people or society as a whole (men, n = 
42 [33%]; women, n = 5 [21 %]; all, n = 47 [31%]). 
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Table 1.  General characteristics and key findings of studies reporting the motivation for firesetting. 
Author(s) and 
location 
Methodology Sample 
characteristics*** 
                Summary points and key findings**** 
 
Age 
Average age: 25 years 
(male, range 16 to 52) 
and 31 years (female; 
range 18 to 62) 
 
 
Cognitive functioning 
15 men and two women 
were reported as having 
intellectual disability (17 
in total). 
 
Setting 
Prison 
 
 
- The second most common reported motive was excitement 
(all, n = 17 [11%]). Men provided this a motive more often 
(n = 16 [12%]) than women (n = 1 [4%]). 
 
- The next most common motive was vandalism, which was 
only reported by men (n = 13 [10%]). 
 
- The fourth most common motive was ‘cry for help’ or 
‘attention seeking’, with seven (5%) men and four (17%) 
women reporting this as a motive (n = 11 [7%] in total) 
 
- Attempted suicide was reported by nine (7%) men and one 
(4%) woman as a motive to set fire (n = 10 [7%] in total). 
This category could be potentially combined within an 
‘attention seeking’ category due to difficulties determining 
the motive in some cases. 
 
- The sixth most common motive was rehousing (men n = 5 
[4%]; women n = 5 [21%]; both n =10 [7%]). This category 
has not been reported in any other study. 
 
- Psychosis was reported as a reason for setting fires by eight 
(5%) participants (men n = 5 [3%]; women n = 3 [13%]). 
 
- Carelessness was reported only by men (n = 8 [6%]). 
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Table 1.  General characteristics and key findings of studies reporting the motivation for firesetting. 
Author(s) and 
location 
Methodology Sample 
characteristics*** 
                Summary points and key findings**** 
 
- Seven (5%) participants reported that they set fires for 
financial reasons (i.e., insurance, fraud). Men n = 6 [5%]; 
women n = 1 [4%]).  
 
- A further seven (5%) participants starting a fire to cover up 
the evidence of a burglary (men n = 6 [5%]; women n = 1 
[4%]). 
 
- Six (4%) participants stated that they set fires to be seen as a 
hero (men n = 5 [4%]; women n = 1 [4%]). 
 
- ‘Other manipulative’ motivation (e.g. trying to get back to 
prison) was reported by six (4%) individuals (men n = 5 
[4%]; women n = 1 [4%]). 
 
- Three men (2%) reported that setting fire was like 
‘antidepressant’. 
 
- Another three (2%) participants reported setting fires on 
behalf of another (‘proxy’). There were two (1%) men and 
one (4%) woman in this category. 
 
- Political motives were reported by two men (1%), and none 
of the women. 
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Table 1.  General characteristics and key findings of studies reporting the motivation for firesetting. 
Author(s) and 
location 
Methodology Sample 
characteristics*** 
                Summary points and key findings**** 
 
6. Barnoux, 
Gannon & O 
Ciardha 
(2015) 
The UK 
Qualitative 
Semi-structured 
interviews 
 
 
Analysis 
Grounded theory 
(GT; Strauss & 
Corbin, 1998) 
 
Number of 
participants:  
N = 38 (firesetters) 
 
Gender 
Male (n =  38) 
 
Age 
Average age: 34.24 years 
(range 18 to 63).   
 
Cognitive functioning 
Two participants were 
diagnosed with 
intellectual disability 
 
Setting 
Prison  
- The motives for firesetting are understood as ‘the offence-
related goals’ which developed from proximal triggers 
leading up the offence and the affective responses they 
generated. 
 
Firesetting Motivation  
 
- The 35 participants reported at least one trigger that was 
contributing to their offending. Three categories of proximal 
triggers emerged from the data: moral transgression (n = 
12), conflict/provocation (n = 21), and unmet needs/problem 
perceived as unsolvable (n = 9). 
 
- Those without identifiable triggers (n = 3) set fires in the 
context of their wider offending behaviour, symptomatic of 
a generally anti-social lifestyle. 
 
- Proximal triggers created three main affective responses: 
anger (n = 27), fear related to being in an unwanted/life-
threatening position (n = 6), and frustration because of 
feeling from attaining goals or unmet expectations (n = 12). 
Some participants reported experiencing more than one of 
these emotions. 
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Table 1.  General characteristics and key findings of studies reporting the motivation for firesetting. 
Author(s) and 
location 
Methodology Sample 
characteristics*** 
                Summary points and key findings**** 
 - Two pathways for goal development were identified from 
the data:  
 
o Non-fire-related goals (n = 12). Motives included 
protection (n = 2), escape (n = 2), economic gain (n = 
2), revenge (n = 4), thrill-seeking (n = 2), and 
communication (n = 2). These participants used fire to 
execute other offence-related goals (e.g., concealing 
evidence [n =  5] or killing a target [n =  2]). For these 
men, their fires were either unplanned or immediately 
planned during the commission of the offence. 
 
o Fire-related goals (n = 26). Reported motives included 
protection (n = 1), escape (n = 3), revenge (n = 10), 
power (n = 6), and protest (n = 6). The majority of 
participants on this pathway planned their firesetting 
before they committed the offence (n = 18). 
 
 
7. Gannon & 
Barrowcliffe 
(2012) 
The UK 
Quantitative 
Questionnaire  
(mixture of open-
ended and closed 
questions) 
Number of 
participants:  
N = 158 (150 completed 
the study) 
Self-reported firesetters: 
- If participants indicated that they have set fire in the past, 
they were asked to answer questions in ‘the fire disclosure 
section’, where one of the open-ended questions was: “why 
did you start the fire(s)?” 
 
- Two participants reported starting a fire during adulthood, 
and 16 during adolescence.  
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Table 1.  General characteristics and key findings of studies reporting the motivation for firesetting. 
Author(s) and 
location 
Methodology Sample 
characteristics*** 
                Summary points and key findings**** 
 
Analysis 
Descriptive 
statistics 
employed to 
analyse set of 
data of interest of 
this review 
N= 18 (16 completed the 
study) 
 
Gender 
Female (n =  109) 
Male (n =  49) 
 
Self-reported firesetters: 
Female (n = 10, 55.6%) 
Male (n = 8, 44.4%) 
 
Age  
Average age: 32.1 years 
(range 18 to 70).   
 
Cognitive functioning 
Not reported 
 
 
- Most of the participants stated that they did not plan to set 
the fire  
         (n = 13, 72%).  
 
- Seven of the participants reported that they set fires 
impulsively (n = 7, 39%) 
 
Firesetting Motivation  
 
- The most common reason reported by participants for 
setting fires was boredom (n = 8). 
 
- The other reasons provided by participants included peer 
pressure (n = 2), wanting to rebel (n = 1), to express feelings 
(n = 2), to destroy evidence (n = 1), out of curiosity (n = 1), 
for excitement (n = 2), for a joke (n = 1). 
 
- Two participants reported that they set fires for no apparent 
reason.  
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Table 1.  General characteristics and key findings of studies reporting the motivation for firesetting. 
Author(s) and 
location 
Methodology Sample 
characteristics*** 
                Summary points and key findings**** 
Setting 
Community (un-
apprehended  firesetters) 
 
8. Barrowcliffe 
& Gannon 
(2015) 
The UK 
Quantitative 
Online 
questionnaire 
 
 
Analysis 
Descriptive 
statistics 
employed to 
analyse set of 
data of interest of 
this review 
Number of 
participants:  
N = 158 (133 completed 
the questionnaire in full)4 
 
Self-reported firesetters: 
n = 18 
 
Gender  
Female (n = 79) 
Male (n = 78) 
 
Self-reported firesetters: 
- Self-reported firesetters were asked to answer questions in 
‘the fire disclosure section’ of questionnaire. One was the 
open-ended questions: “why did you start the fire(s)?” 
 
- Two participants reported igniting their first fire in 
adulthood. 
 
- Seven participants reported igniting their most recent fire in 
adulthood. 
 
Firesetting Motivation  
 
- The most common reported motivation was experimentation 
and curiosity (n =9, 81.8 %), followed by alleviating 
boredom/creating excitement (n = 6, 54.5%)  
 
- Three (27.3%) participants reported that they loved fire, two 
(18.2%) stated that they set a fire(s) as a ‘dare or prank’, and 
                                            
4 256 individuals accessed the online survey, 158 answered a question related to deliberate firesetting, one participant was excluded due to having conviction for fire 
setting and 24 participants did not complete the questionnaire.  
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Table 1.  General characteristics and key findings of studies reporting the motivation for firesetting. 
Author(s) and 
location 
Methodology Sample 
characteristics*** 
                Summary points and key findings**** 
Female (n = 7, 38.9%) 
Male (n = 11, 61.1 %) 
 
Age 
not reported   
 
Self-reported firesetters: 
Average age: not 
reported 
 
Cognitive functioning 
Not reported but all 
participants reported 
holding formal 
qualifications. 
 
Setting 
Community (un-
apprehended firesetters) 
two reported having problems at home or school as reason 
for setting fire(s) 
 
- Other motivations stated by participants were: vandalism (n 
= 1, 9.1%), covering a crime/destroying evidence (n = 1, 
9.1%), and financial gain (n = 1, 9.1%), 
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Table 1.  General characteristics and key findings of studies reporting the motivation for firesetting. 
Author(s) and 
location 
Methodology Sample 
characteristics*** 
                Summary points and key findings**** 
9. Barrowcliffe 
& Gannon 
(2016) 
The UK 
Quantitative 
Online 
questionnaire 
 
 
Analysis 
Descriptive 
statistics 
employed to 
analyse set of 
data of interest of 
this review 
Number of 
participants:  
N = 232 (204 completed 
the questionnaire in full) 
 
Self-reported firesetters: 
n =  40  
 
Gender 
Female (n= 188) 
Male (n= 37) 
 
Self-reported firesetters: 
Female (n = 25, 62.5%) 
Male (n = 15, 37.5%) 
 
Age 
- Self-reported firesetters were asked to answer questions 
about their firesetting behaviour, including questions 
regarding motivation. 
 
- The majority of participants reported that the most recent 
firesetting behaviour took place between the ages of 10 and 
18 years. 
 
- Six participants reported setting fires in adulthood (range 20 
– 37). 
 
- One participant reported setting their first fire in adulthood. 
 
- The majority of firesetters reported multiple motivations (n 
= 27, 72.5%) 
 
- Boredom was reported to be the motivation associated only 
with fires set in adolescence.  
 
Firesetting Motivation  
 
- The most common reported motivations were alleviating 
boredom/creating excitement (n = 27, 67.5%), followed 
closely by experimentation and curiosity (n =  26, 65%). 
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Table 1.  General characteristics and key findings of studies reporting the motivation for firesetting. 
Author(s) and 
location 
Methodology Sample 
characteristics*** 
                Summary points and key findings**** 
Average age: 25.12 years 
(range 18 to 69).   
 
Self-reported firesetters: 
Average age: 24 years 
 
Cognitive functioning 
Not reported  
 
Setting 
Community (un-
apprehended firesetters) 
 
- Nine (22.5%) participants reported that they loved fire, eight 
(20%) stated that they set a fire(s) as a ‘dare or prank’, four 
(10%) reported vandalism as a motive.  
 
- The next common motive was going along with friends (n = 
2, 5%) and being stressed or frustrated (n = 2, 5%), followed 
by having problems at home or school (n = 1, 2.5%) and 
protecting themselves (n = 1, 2.5%) 
 
- None of the participants stated revenge, insurance pay-
out/financial gain, or covering up another crime as a motive. 
 
10. Perrin-
Wallqvist & 
Norlander 
(2003) 
Sweden 
Qualitative  
Semi-structured 
Interviews 
 
 
Number of 
participants:  
N = 95 
 
Self-reported firesetters 
- Data was collected during semi-structured interviews with a 
psychologist 
 
 
- None of the male participants were playing with fire at age 
of 18, as it was regarded as abnormal and not suitable 
activity for people that age.  
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Table 1.  General characteristics and key findings of studies reporting the motivation for firesetting. 
Author(s) and 
location 
Methodology Sample 
characteristics*** 
                Summary points and key findings**** 
Analysis 
Not reported 
n = 55 
 
Gender 
Male (n =  50) 
Female (n = 45) 
 
Self-reported firesetters: 
Female (n =  20, 44%) 
Male (n =  35, 70%) 
 
 
Age 
Males: all 18 years old 
Females: 18 and 19 years 
old 
 
Cognitive functioning 
 
Firesetting Motivation  
 
- Male participants reported curiosity/excitement and 
distraction/boredom as main motives for fire play.  
 
- Female participants reported seeking excitement (something 
forbidden, curiosity and wonder, 12 participants), 
amusement (having something to do, often with others, n = 
4), and ‘bizarre’ firesetting (means of expression, source of 
power and escape of reality, n = 4) as motives. 
 
- Females reported playing with fire while in their teenage 
years, mostly for amusement (17/20), two females reported 
excitement as a motive.  
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Table 1.  General characteristics and key findings of studies reporting the motivation for firesetting. 
Author(s) and 
location 
Methodology Sample 
characteristics*** 
                Summary points and key findings**** 
Not reported, (average 
cognitive functioning is 
suggested due to 
recruiting from 
mainstream educational 
setting) 
 
Setting 
Community sample 
 
11. Walsh & 
Lambie 
(2013) 
New Zealand 
Qualitative 
Semi-structured 
interview  
The Behaviour 
Motivation 
Interview (the 
BMI) 
 
 
Number of 
participants:  
N = 31 
Adolescents5 (n = 18) 
Caregivers (n =13) 
 
Gender 
Males (n = 18) 
- The participants completed the BMI questionnaire and then 
were prompted to provide more information regarding all 
questions. 
 
Firesetting Motivation  
 
- The most common motivation reported by the participants 
was boredom (n = 8 unprompted, n = 12 prompted); 
followed by anger (n = 2, n = 11), experimenting (n = 4, n 
= 9), peer influence (n = 2, n = 9). 
                                            
5 Only information provided by this group will be analysed as it provides data of interest for this review. 
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Table 1.  General characteristics and key findings of studies reporting the motivation for firesetting. 
Author(s) and 
location 
Methodology Sample 
characteristics*** 
                Summary points and key findings**** 
Analysis 
Grounded Theory 
(Glasser, 1967) 
 
Age 
Age range 10.5 to 16.6 
years 
 
Cognitive functioning 
Not reported 
 
 
Setting 
Community sample – 
young males involved in 
unsanctioned firesetting 
within last 2 years. 
 
 
- Fascination was reported unprompted by 4 participants, but 
after further exploration none of their responses were 
recorded in this category. 
 
- Initially none of the participants reported that their 
motivation was to gain attention, after further exploration, 
however, two responses were coded in this category.  
12. Kolko & 
Kazdin 
(1994) 
The USA 
Qualitative  
Semi-structured 
interview 
 
Number of 
participants:  
N = 95 
 
- In order to identify the motivation for setting fire, children 
were asked ‘why did you do it?’ and two followed up 
questions were asked to survey the presence and nature of 
their secondary motives.  
 
Firesetting Motivation  
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Table 1.  General characteristics and key findings of studies reporting the motivation for firesetting. 
Author(s) and 
location 
Methodology Sample 
characteristics*** 
                Summary points and key findings**** 
 
Analysis 
Fire Incident 
Analysis for 
Children (FIAC) 
Gender 
Male (n = 75),   
Female (n = 20) 
 
Age 
Average age 9.5 (range 6 
to 13) 
 
Cognitive functioning 
Within normal range. 
 
Setting  
Inpatient (n =  23) 
Outpatient (n = 30) 
Community non-patient  
(n =  42) 
 
 
- The most common primary motive for the incident was 
“fun/playing around/just wanted to” (n = 33, 35.2 %), 
followed by curiosity/experimentation (n = 16, 17%).  
 
- Non-interpersonal effects (n = 13, 13.8%) and 
anger/manipulation (n = 11, 11.7%) were also listed by 
children as motives.  
 
- 21 (22.3%) children stated that they had “no reason” or that 
they did not know why they set the fire.  
 
 
- A secondary motive was reported by 11 children: curiosity 
(n = 6, 54.5%) and anger (n = 5, 45.5%) 
 
- Emotional consequences after setting a fire were as follows: 
remorse/guilt (n = 50, 53.2%), neutral (n = 30, 31.9%), and 
positive (n = 14, 14.9%). 
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Table 1.  General characteristics and key findings of studies reporting the motivation for firesetting. 
Author(s) and 
location 
Methodology Sample 
characteristics*** 
                Summary points and key findings**** 
13. Swaffer & 
Hollin 
(1995) 
The UK 
Qualitative  
Interviews 
 
Analysis 
Grounded Theory 
(Strauss & 
Corbin, 1990) 
Number of participants 
N = 17 
 
Gender 
Male (n = 14),   
Female (n = 3) 
Age 
Average age 15.41 
(males) and 16.77 
(females). 
Cognitive functioning 
Not reported 
Setting  
Inpatient  
- Participants were asked about antecedents to the firesetting, 
the incident itself, and the consequences of setting the fire.  
 
Firesetting Motivation  
 
- Six distinct reasons for setting fires were extracted from the 
gathered data: revenge, crime concealment, self-injury, peer 
group pressure, denial/accidental, and fascination with fire.  
 
 
 
 
  
***Only data provided by the firesetters will be analysed in this review. Additional restrictions (if present) are explained in the 
corresponding footnotes.  
**** Most of the participants in the studies provided more than one motivation, and consequently in some studies the number of 
reported motivations exceeds number of participants. 
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Table 2. Methodological characteristics of quantitative studies (n =  6) 
Study 
 
Participant 
Demographics 
 
Sample 
Representativeness 
(N) 
 
Inclusion 
and 
Exclusion 
criteria 
Measurements 
constraints 
Definition  
of 
motivation 
Recall 
bias 
Other sources of potential bias 
1. Clare, 
Murphy, 
Cox & 
Chaplin 
(1992) 
     The UK 
Yes 
Good 
 
N = 1 
 
Yes No  No yes 
- Case study – only one 
participant included. 
- Utilised measure for which 
psychometric properties were 
not provided/discussed. 
- Retrospective self-report – 
potential reporting bias 
 
2. Murphy & 
Clare 
(1996) 
The UK 
Yes 
Good 
 
N = 10 
 
 
Yes No  
 
Moderate 
 
yes 
- Utilised measure for which 
psychometric properties were 
not provided/discussed 
- Retrospective self-report – 
potential reporting biases. 
3. Tylor, 
Robertson, 
Thome, 
Beslaw & 
Watson 
(2006) 
      The UK 
Yes 
Good 
 
N = 6 
 
Moderat
e 
No  Moderate yes 
- Utilised measure for which 
psychometric properties were 
not provided/discussed 
- Retrospective self-report – 
potential reporting biases 
- The inclusion criteria are 
determined by scores on 
measures of anger, self-esteem 
and depression, but cut off 
points are not provided. This 
may lead to sample biases. 
4. Gannon & 
Barrowclif
fe 
Yes 
Moderate 
 
N = 18 
Yes 
 
Moderate 
 
 
No 
 
Mod
erat
e 
- Utilised measure for which 
psychometric properties were 
not provided/discussed 
Page 44 of 203 
 
(2012) 
      The UK 
 - Participants were recruited via 
a combination of university 
and community forums, the 
University Research 
Participation Scheme, and 
snowballing techniques. 
- Retrospective self-report – 
potential reporting biases 
- Inclusion criteria were in form 
of statements describing some 
reasons behind setting fires. 
5. Barrowclif
fe & 
Gannon 
(2015) 
      The UK 
Yes       
Moderate 
 
N = 18 
Yes No  
 
No 
 
Mod
erat
e 
- Utilised measure for which 
psychometric properties were 
not provided/discussed 
- Participants were recruited 
from a very specific 
geographical location.  
- Retrospective self-report – 
potential reporting biases 
- Inclusion criteria were in form 
of statements describing some 
reasons behind setting fires. 
6. Barrowclif
fe & 
Gannon 
(2016) 
The UK 
Yes 
Moderate 
 
N = 40 
Yes No  
 
No 
 
Mod
erat
e 
- Utilised measure for which 
psychometric properties were 
not provided/discussed. 
- Participants were recruited via 
a combination of social media 
and snowballing techniques. 
- Retrospective self-report – 
potential reporting biases 
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- Inclusion criteria were in form 
of statements describing some 
reasons behind setting fires. 
Note. (1) Participant demographics: yes, participant demographics are reported clearly; moderate, participant demographics are 
reported partially; no, participant demographics are not reported adequately. (2) Sample representativeness: good, sample consists of 
confirmed firesetters; moderate, sample consists of self-reported firesetters; poor, little or no information is provided to be able to 
assess these criteria adequately (3) Inclusion and exclusion criteria: yes, inclusion and exclusion criteria are reported clearly; 
moderate, inclusion and exclusion criteria are reported partially or indirectly; no, inclusion and exclusion criteria are not reported. 
(4) Measurement constraints: no, measures were allowing participants to freely report their motivation; moderate, participants had to 
fit their answers into pre-determined category but also had the opportunity to provide the motivation for firesetting through the use of 
open questions; yes, participants had to fit their answer into pre-determined categories and it is unclear whether participants had an 
opportunity to provide alternative motivations for setting fire. (5) Definition of motivation: yes, motivation was clearly defined; 
moderate, motivation was not clearly defined but it was anchored within an appropriate theoretical framework; no, there is no 
consideration for defining ‘motivation’ present. (6) Recall bias: yes, research has not reported when the firesetting took place 
(childhood or adulthood) and how recent the event was; moderate, the study provided some data in this regard; no, no data of this 
nature was reported.                       
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Qualitative Studies  
Seven studies used qualitative methodologies. Sample sizes ranged from 17 to 153, with 
a total of 441 participants across all studies. A set of criteria from Tracy (2010) were 
adapted to assess the quality of qualitative studies (see Table 3). Five of the studies met 
criteria for being satisfactorily rigorous in terms of method, data collection, and analysis 
(‘rich rigour’; Barnoux et al., 2015; Kolko & Kazdin, 1994; Perrin-Wallqvist & 
Norlander, 2003; Swaffer & Hollin, 1995; Walsh & Lambie, 2013). However, three 
studies shared limitations in regards to a limited/lack of methodological description, 
research procedures, and analytic procedure (e.g. transcribing, data extraction; (Coid et 
al., 1999; O'Sullivan & Kelleher, 1987; Rix, 1994). 
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Table 3. Methodological characteristics of qualitative studies (n = 7) 
Study 
Rich 
rigour 
Sincerity Credibility 
Significant 
contribution 
and 
resonance 
Ethical 
clarity 
Meaningful 
coherence 
1. Coid, 
Wilkins & 
Coid 
         (1999) 
         The UK 
moderate no moderate moderate no no 
2.  Rix (1994) 
        The UK 
moderate no moderate yes no moderate 
3. Barnoux, 
Gannon 
Coid, &  
O Ciardha 
       (2015) 
       The UK 
yes moderate yes yes no yes 
4. Perrin-
Wallqvist 
& 
Norlander 
       (2003) 
      Sweden 
yes no moderate yes moderate moderate 
5. Walsh & 
Lambie 
       (2013) 
       New 
Zealand 
yes moderate yes yes moderate yes 
6. Kolko & 
Kazdin 
      (1994) 
     The USA 
yes moderate moderate yes no moderate 
7. Swaffer & 
Hollin 
      (1995) 
      The UK 
yes no Moderate  yes no moderate 
Note. Criteria adapted from Tracy (2010). 
(1) Rich rigour: yes, the study clearly provides a rich description and rationale for the methods and forms of analysis 
undertaken; moderate, the study provides a less detailed or limited description or rationale for these criteria; no, little 
or no information is provided to be able to assess these criteria adequately. (2) Sincerity: yes, a good degree of 
researchers’ reflexivity regarding their own biases, values and inclinations that can influence the research and a 
degree of transparency about the method and challenges is provided; moderate, the study provides less detailed 
description of these criteria but does address some issues relating to researcher assumptions and identified 
challenges; no, little or no information is provided to be able to assess these criteria adequately. (3) Credibility: yes, 
the research findings appear credible, given the methodologies utilised and the depth of analysis described; 
moderate, findings may be credible but weakened by superficial or less clear analysis and description; no, little or 
no information is provided to be able to assess these criteria adequately. (4) Significant contribution and resonance: 
yes, the research provides important and significant insights regarding motivations for setting deliberate fires and 
has practical or theoretical utility; moderate, the research provides some insights but is less detailed or has less 
applicability; no, little or no information is provided to be able to assess these criteria adequately. (5) Ethical clarity: 
yes, ethical procedures are described clearly and the authors acknowledge the impact of broader ethical issues in 
relation the research; moderate, ethical procedures are detailed less clearly or consideration of broader ethical issues 
is limited; no, little or no information is provided to be able to assess these criteria adequately. (6) Meaningful 
coherence: yes, the research utilises appropriate theory and methods to achieve stated aims; moderate, the research 
utilises methods that are generally appropriate but which may inhibit or fail to address some aims; no, little or no 
information is provided to be able to assess these criteria adequately. 
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The majority of studies demonstrated a poor level of ‘sincerity’ (which describes a degree 
of researchers’ reflexivity regarding their own biases, values and inclinations that can 
influence the research, as well as a degree of transparency about the method and 
associated challenges). Three studies demonstrated a moderate level of ‘sincerity’ as they 
were transparent about the challenges encountered while conducting the research and 
recognising its limitations (Barnoux et al., 2015; Kolko & Kazdin, 1994; Walsh & 
Lambie, 2013). 
Five studies (Coid et al., 1999; Kolko & Kazdin, 1994; Perrin-Wallqvist & Norlander, 
2003; Rix, 1994; Swaffer & Hollin, 1995) demonstrated some level of ‘credibility’, which 
refers to the trustworthiness and plausibility of the research findings, in relation to the 
method and detail of analysis used in the study. The main limitation across these studies 
was a lack of description as to how the data was analysed. Two papers were considered 
to demonstrate a good level of ‘credibility’ (Barnoux et al., 2015; Walsh & Lambie, 
2013). 
 
All studies were thought to have made a ‘significant contribution’ to the research topic 
by providing data that extended knowledge about the motivations for firesetting (which 
can be utilised in treatment planning and risk assessment). Only two papers achieved a 
‘moderate’ level of ‘ethical clarity’ (Perrin-Wallqvist & Norlander, 2003; Walsh & 
Lambie, 2013), by including ethical considerations during the recruitment process. The 
remaining papers did not describe any ethical consideration in regards to how the research 
was conducted.  
 
The majority of studies achieved an adequate level of ‘meaningful coherence’ by 
employing suitable theory, methods, and procedures to address their research aim(s). 
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Coid, Wilkins, and Coid‘s (1999) paper was, however, particularly limited in this regard, 
as their research was not underpinned by any relevant theoretical perspective.      
Key findings  
The studies included in this review appeared to be focused on very distinctive groups of 
firesetters, which can be described as: adult firesetters (un-apprehended and apprehended) 
and juvenile firesetters. Within ‘the adult apprehended’ category, a distinct subgroup of 
studies that focused solely on firesetters with intellectual disabilities was also identified. 
The findings for the identified groups will be reported separately and then 
compared/contrasted in a further section of the review. 
Adult Firesetters 
Ten studies reported data gathered from adult firesetters in total. The aim of two of these 
studies was to explore the motivational aspects of firesetting (Murphy & Clare, 1996; 
Perrin-Wallqvist & Norlander, 2003), the remaining eight reported motivational aspects 
of firesetting as a part of their research. Two distinct groups of adult firesetters became 
apparent during this review: un-apprehended firesetters (Barrowcliffe & Gannon, 2015; 
Barrowcliffe & Gannon, 2016; Gannon & Barrowcliffe, 2012; Perrin-Wallqvist & 
Norlander, 2003) and apprehended firesetters (Barnoux et al., 2015; Clare et al., 1992; 
Coid et al., 1999; Murphy & Clare, 1996; Rix, 1994; Taylor et al., 2006). 
Un-apprehended firesetters. After analysing data provided by Barrowcliffe and Gannon 
(2012, 2015, 2016) it became apparent that the motivations most frequently reported by 
firesetters were ‘excitement/being bored’ and ‘curiosity/experimentation’. The summary 
of how frequently the reported motivations were mentioned across the four studies (‘the 
frequency analysis’) is presented in table 4. Perrin-Wallqvist and Norlander’s (2003) 
paper only reported frequencies provided by female participants and, therefore, only 
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female samples have been included in ‘the frequency analysis’. However, the motivations 
reported by male participants in that study were consistent with those reported in table 4. 
 
Table 4. Motivations reported by un-apprehended firesetters (N = 96) 
Motivation Frequency of reporting 
 (n, %)  
Excitement/feeling bored 66    (68.75 %) 
Curiosity/experimentation                   36          (37.5 %) 
Love for fire         12                  (12.5 %) 
Prank/dare/joke 11   (11.46 %) 
Vandalism 5                                (5.21 %)
Peer pressure/going along with others 4                                (4.17 %)
Amusement  4                                (4.17 %)
‘bizarre’ (means of expression, source of power and 
escape of reality) 
4                                (4.17 %)
Problems at home/school 3                                (3.13%)
Being stressed/frustrated 2                                 (2.08 %)
To express feelings 2                                 (2.08 %)
To destroy evidence/cover up crime 2                               (2.08 %)
To rebel                    1           (1.04 %) 
For protection 1                              (1.04 %)
Financial gain 1                                 (1.04 %)
Note: some participants provided more than one motivation, hence ‘n’s will not add 
up to ‘N’. 
 
It is worth noting that in Perrin-Wallqvist and Norlander’s (2003) paper, adult participants 
were specifically asked about the motivations for firesetting in their childhood. It appears 
that most of the participants in all four studies were referring to childhood firesetting 
behaviour, which may explain the similarities. 
Apprehended firesetters. While analysing the group of studies concentrating on 
apprehended firesetters, it became apparent that some of the studies concentrated purely 
on firesetters with intellectual disability (Clare et al., 1992; Murphy & Clare, 1996; Taylor 
et al., 2006). However, others did not report the level of participants’ cognitive 
functioning, or they merged the data elicited from firesetters diagnosed with ID with data 
provided by firesetters without diagnosis of ID (Barnoux et al., 2015; Coid et al., 1999; 
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Rix, 1994). There were also significant differences in methodology used to gather the 
data between those studies, thus, the key findings from those studies will be discussed 
separately. 
Firesetters with Intellectual Disabilities. All three studies that focused on firesetters with 
ID (Clare et al., 1992; Murphy & Clare, 1996; Taylor et al., 2006) used questionnaires to 
elicit cognitions/feelings prior to and after the event of firesetting. The elicited 
feelings/cognitions were interpreted by authors as ‘motives’ for firesetting. The 
questionnaires used in the studies were purposely developed with the intention of 
analysing the function of the firesetting in the lives of people with ID (Murphy & Clare, 
1996). The questionnaire responses indicate that ‘feeling of anger’, ‘low social 
attention/not being listened to’, and ‘feeling sad/depressed’ are the most frequent 
events/feelings/cognitions prior to firesetting behaviour6.  In terms of 
events/feelings/cognitions following the firesetting, the participants most frequently 
reported that they were ‘feeling less angry’ and ‘feeling attended to/listened to’.  
Murphy and Clare (1996) reported that participants were less able to recall the 
events/feelings/cognitions following the firesetting. It has been suggested that this may 
be caused by potential difficulties in processing the cognitions and emotions they 
experience after firesetting incident(s). 
Apprehended firesetters (data elicited from firesetters with and without ID merged). The 
findings of three papers indicated that the revenge was the most frequently cited 
motivation by this group of firesetters (Barnoux et al., 2015; Coid et al., 1999; Rix, 1994). 
The frequency of reported motivations for firesetting provided by this group is presented 
in table 5.  
                                            
6 The ‘frequency analysis’ cannot be performed here as the reporting of the findings across the studies is 
inconsistent (mean ratings vs frequencies). 
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In all three studies (Barnoux et al., 2015; Coid et al., 1999; Rix, 1994) participants were 
interviewed and raw data was organised into categories of motivations (e.g. revenge). Rix 
(1994) provided a very good description of categories, with examples included, and the 
majority of the categories provided by Barnoux et al. (2015) were also adequately 
described. The information provided in Coid et al.’s (1999) paper was much more limited 
in this respect, even though motivations listed as ‘pre-planned’ or ‘displaced aggression’ 
would benefit from explanation.
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Findings provided by Barnoux et al. (2015) and Coid et al. (1999) indicate that anger, 
fear/anxiety, frustration and dysphoria were the most frequently experienced emotions by 
firesetters prior to setting fires.  
Female participants interviewed by Coid et al. (1999) reported that the distressing 
symptoms (e.g. anxiety, anger) were often progressively intensifying and culminating in 
firesetting behaviour.  
 
                                            
7 Data elicited from firesetters with and without ID are merged 
Table 5. Motivations reported by apprehended firesetters7 (N = 216) 
Motivation Frequency of reporting 
(n, %) 
Revenge 69  (31.94 %) 
Excitement  26  (12.04 %) 
Displaced aggression 20 (9.26 %) 
Reduction of distressing symptoms (depression, 
anxiety etc.) 
18 (8.33 %) 
Cry for help/attention 14 (6.48 %) 
Attempted suicide 13 (6.01 %) 
Vandalism 13 (6.01 %) 
Cover up 12 (5.55 %) 
Carelessness/accidental 11 (5.09 %) 
Re-housing 10 (4.62 %) 
Economic gain 9 (4.16 %) 
Psychotic 8 (3.70 %) 
Pre-planned 8 (3.70 %) 
Power  6 (2.77 %) 
Protest 6 (2.77 %) 
Other manipulative  6 (2.77 %) 
Heroism (wanting to be seen as a hero) 6 (2.77 %) 
Escape  5 (2.31 %) 
Protection 3 (1.38 %) 
Proxy (on behalf of others) 3 (1.38 %) 
Communication 2 (0.92 %) 
Murder 2 (0.92 %) 
Political 2 (0.92 %) 
Note: some participant provided more than one motivation, hence ‘ns’ will not add up 
to ‘N’; 
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Juvenile firesetters 
Three papers included in this review focused on juveniles who set deliberate fires (Kolko 
& Kazdin, 1994; Swaffer & Hollin, 1995; Walsh & Lambie, 2013). All three studies used 
interviews to elicit data from participants.  
Swaffer and Hollin (1995) and Walsh and Lambie (2013) used Grounded Theory 
(Glasser, 1967) to analyse the data but reported their findings in very different ways. 
Swaffer and Hollin (1995) derived six motivational themes from data provided by 
participants: revenge, crime concealment, self-injury, peer group pressure, 
denial/accidental, and fascination. In contrast, Walsh and Lambie (2013) identified 
themes that included anger (the most prominent motivation), attention, boredom, 
experimenting, peer influence, and fascination. 
juveniles interviewed in Kolko and Kazdin’s (1994) study reported fun/playing 
around/just wanted to, no reason, curiosity/experimentation, non-interpersonal effects 
and anger/ manipulation as primary motivations. It is worth noting that juveniles 
interviewed in this study represent the youngest group of participants across all three 
papers, which may have contributed to their difficulties in providing motivations for 
firesetting behaviour. 
Discussion 
This review explored the motivations for firesetting provided by juvenile and adult 
firesetters. The analysed data is comprised of a wide range of firesetters’ characteristics, 
e.g. age, cognitive ability, gender, and legal status (apprehended vs. un-apprehended). 
The findings suggest that firesetters are a very heterogeneous group, with differences in 
the motivations for firesetting between and within subgroups (e.g. adults, children).  
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A lack of a clear definition of motivation was a limitation for most of the reviewed papers. 
Only two studies anchored their understanding of motivation within a theoretical 
framework (Murphy & Clare, 1996; Taylor et al., 2006; Barnoux et al., 2015), developing 
a new conceptualisation of motivation in relation to firesetting behaviour. The lack of a 
clear definition of the researched concepts decreases the validity of the studies, making it 
more difficult to replicate the results and thus to generalise the findings. There are many 
different ways that motivations for firesetting were discussed in the studies included in 
this review. Some studies focused more on emotional and cognitive aspects (Perrin-
Wallqvist & Norlander, 2003; Taylor et al., 2006) and others provided more descriptive 
categories (e.g. crime concealment, e.g. Rix, 1994). Although from a legal point of view 
it is important to establish, for instance, whether the fire was set to conceal the crime or 
to commit insurance fraud, it may be more clinically relevant to establish what emotions, 
feelings, and cognitions are experienced by firesetters pre- and post-firesetting, as this 
information can contribute to the further development of the treatment programs and risk 
assessments. 
The motivations for firesetting provided by juveniles varied significantly, which may be 
explained by many different factors including: age, setting, and method of data analysis. 
Juveniles participating in Kolko and Kazdin’s (1994) study were the youngest sample 
(average age 9.5 years) and the motives provided by them were the least specific (e.g. 
‘just wanted to’). This sample was also recruited from many different settings (e.g. 
outpatient, inpatient, community), which could potentially produce a different result from 
a sample recruited from a single setting. In contrast, the average age of the sample 
interviewed by Swaffer and Hollin (1995) was 16.09 years and all participants were 
residing in the Youth Treatment Service (YTS, secure accommodation for young people 
in UK, Swaffer and Hollin, 1995), and the motivations provided by this group differed 
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significantly from the motivations reported by participants in Kolko and Kazdin’s (1994) 
study. This may be related not only to the age of the participants but also the fact that the 
juveniles participating in Swaffer and Hollin (1995) study were considered to be ‘the most 
disturbed and difficult adolescents in the United Kingdom’ (Swatter & Hollin, 1995, 
p.620) which suggest that the groups may have been differing in relation to other 
characteristics. It is worth noting that even though Swaffer and Hollin (1995) and Walsh 
and Lambie (2013) utilised the same methodology for analysing data, the themes they 
identified within data were very different, which can be attributed to sample 
characteristics and/or researcher biases, which neither of the studies discussed.  
The similar discrepancies in reported motivations were found in the adult sample. It has 
been identified that there are vast differences in reporting motivations provided by adult 
firesetters, where the main discrepancies seem to be related to factors like cognitive 
functioning and the legal status of participants. The motivations reported by un-
apprehended firesetters seem to differ from those reported by apprehended firesetters; one 
of the most striking differences being an absence of ‘revenge’ as a motive reported by un-
apprehended firesetters (revenge is the most frequent motivation cited by apprehended 
firesetters). It is suggested that ‘revenge firesetting’ is more likely to cause significant 
damage to the targeted person or object, thus attracting the attention of the police 
(Barrowcliffe & Gannon, 2016).   
Most of the un-apprehended adult firesetters reported engaging in firesetting behaviour 
in childhood/adolescence (Barrowcliffe & Gannon, 2015; Barrowcliffe & Gannon, 2016; 
Gannon & Barrowcliffe, 2012). Barrowcliffe & Gannon (2016) found that the ‘boredom’ 
was mostly associate with juvenile firesetting, which has an important clinical 
implications (e.g. more opportunity for children to engage in interesting meaningful 
activities may decrease the likelihood that they will set fire). In their paper Perrin-
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Wallgvist and Norlander (2003) specifically asked young adults about their motivations 
to set fire in childhood, and the most prominent motivations provided by participants 
match the ones that were found in studies conducted by Barrowcliffe and Gannon (2012, 
2015, 2016), which may suggest that most of the motivations provided by participants in 
those studies were related to juvenile firesetting.  
It is important to note, most of the studies included in this review do not specify the 
firesetting incidents reported by adult participants were set in adulthood or 
childhood/adolescence, and how long ago they took place, which can increase a recall 
bias.  
In this review there were three studies (Clare et al., 1992; Murphy & Clare, 1996; Taylor 
et al., 2006) that were focusing solely on adult apprehended firesetters with intellectual 
disability, and suggested that firesetters with ID are distinct group of offenders. 
Motivational factors explored in those studies were rooted in behavioural tradition and 
based on functional analysis. Participants in those studies completed a purposely 
developed questionnaire8 which pre-determined the motivational categories on basis of 
previous research (Murphy and Clare, 1996). Utilising a consistent data gathering method 
produced consistent findings across the studies, and made the potential replication of the 
studies easier. However, it may restrict researchers’ abilities to explore other new areas 
that might require more unique methodologies.  
In light of the evidence that firesetters with ID may form a distinct group of offenders 
(Murphy and Clare, 1996), it is important to consider that the findings of the studies that 
analyse data elicited from firesetters with and without ID together may be subject to 
sampling biases and should be generalised with caution.  
                                            
8 Items covered and structure of the FAI, the FAS and the FSAS are the same.   
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Due to the reported heterogeneity within both the juvenile and the adult groups of 
firesetters, it is difficult to conclude whether their motivations differ significantly. The 
motivations reported by un-apprehended adult firesetters seem to be similar to those 
reported by juveniles, with the exception of the findings reported by Swaffer and Hollin 
(1995). The findings reported by Swaffer and Hollin (1995) are fitting better with 
motivations reported by adult apprehended firesetters (Coid et al. 1999, Rix, 1994), which 
suggests that the ‘legal status’ of participants may be an important factor when the 
motivation for firesetting is considered. 
 
 
Limitations 
This review provides a systematic overview of current research regarding motivations for 
firesetting reported by child and adult firesetters. The current review and the research 
papers included do have a number of limitations, which will be briefly discussed in this 
section.  
First limitation of this review would be the fact that in order to ensure a basic quality 
standards of review papers only academic peer-reviewed articles were included, the 
unpublished and non-peers reviewed research papers were excluded. However, 
considering the limited research in this area and the biases associated with publication 
process, it may be useful to include unpublished papers (‘grey literature’) to make the 
finding of future reviews more comprehensive.  
Secondly, the papers included in this review were selected only by the primary author, 
which can result in various biases, including subjective biases at stage of studies selection 
and biases related to assessing quality of the included papers. 
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Thirdly, the definition of ‘juvenile firesetter’ adapted for propose of this review was very 
broad, thus potential differences in motivations for firesetting reported by young children 
and adolescents may have been neglected.  
And finally, it has been recognised that the quality of the studies included in this review 
vary significantly, especially when level of sincerity of qualitative studies is considered. 
A lack of reflexivity, transparency, and methodological clarity decrease the credibility of 
the findings, which makes drawing conclusion based on those findings more difficult. 
The considerable differences in methodology employed by quantitative studies made it 
more challenging to synthesise and compare the data. A lack of clear definition of 
motivations was also identified as limitation across the studies, as lack of construct 
validity make it difficult to assess whether different studies are measuring/exploring the 
same concept. 
Further reviews on this topic would also benefit from directly comparing and contrasting 
the motivations reported by various groups of firesetters identified in this review.
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Abstract 
Psychological flexibility (PF) has been identified as an important process in promoting 
therapeutic change and it is currently mostly associated with Acceptance and 
Commitment Therapy (ACT; Hayes, Strosahl, & Wilson, 1999). The primary aims of this 
study were (1) to examine whether PF processes can be detected in client talk during 
therapy that does not overtly target PF as a change process; and (2) to examine whether 
changes in detected levels of PF are related to clinical outcomes. A coding framework 
was developed to capture the PF processes in participants’ talk, and a panel of judges 
made predictions about the therapy outcomes based on the analysed data. Results showed 
that the PF process can be reliably identified in the talk of participants who engaged in 
Cognitive Behavioural Therapy (CBT). It is unclear, however, whether accurate outcome 
predictions can be made based on the identified patterns of PF. The complexity and 
challenges associated with researching change processes in therapy are highlighted in this 
study. Findings provide a platform for future research into the role of PF in facilitating 
psychotherapeutic change. 
Keywords: psychological flexibility, psychotherapeutic change processes, CBT, ACT 
Declarations of interest: none
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Introduction 
According to the Global Burden of Disease (Institute for Health Metrics and 
Evaluation [IHME], 2013) report, mental health difficulties account for 21.2% of years 
lived with disability worldwide and have a significant impact on length and quality of 
life. Currently, there are a plethora of psychological treatments available to support 
people who experience poor mental health, and there is a large body of research 
supporting the notion that a number of well-established treatments produce similar 
outcomes, across different presentations and populations10 (Leichsenring & Rabung, 
2008; Tschacher, Junghan, & Pfammatter, 2014; Wampold et al., 1997). New 
psychological treatments which proclaim to offer novel approaches to therapy continue 
to be created but their founders frequently fail to clearly explain the mechanism of change 
that makes the therapy successful (Grawe, 1997; Villatte et al., 2016). It has been argued 
that gaining better understanding of the change processes that underlie successful 
treatments could be the first step to bring order and parsimony to the current status of 
treatment proliferation (Kazdin, 2006). Furthermore, it has been argued that integrating 
the processes that are considered to facilitate change across different therapies into a 
modular treatment approach could be advantageous for optimising successful treatments 
(Kazdin, 2007; Hayes, Villatte, Levin, & Hildebrandt, 2011) and could potentially reduce 
the likelihood of introducing new therapy approaches which actually are just ‘re-
packaging’ of well-known principles (Johansson & Høglend, 2007; Rosen & Davison, 
2003).  
It has been noted, however, that establishing which processes lead to therapeutic 
change is difficult due to factors such as poor operationalisation of proposed change 
                                            
10 Please see sections from 1.1 to 1.3 of extended paper for extended background on mental health 
prevalence, aetiology and treatment. 
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processes and a lack of clarity about adequate methods of analysis (Flückiger, Del Re, 
Wampold, & Horvath, 2018;  Lampropoulos, 2000). Additionally, most research that has 
investigated therapy outcomes has failed to demonstrate the temporal relationship 
between change processes and outcomes, meaning that it is difficult to conclude with any 
certainty about causality (Kazdin, 2007).  
A number of prominent authors have suggested that ‘common factors’11, such as 
‘working alliance’ (Bordin, 1979), can be identified across most empirically-supported 
interventions and account for improved therapy outcomes (Hubble, Duncan, & Miller, 
1999; Villatte et al., 2016; Wampold, 2001). In many therapies, however, common factors 
have been acknowledged as ‘important but not sufficient’ change factors (Westbrook, 
Kirk, & Kennerley, 2011), and it is understood that other ‘active ingredients’ of therapy 
are crucial in achieving therapeutic change (Chambless & Ollendick, 2001). 
Different psychotherapeutic approaches offer different models of understanding 
symptoms of mental ill-health and, therefore, different means of addressing these. For 
example, one of the most commonly recommended therapies (Moloney, & Kelley, 2004), 
Cognitive Behavioural Therapy (CBT)12, proposes that not the events themselves, but a 
person’s appraisal of these events leads to distress. Consequently, CBT aims to alter the 
client’s cognitive processes and/or behavioural responses in order to reduce distress 
(Beck, 2011). The last few decades has seen an increase in the use of ‘acceptance and 
mindfulness-based therapies’, which focus on helping people to ‘live well’ despite 
experiencing psychological difficulties (Hayes, Luoma, Bond, Masuda, & Lillis, 2006). 
These new treatment approaches emphasise the role of experiential avoidance in human 
psychological suffering (Hayes, Wilson, Gifford, Follette, & Strosahl, 1996; Linehan, 
                                            
11 Please see section 1.4 of extended paper for a discussion on common factors. 
12 Please see section 1.7 of extended paper for a discussion on therapy approaches relevant to this study  
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1993). Experiential avoidance  can be defined as ‘the attempt to alter the form, frequency, 
or intensity of private experiences, such as thoughts, feelings, bodily sensations or 
memories, even when doing so is costly, ineffective or unnecessary’ (Hayes, Levin, 
Plumb-Vilardaga, Villatte, & Pistorello, 2013, p.184). It has been hypothesised that 
engaging in avoidant behaviour leads to reduction in personally meaningful pursuits and, 
consequently, decreases a person’s quality of life. In order to address this problem, 
acceptance and mindfulness interventions aim to increase psychological flexibility and 
facilitate a broader behavioural repertoire, in order to ultimately improve clients’ quality 
of life (Hayes et al., 2006).  
Psychological Flexibility13 
Psychological flexibility (PF) has been considered to be an important ingredient 
of good psychological health for around five decades (Gloster, Meyer, & Lieb, 2017), and 
many components of PF are shared by traditional and modern contextual therapies (Arch 
& Craske, 2008; Hayes et al., 2011), as well as with existential, humanistic and analytic 
approaches (Levin, Hildebrandt, Lillis, & Hayes, 2012). After reviewing relevant 
literature in this area, Kashdan and Rottenberg (2010) concluded that PF predominantly 
refers to a number of dynamic processes which determine a person’s interactions with 
their environment.  
For the purpose of this research, the model of PF associated with Acceptance and 
Commitment Therapy14 (ACT; Hayes, et al., 1999) has been adopted. From the ACT 
perspective, PF is defined as ‘the ability to contact the present moment more fully as a 
conscious human being, and to change or persist in behaviour when doing so serves 
valued ends’ (Hayes, et al., 2006, p. 7). Within ACT, PF consists of six interlinked 
                                            
13 Please see section 1.5 of extended paper for further details on psychological flexibility.  
14 See section 1.7.2 of extended paper for discussion about ACT 
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processes (see Figure 2 and Table 9’), which can be further pragmatically considered as 
three dyadic processes: (1) ‘openness to experience and detachment from literality’ 
(acceptance; defusion); (2) ‘self-awareness and perspective taking’ (present moment 
awareness; self-as-context); and (3) ‘motivation and activation’ (values; committed 
action) (Hayes et al., 2011).  
OPENNESS TO 
EXPERIENCE AND 
DETACHMENT FROM 
REALITY 
SELF-AWARENESS 
AND PERSPECTIVE 
TAKING 
MOTIVATION AND 
ACTIVATION 
  
It has been suggested that PF allows people to accept unwanted private experiences 
by adopting a non-judgmental stance and treating these experiences for what they are – 
just experiences, not ‘truths’ (Ciarrochi, Robb, & Godsell, 2005; Hayes et al., 1999).  
Each PF process can be conceptualised as ‘a positive psychological skill’, which, when 
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mastered, helps individuals to move from being psychologically inflexible towards being 
psychologically flexible. Consequently, it is proposed that psychologically flexible 
individual are less likely to engage in avoidant behaviours when faced with distressing 
private events and are more likely to act in adherence to their values (Hayes et al., 1999; 
Twohig, Vilardaga, Levin, & Hayes, 2015).  
All six core PF processes are strongly interlinked and aim to target six problems 
associated with psychological inflexibility (PI; Figure 3.). PI has been defined as ‘an 
inability to persist or change behaviour in the service of long-term valued ends’ (Hayes 
et al., 2006, p.6) and is a result of engaging in experiential avoidance and cognitive fusion.
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Acceptance and Commitment Therapy 
Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT) has been defined as ‘a therapy 
approach that uses acceptance and mindfulness processes, and commitment and 
behavioural change processes, to produce greater psychological flexibility’ (Hayes, 
Strosahl, Bunting, Twohig, & Wilson, 2004, p.13). ACT therapists focus on helping 
people to ‘live well’ by altering how they relate to their experiences, focusing on altering 
the context, not the content, of private experiences (Hayes et al., 1999). Consequently, 
the aim of ACT is not to reduce symptoms of distress but to increase clients’ PF and help 
them to live well despite experiencing distressing private events. In ACT, all 
psychological events are considered ‘ongoing actions of the whole organism interacting 
in and with historically and situationally defined contexts’ (Hayes et al., 2006, p. 4), and 
the unit of analysis is ‘behaviour in context’ (Biglan & Hayes, 1996).15 
There is a growing body of evidence that suggests that ACT is effective in treating 
multiple disorders16, such as anxiety, depression, addictions (A-Tjak et al., 2016), eating 
disorders (Juarascio et al., 2013), aggression (Zarling, Lawrence, & Marchman, 2014), 
and Chronic Fatigue Syndrome (Roche, Dawson, Moghaddam, Abey, & Gresswell, 
2017). The aforementioned research findings suggest that processes underpinning PF are 
important factors in generating therapeutic change in clients who undertake ACT, despite 
the variety of presenting difficulties.  
Rationale for the Current Study  
It has been noted that, in most ACT studies, purposively developed self-report 
questionnaires, such as the Comprehensive Assessment of Acceptance and Commitment 
                                            
15 This approach is consistent with the epistemological position of ACT founders and adopted in this 
study, which is discussed in 2.1 section of the extended paper.   
16 Please see section 1.8 of extended paper for discussion on effectiveness of ACT. 
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Therapy processes (CompACT; Francis, Dawson, & Golijani-Moghaddam, 2016) or the 
Acceptance and Action Questionnaire (AAQ-II; Bond et al., 2011), were used to measure 
changes in PF. Consequently, it could be argued that, in these studies, clients’ 
socialisation to the model, rather than real change in PF, were assessed.                                             
Given the abovementioned limitations associated with using PF self-report 
measures in psychotherapy process research (Doss, 2004), it has been suggested that 
observational methods may allow for a more reliable assessment of  processes which are 
assumed to account for successful treatment outcomes (Hesser, Westin, Hayes, & 
Andersson, 2009). Previous studies have demonstrated that client talk during sessions is 
related to treatment outcomes (Amrhein, Miller, Yahne, Palmer, & Fulcher, 2003; Tang, 
DeRubeis, Beberman, & Pham, 2005) and, therefore, may be a valuable source of 
information regarding the therapeutic process. 
The evidence suggests that PF is a transdiagnotic process, meaning that an increase 
in PF is associated with a reduction of distress across a range of diagnoses. It is less clear, 
however, whether the PF process is also trans-theoretical, meaning that it is unclear 
whether other successful therapies, such as CBT, also operate through the process of PF. 
Therefore, the primary aims of this study were (1) to examine whether PF processes 
can be detected in client talk during therapy that does not overtly target PF as a change 
process (CBT) and (2) to examine whether changes in detected levels of PF are related to 
clients’ clinical outcomes. 
In order to not bias the coding process, all coders were blind to the clinical outcomes 
of participants until all coding was completed (see Procedure Section for further details). 
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Method17 
Data 
  Data used in this study were therapy recordings and outcome measures collected 
as part of a separate research project in which eight sessions of CBT were delivered to 
participants with complex presentations. The therapist delivering the intervention was a 
final-year trainee clinical psychologist. In order to assess treatment fidelity, the Cognitive 
Therapy Rating Scale (CTRS; Young & Beck, 1980) was completed by the therapist 
whilst listening back to audio recordings for each session. A co-researcher rated 12% of 
all delivered sessions (one full session per client), and overall inter-rater reliability for the 
CTRS and frequency of process formulations was α = .88. 
Consent for data to be used for secondary analysis was given by three participants. 
Recordings of the second, fourth and last therapy sessions for each participant were 
transcribed (490 minutes in total) and subsequently coded by the principal researcher (see 
‘Procedure’ for more details). NVIVO software was used to aid analysis of the transcribed 
data. 
Participants18 
Participants were recruited from two adult community mental health teams in the 
UK. Participant’s demographics are outlined in Table 6. 
 
 
                                            
17 Please see section 2 of extended paper for further details on methodology 
18 Please see section 2.4 of extended paper for further details on participants demographics  
Table 6. Participant demographics   
Participant Gender Age Diagnosis Therapy Focus 
1 Female 35 EUPD Low Mood 
2 Female 61 Bipolar Disorder Low Mood 
3 Female 39 EUPD Low Mood 
Note. EUPD = Emotionally Unstable Personality Disorder  
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Outcome Measures 
Outcome measures completed by participants in the original19 study are outlined 
in Table 7.
                                            
19 Phrases ‘original study’ or ‘original data’ refer to the research project where the data were sourced 
from. 
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Table 7. Outcome measures: Characteristics and Psychometric Properties 
Measure Aim 
No. of items and 
scaling 
Example item 
Directionality 
and Scoring 
Reliability 
(IC and TR) 
Validity 
 
Patient Reported 
Outcomes 
Measurement 
Information System 
- Short Form (8b) 
Measure (PROMIS 
Depression; Cella et 
al., 2010)  
 
Assesses 
affective and 
cognitive 
aspects of 
depression. 
 
8 items 
5-point Likert 
scale (1-5) 
 
In the past 7 
days…I felt like 
a failure. 
 
Scores 
transformed into 
T-scores. 
Higher scores 
indicate higher 
levels of 
depression. 
 
IC 
α = .90 
(Vilagut et al., 
2015). 
 
Good convergent 
validity with 
related emotions. 
 
Able to 
discriminate 
between 
depression and 
other co-
morbidities. 
(Vilagut et al., 
2015). 
 
 
Clinical Outcomes 
in Research 
Evaluation – 
Outcome 
Measurement 
(CORE-OM; Evans 
et al., 2000)  
 
Assesses 
therapeutic 
outcomes across 
four dimensions 
(functioning, 
problems/sympt
oms, wellbeing 
and risk) 
 
34 items 
(4 subscales) 
6-point Likert 
scale (0-5) 
 
“I have felt able 
to cope when 
things go 
wrong”. 
 
Scores 
calculated as 
averages 
multiplied by 
10. 
Higher scores 
indicate higher 
levels of mental 
health 
difficulties. 
Range: 0-10 
 
IC 
α = .91 
(Connell et al., 
2007) 
TR 
r = .91 (Connell 
et al., 2007) 
 
Good 
convergent 
validity, 
subscales highly 
correlated with 
related 
measures. 
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Measure Aim 
No. of items and 
scaling 
Example item 
Directionality 
and Scoring 
Reliability 
(IC and TR) 
Validity 
 
Mental Health 
Continuum – Short 
Form (MHC-SF; 
Keyes, 2002)  
 
Assesses 
wellbeing. 
Consists of three 
dimensions: 
emotional, 
psychological 
and social 
wellbeing. 
 
14 items 
(3 subscales) 
6-point Likert 
scale (0-5) 
 
“During the past 
week, how often 
did you feel… 
that you had 
something 
important to 
contribute to 
society”. 
 
Scores 
calculated as 
averages. 
Higher scores 
indicate an 
improved 
wellbeing. 
 
 
IC 
α = .92 
(Keyes et al., 
2012) 
TR 
r = .68 
(Lamers et al., 
2011) 
 
Good 
convergent 
validity, 
subscales 
correlate with 
related 
measures. 
Good 
discriminant 
validity with 
two-continuum 
model of mental 
health. 
Note. IC = Internal Consistency; TR = Test-Retest 
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Procedure 
Ethics. This study was approved by the University of Lincoln, School of 
Psychology Research Ethics Committee (SOPREC)20. 
 
Development of the coding framework. An extensive review of ACT literature was 
conducted to gain a comprehensive theoretical understanding of all six PF core 
processes. The initial reading list consisted of literature recommended by facilitators of 
an ACT workshop, followed by discussions with co-researchers and internet database 
searches (e.g. Google Scholar and EBSCO). Reviewed literature included publications 
explaining theoretical and philosophical underpinnings of PF (e.g. Biglan & Hayes, 
1996; Hayes et al., 2006) and journal articles reporting PF-related research findings 
(e.g. Ciarrochi, Bilich, & Godsell, 2010; Hesser, et al., 2009; Twohig et al., 2015). The 
coding framework utilised in this study (Table 9) was adapted from a categorisation 
framework developed by Levin et al. (2012). The current study adapted the framework 
by focusing solely on participants' talk (see Table 8). Further changes were made to 
ensure the framework would allow coders to consider both PF and PI processes in 
participant talk (Table 9). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
20 See Appendices B, C and D for documentation related to ethical approval  
Table 8. Example of Adaptation for Current Study. 
Levin et al. (2012) Current Study 
ACCEPTANCE 
(a) instructing participants to sit with, lean 
into or otherwise relate to difficult 
thoughts and feelings in an accepting 
way; 
(b) discussing how to practice acceptance;  
(c) discussing and/or helping participants 
notice the negative effects of suppression, 
avoidance or otherwise controlling one's 
thoughts and feelings;  
(d) explicitly targeting letting go of 
unhelpful experiential avoidance 
strategies. 
a) participants mentioning that they were 
relating to difficult experiences (including 
thoughts and feelings) in an accepting/non-
accepting way;  
(b) discussing ability (or lack of ability) to 
practice acceptance;  
(c) discussing the consequences of suppressing, 
avoiding or otherwise attempting to control 
thoughts and feelings; 
(d) discussing different ways of reducing the 
frequency of engaging in unhelpful experiential 
avoidance strategies.  
 
Page 81 of 203 
 
Table 9. Coding Framework 
PSYCHOLOGICAL FLEXIBILITY  PSYCHOLOGICAL INFLEXIBILITY  
ACCEPTANCE DOMAIN 
Acceptance Experiential Avoidance 
‘…involves a willingness to experience those distressing emotions 
and experiences that are encountered in the process of behaving 
consistently in one’s values’ (Flaxman, Blackledge, & Bond, 
2011, p.21). 
‘All attempts to reduce or avoid aversive private experiences in the form 
of thoughts, images, physiological sensations and emotions’ (Hayes et 
al., 1999). 
Coding criteria 
(a) participants mentioning that they were relating to difficult experiences (including thoughts and feelings) in an accepting/non-accepting way;  
(b) discussing ability (or lack of) to practice acceptance;  
(c) discussing the consequences of suppressing, avoiding or otherwise attempting to control thoughts and feelings; 
(d) discussing the ways of reducing the frequency of engaging in unhelpful experiential avoidance strategies. 
COGNITIVE DEFUSION DOMAIN  
Cognitive Defusion Cognitive Fusion 
Altering the function of thoughts and feelings by adapting their 
verbal functions (Hayes et al., 2006). 
‘Verbal dominance over behavioural regulation… pervasiveness of 
literal, reason-giving, problem-solving and evaluative contexts sustained 
by natural language communities’ (Hayes et al., 2013, p.183). 
Coding criteria 
(a) participants relating to their thoughts in a nonliteral way (e.g. seeing thought as just a thought, saying the thought in a funny voice); 
(b) participants noticing when they were judgmental and actively ‘letting it go’; 
(c) participants displaying cognitive fusion by relating to their thoughts and feelings in literal/reason-giving way. 
PRESENT-MOMENT AWARENESS DOMAIN  
Present-Moment Awareness  Lack of present-moment awareness  
Non-judgemental, voluntary and flexible focus on 
experiences in the moment (Hayes et al., 2006). 
‘Loss of flexible contact with the present’ (Hayes et al., 2013, p.184) 
Coding criteria 
(a) Participants making statements which suggest that they are/were paying attention/not paying attention to their bodily sensations, thoughts, feelings 
and/or other internal experiences in the present moment;  
(b) Participants reporting being on ‘autopilot’, not paying attention while doing things that were important to them. 
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SELF-AS-CONTEXT DOMAIN  
Self-as-Context  Attachment to the Conceptualised Self (Self-as-Story) 
Considering the self as more than thoughts, feelings and physical 
sensations, and being receptive to experiencing changing emotions 
(Hayes et al., 2006) 
Considering self as being a ‘finished product’, unconnected from the 
flow of current experience and being insensitive to context (Atkins & 
Styles, 2016). 
Coding criteria 
(a) participants talking about themselves as though they were observing themselves from a different perspective; 
(b) participants describing aspect or qualities of self that were rigid and evaluative and were relatively insensitive to change in context. 
VALUES DOMAIN  
Values Lack of Values Clarity 
‘… verbal statements about what state of affairs an individual 
desires to repeatedly experience throughout his life’ (Flaxman et 
al., 2011, p.37). 
‘The failure to contact and specify appetitive consequences of importance’ 
(Hayes et al. 2013, p.186). 
Coding criteria 
(a) participants talking about/clarifying their values;  
(b) participants reporting a lack of values clarity. 
COMMITTED ACTION DOMAIN  
Committed Action Lack of Committed Action 
Relates to changes in behaviour that are guided by one’s values 
(Hayes et al., 1999). 
Relates to behaviours that are inconsistent with one’s values (Ciarrochi, 
Bilich & Godsell, 2010). 
Coding criteria 
(a) participants making commitments to act in ways that would bring them towards their values; 
(b) participants reporting that they acted / were unable to act in a way that was consistent with their values. 
Note. The ‘neutral’ category has been considered when coded text appears to belong to a particular PF domain but it was difficult to decide whether it 
could be classified as a PF or PI statement. 
 
Page 83 of 203 
 
Application of the coding framework21. In adherence with ACT principles, the core 
unit of analysis in the current study was ‘behaviour in context’ (Biglan & Hayes, 1996), 
where all behaviour (including verbal behaviour – ‘talk’) was considered to only have 
meaning when linked to the historical and current context (Hayes et al., 2013). This means 
that ‘the unit of analysis’ could consist of one or a few sentences, and that multiple codes 
could be assigned to one ‘unit of analysis’, e.g. a portion of client talk could be coded 
within Values and Committed Action domains. This is consistent with ACT theory, 
suggesting that PF processes are highly interlinked (Hayes, et al., 1999). 
To explore the application of the coding framework, transcripts from a sample of 
sessions (not included in the primary analysis) were analysed by the research team. 
Consensus was reached by agreeing which specific PF code should be applied to an 
analysed fragment of text (e.g. researchers agreed that certain parts of the text should be 
coded as experiential avoidance). Through application of the framework, it transpired 
that, in some cases, certain statements referred to the processes of interest; however, it 
was difficult to ascertain whether they should be coded within the ‘flexible’ or ‘inflexible’ 
category. For example, the statement ‘I could talk myself into coping with the feelings… 
like if you’ve got pain, you talk yourself into coping with pain to a degree’ could be 
categorised as experiential avoidance or acceptance, as it is unclear what the participant 
means by saying ‘talk yourself into coping’. The participant might have coped by 
accepting the feeling, which would indicate direction towards PF, or she might have 
coped by distraction, which would indicate experiential avoidance (PI direction). On that 
basis, researchers also included a ‘neutral’ category to capture this type of ‘directionally 
ambivalent’ talk. The researchers also agreed that we were unable to identify PF processes 
in some portions of text, which therefore remained un-coded. It has been noted, however, 
                                            
21 Please see section 2.6.1 of extended paper for detailed examples of applying coding framework  
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that the absence of evidence is not evidence of absence and that just because PF cannot 
be identified, it does not mean that PF processes are not active on a more covert level. 
 After the principal researcher completed preliminary coding, the co-researchers 
rated one session (12% of the material) to check for conceptual agreement/discrepancies 
in coding. Inter-rater reliability22 at this point was calculated as r = 0.90.  
 Discrepancies were mostly related to the Values domain, which may be linked to 
adopting ‘behaviour in context’ as the analytic unit. It is likely that the principal 
researcher coded parts of the participants’ talk within the Values domain as it was relating 
to values mentioned by the participant at some point during the therapy. Second coders 
were not as familiar with the content of participants’ talk, which possibly made it more 
difficult to identify some aspect of the Values domain in the text. It was also decided that 
participants' recollection of historical values could not automatically be coded in the 
Values domain – it was only coded as such if it was made clear that the participant still 
subscribes to the value. Similarities and differences in conceptualisation of Self-as-Story 
and Cognitive Fusion processes were also discussed. It was decided that Self-as-Story 
should be applied when ‘a person describes, evaluates, explains and understands the self, 
using conceptualisation abstracted from the ongoing flow of experience’ (Atkins & 
Styles, 2016, p. 72); for instance, a participant describing herself as ‘a complete idiot’. 
Following discussions with co-researchers, the principal researcher re-examined 
coded data, and a further 10% of the rated material (1 session) was checked for inter-rater 
reliability. Overall, the inter-rater reliability was r = 0.88.        
Outcome predictions. After coding was completed, all researchers involved in the 
project made independent judgments about the therapy outcomes based on analysed data. 
The coded data presented to co-researchers was anonymised to minimise potential bias. 
                                            
22 Pearson correlation coefficient 
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Results23 
Proportion of PF Processes in Client Talk 
In order to examine the proportion of client talk which related to key processes of 
interest, we considered client talk within the session as 100%, and then examined what 
percentage of that talk related to specific PF domains. For instance, P1’s talk accounted 
for 68.51% of total talk during session one. For the purpose of analysis, this was treated 
as 100%, of which 6.19% was coded within the Acceptance domain (Table 10)24. This 
method of presenting data allowed for clear representation of what proportion of the PF 
processes were identified within the participants’ talk. Participant talk could be coded as 
belonging to more than one domain, meaning that total coded text per session, per 
participant could potentially exceed 100% (Table 10). On average, 43% (range 15% to 
67%) of participant talk was coded per session (this figure includes double and triple 
coding). 
                                            
23 See section 3 of extended paper for supplementary results. 
24 Please see section 2.6.2 of extended paper for breakdown of calculations 
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Table 10. A Percentage of Coded Text per Participant, per PF Domain per Session (Including Text Coded as ‘Neutral’) 
 
% of participant 
talk during the 
session 
Acceptance 
Cognitive 
Defusion 
Present 
Moment 
Awareness 
Committed 
Action 
Self 
as 
Context 
Values 
% of coded 
text per 
participant, 
including 
double and 
triple coding 
  % % % % % %  
Participant 1         
Session 2 68.51 6.19 10.45 1.55 23.98 2.60 22.49 67.26 
Session 4 57.08 6.60 7.10 0.60 27.17 3.26 18.94 63.67 
Session 9 51.84 27.97 15.14 9.51 1.60 3.32 4.26 61.81 
Participant 2         
Session 2 63.84 9.81 2.29 5.83 14.57 0.69 10.12 43.30 
Session 4 60.19 2.01 2.48 3.31 10.85 0.91 4.07 23.63 
Session 8 61.74 4.89 2.62 0.62 4.94 0.63 1.51 15.21 
Participant 3         
Session 2 58.31 5.01 4.39 6.47 14.30 0.33 19.86 50.35 
Session 4 67.66 1.64 1.51 0.38 13.94 0.56 10.67 28.70 
Session 8  39.06 6.27 1.54 0.33 9.17 0.33 15.08 32.72  
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A mean percentage of each domain identified per session across all participants is 
presented in Table 11. 
  
A sample of coded participants’ talk is presented in Table 12.
Table 11.  Means and Standard Deviations of Percentages of Coded Talk across Sessions 
(Including Text Coded as PF, Neutral and PI).  
 
Process 
Session 2 
M                SD 
Session 4 
M              SD 
Session 8/9 
M               SD 
Total 
M            SD 
Committed 
Action 
17.62 5.51 17.32 8.67 5.24 3.79 13.39 8.21 
Values 17.49 6.52 11.23 7.45 6.95 7.17 11.89 7.64 
Acceptance 6.99 2.51 3.42 2.76 3.04 12.95 7.82 7.94 
Cognitive 
Defusion 
5.69 4.25 3.69 2.98 6.43 7.56 5.28 4.74 
Present 
Movement 
Awareness 
4.61 2.67 1.43 1.63 3.49 5.21 3.18 3.35 
Self-as-
Context  
1.20 1.22 1.58 1.47 1.43 1.64 1.4 1.27 
Note: The processes are ordered from the most- to the least-frequently identified processes.  
M: mean, SD: standard deviation  
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Table 12. A Sample of Coded Participant Talk For Each PF Domain  
PF DOMAIN PF  Neutral PI 
Acceptance ‘But I just try and remember that it’s just a 
feeling and just to ride it out.’ 
‘It’s just hard.’ 
 
‘I mean, I can have the radio on in the 
morning, like, and I’ll be singing literally to 
the songs so that my mind doesn’t think 
about anything else… and, no, they’re still 
there.’ 
Cognitive 
Defusion 
‘It’s a feeling, it can’t hurt me, that's what I 
tell myself all the time.’ 
‘I do, yeah. I do feel like it’s too much, but I 
think that’s because of my mental state. But 
then is my mental state this way because 
I’ve took on too much? That’s what I think.’ 
 
‘If my head would switch off for five minutes 
I’d be fine, but it’s like I went to bed last 
night at a quarter past ten, at quarter past 
one I was still awake.’ 
Present-Moment 
Awareness 
‘I would say I was between angry and 
upset.’ 
 
‘It was like when you said, “I’ve been down 
there and up there but I’ve never been in 
the middle”. Well I must’ve been.’ 
 
‘I don’t feel anything, honest, I wish I did. 
Any emotion will do. I mean who can watch 
Long Lost Family and not cry?’ 
Self-as-Context - ‘I mean, some days, I don’t think I’m the 
best mum, but I don’t think I’m the worst 
mum. But then, other days, I remember 
situations and I think, “Oh, that was terrible” 
and I feel like I’m still waiting to be a good 
mum.’ 
‘Nobody else is a doolally tap like me then.’ 
 
 
Values ‘I love my family, I feel guilty for anything 
bad I've said about any of my family. 
I’ve become more loving because I think, 
“God I love you so much”.’ 
 
‘And then, in an afternoon I’d probably sit 
and do some knitting or go and see my 
friend.’ 
 
‘I want a life but I don’t know what I want.’ 
Committed 
Action 
 
 
‘Well, I let… I don’t like ironing about… I 
thought “I’m going to iron them few bits”. 
That was the other day, and then yesterday 
I did all my granddaughter’s washing.’ 
‘…just didn’t feel right. Tried meditating, 
everything was going wrong.’ 
 
‘I have to go on a diet. I had a warm fudge 
brownie…’ 
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Patterns of PF and Clinical Outcomes 
In order to establish a broad PF score for each participant, we summed all of the 
percentages of text coded as flexible (per session, Figure 4); the same process was 
completed for text coded as inflexible (Figure 4). This was considered the best way of 
presenting data, as it has been hypothesised in ACT that a higher general level of PF 
indicates a better quality of life and may lead to symptom reduction (even though this is 
not a primary goal of ACT). In turn, a high level of PI is associated in ACT with low 
quality of life and higher level of symptoms (Hayes et al., 1999). The analysed data, 
presented in the aforementioned way, was further examined by researchers who made 
predictions about the relationship between changes in PF and PI percentages and clinical 
outcomes. 
Analysed data did not show clear patterns of PF or PI increase or decrease over 
time, across participants (Figure 4). 
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Individual Participants 
Participant 1 (P1). This participant’s levels of PF and PI appear to remain relatively 
stable, with a slight increase in PF observed during session four. There was a substantial 
increase in Experiential Avoidance (together with a slight increase in Lack of Present-
Moment Awareness), which formed a substantial part of the overall percentage of PI talk 
identified in the final session. A decrease in Values and Committed Action contributed to 
an overall decrease in PF during the final session. 
During the final session, P1 described various ways of coping with her distress, 
mostly by utilising ‘distractions’; for instance, ‘I try and just do fun things, try and distract 
myself’. This way of managing distress is consistent with principles of CBT but would 
be coded as Experiential Avoidance in this study, which may explain the aforementioned 
increase. The content of sessions was also important when Experiential Avoidance was 
considered – P1 was talking about her ability to control her thoughts, which is generally 
associated with negative outcomes in ACT, but she did not explain what that ‘control’ 
looked like, meaning that it was difficult to code these statements directionally.  
A decrease in Committed Action was somewhat unexpected, considering that 
engaging in new activities (such as distractions) could be seen as behavioural activation, 
a technique which is associated with Committed Action (Hayes et al., 2011). Statements 
mentioning ‘distractions’ would not be coded as Committed Action in this study, 
however,  because P1 had not spoken of any values that could be pursued by engaging in 
the aforementioned behaviours. Moreover, P1 spoke about not being able to ‘control’ 
physiological sensations which she associated with prolonged distress, e.g. ‘adrenaline 
would be pumping for four or five days forever without stopping’. This has been coded 
as Lack of Present-Movement Awareness; but it is important to note that P1 was suffering 
from physical ill health, hence some of the reported symptoms may be associated with 
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real physiological processes (which are signs of poor physical health), rather than lack of 
Present-Moment Awareness. 
Participant 2 (P2). A gradual decrease in both PF and PI was observed. The reduction in 
PI was mainly a result of a decrease in text coded as Experiential Avoidance. This pattern 
is somewhat difficult to interpret in terms of possible therapy outcomes. Within ACT 
therapy, a decrease in PI would be associated with positive outcomes; a reduction in PF, 
however, would indicate a negative trend (Hayes et al., 1999).  
Concurrent with the reduction of Experiential Avoidance during the final session, 
two instances of P2's talk were coded as Acceptance (e.g. ‘Yeah, and just, yeah, I think, 
well, this is me and that's it isn't it?’). Although these two statements account for only a 
minor fraction of P2's talk during that session, they could potentially suggest an important 
change in the way she relates to her experiences. This shows that, at least on some level, 
P2’s attitude has changed, as previously she was only expressing wishes such as ‘I just 
want to be ordinary’. 
The issue of self-report is also important when therapy outcomes are considered; 
for instance, P2 openly reported that she values the support and interaction she receives 
from health professionals. This could possibly influence how she scored on the self-
reported outcome measures and, equally, it could influence how she was talking about 
her experiences. Reduction in PI talk could potentially indicate a positive outcome where 
a decrease in PF could signal that P2’s behaviour (such as expressing distress) is 
consistent with her values (e.g. having support).  
Participant 3 (P3). A reduction of PF was noted in the case of P3, with relatively stable 
PI. A reduction in PF was mostly associated with a reduction in the Values and 
Committed Action domains, paired with a slight increase in Lack of Values Clarity. 
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During the final session, P3 reported that ill physical health was preventing her from 
doing things that were important to her, which was coded as Lack of Committed Action 
in light of the inability to act in the way that was consistent with P3’s values. This 
reduction significantly contributes to the decrease of overall PF when taken out of 
context, but it does not necessarily signify that P3 became less psychologically flexible.   
Clinical Outcomes 
In order to assess whether blind predictions could be made regarding clinical 
outcomes (based only on the results of the coding exercise), all four researchers involved 
in the project were asked to answer the following questions for each participant: 
1. During the course of their sessions has the participant’s level of distress increased, 
decreased or remained stable? 
2. During the course of their sessions has the participant’s perception of quality of life 
increased/decreased/remained stable? 
3. If any changes in outcomes are predicted, would you be confident that they are 
clinically significant? 
Only directionally coded text  (indicating PF or PI) was analysed in terms of making 
predictions about the outcome, as talk coded as ‘neutral’ was not anticipated to be able to 
establish whether participants’ talk indicated that they were moving towards inflexibility 
or flexibility.  
The predictions, along with clinical outcomes derived from the original study, are 
outlined in Table 13. 
 
Page 94 of 203 
 
 
P1 demonstrated a reliable improvement in terms of scores on the Patient-Reported 
Outcomes Measurement Information System (PROMIS) and Clinical Outcomes in 
Research Evaluation (CORE); however, this was not clinically significant, and the 
participant remained within the range of clinical distress. These outcomes are consistent 
with the judges’ predictions that there was ‘not clinically significant change’ but are 
inconsistent with directional predictions of a (not clinically significant) trend towards 
deterioration. P1’s scores on the Mental Health Continuum – Short Form (MHC-SF) 
indicated that there was a clinically significant change in her perceived quality of life, 
which is inconsistent with the judges’ predictions of ‘no clinically significant change' or 
a slight (not clinically significant) deterioration. 
P2 demonstrated a reliable improvement in terms of scores on the CORE; however, 
this was not clinically significant, and the participant remained within the range of clinical 
distress. Her scores on PROMIS indicated no significant change. These outcomes are 
consistent with the predictions made by the majority of judges (3/4), who proposed that 
Table 13. Participants’ Individual Therapy Outcomes and Outcome Predictions Made by the 
Judges 
 
 
ACTUAL 
OUTCOMES  
PARTICIPANT 1 
 
 
PARTICIPANT 2 
 
 
PARTICIPANT 3 
 
 
PROMIS 
CORE 
MHC-SF 
Improvement* 
Improvement* 
Improvement** 
No Change 
Improvement* 
No Change 
No Change 
Improvement* 
No Change 
 
DISTRESS 
QUALITY OF 
LIFE 
DISTRESS 
QUALITY OF 
LIFE 
DISTRESS 
QUALITY OF 
LIFE 
JUDGE 1 NC NC NC NC NC (D) NC (D) 
JUDGE 2 NC (D) NC (D) NC I** NC NC 
JUDGE 3 NC (D) NC NC NC NC NC 
JUDGE 4 NC (D) NC (D) I** NC (I) NC NC (D)I 
Note. RCI and CSC calculated using clinical and non-clinical norms in published literature unless 
standardised norms are available.  
* indicates reliable change; ** indicates clinically significant change; NC - no change; NC (D) – no change but 
(not clinically significant) trend towards deterioration; NC (I) – no change but (not clinically significant) trend 
towards improvement; I** - improvement (clinically significant). 
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there was ‘no significant change’ in P2’s distress. One of the judges predicted a clinically 
significant improvement in this domain, which was inconsistent with the reported 
findings. P2’s scores on MHC-SF indicated that there was no significant change in her 
perceived quality of life, which is consistent with predictions made by the majority of 
judges (3/4). One judge predicted a clinically significant improvement in P2’s scores, and 
another judge suggested a possible non-significant trend towards improvement – both 
predictions were unsupported by the original clinical outcomes.  
P3 demonstrated a reliable improvement in terms of scores on the CORE; however, 
this was not clinically significant, and the participant remained within the range of clinical 
distress. Her scores on the PROMIS indicated no significant change. These outcomes are 
consistent with the predictions made by the judges, who proposed that there was ‘no 
clinically significant change’ in P3’s distress. One of the judges suggested a slight (not 
significant) trend towards deterioration in this domain, which was inconsistent with the 
findings. P3’s scores on the MHC-SF indicated that there was no significant change in 
her perceived quality of life, which was consistent with the predictions made by the 
judges. One judge suggested a possible, but not significant, trend towards improvement 
and another judge indicated a possible, but not significant, trend towards deterioration — 
both suggestions were unsupported by the actual outcomes. 
Outcome predictions 
There was 92% (22/24) agreement amongst judges in terms of predicting ‘no 
clinically significant change’. In 41% of these instances, judges indicated a ‘not 
significant trend’ towards deterioration (78%) or towards improvement (22%). 
Overall, judges’ predictions in relation to whether there was any ‘clinically 
significant change’ were correct in 75% of cases. A general trend across all participants 
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was towards improvement, but in 7 out of 11 instances, when directional predictions were 
made by judges, they were inconsistent with this trend. 
Discussion 
The primary aim of this study was to explore whether PF processes can be identified 
in participant talk during therapy that does not overtly target PF. Additionally, we 
examined whether changes in detected PF and PI levels are related to clinical outcomes. 
Identifying PF in Participant Talk25 
The results suggest that PF processes can be identified in the talk of participants 
who engage in therapy that does not explicitly target PF.  
The results show discrepancies in the frequency of PF components identified within 
the text. The most frequently identified process was Committed Action, closely followed 
by Values. Hayes et al. (1999) suggested that the Committed Action process encompasses 
all behavioural methods used to form and maintain patterns of values activities, such as 
goal setting, contingency management, behavioural activation and exposure. These 
techniques are frequently used in CBT, hence it makes sense that this domain was the 
easiest to identify. Additionally, Committed Action in ACT is always considered in the 
context of a person's values (Hayes et al., 2013); therefore, similarities in the frequency 
of identifying these two domains are not necessarily surprising26.  
Acceptance was the third most-frequently coded domain, followed by Cognitive 
Defusion. This finding can be related to techniques commonly used in CBT, such as 
‘decentring’ (Arch & Craske, 2008). In ACT, as well as in CBT, clients are encouraged 
to ‘defuse/decentre from their thoughts’. In CBT, unlike in ACT, however, the aim of this 
                                            
25 Please see section 4.1 of extended paper for a discussion on patterns of PF in participants’ talk. 
26 Please see section 1.5 of the extended paper for a discussion on the relationship between PF processes.   
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process is to identify ‘faulty thoughts’, to assess their validity and, if required, to alter the 
thoughts identified as ‘faulty’ (cognitive restructuring). Any attempts to alter one’s 
thoughts would be considered as experiential avoidance within the ACT model, and it 
was coded as such in this study.    
The second least-frequently coded domain was Present-Moment Awareness, which 
may be related to the fact that, traditionally, mindfulness techniques are not incorporated 
into CBT therapy, hence Present-Moment Awareness compatible statements were 
infrequently featured in client talk. 
The least-frequently identified domain was Self-as-Context, and no utterances were 
coded as illustrating ‘Self-as-Context’ processes. This finding is consistent with the 
existing literature which suggests that this concept is the most abstract and difficult to 
capture and that, to some extent, Self-as-Context processes may be better understood as 
a part of Cognitive Defusion or Present-Moment Awareness domains (Foody, Barnes-
Holmes, & Barnes-Holmes, 2012). It has also been noted that the Self-as-Context domain 
seems to be the least-frequently researched PF ‘stand-alone’ component and is usually 
included in the domain of Present-Moment Awareness (Villatte et al., 2016). Moreover, 
Francis et al. (2016) reported that, following a Delphi consensus process, no Self-as-
Context items were included in the CompACT, and it has been suggested that this was 
due to difficulties in operationalising it accurately. 
The findings of this study may support the notion that it may be more useful to 
consider the Self-as-Context process in the context of the Present-Moment Awareness 
domain rather than as a separate component of PF. Alternatively, more efforts towards 
accurately operationalising this process should be made if it continues to be outlined as a 
crucial component of PF. 
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A possible explanation for the observed distribution of PF processes might be 
related to the content of participant talk: the Committed Action and Values domains are 
more likely to resemble normal, everyday conversation where people discuss their goals, 
what is important to them and talk about activities of daily living, etc. It seems that the 
more abstract constructs become, the less ‘natural’ it is for people to spontaneously talk 
about them. 
The aforementioned distribution of the PF process in the coded data is theoretically 
consistent with PF conceptualisation outlined by Hayes et al. (2011), where PF processes 
are divided into three dyadic domains (see Figure 1): Committed Action - Values, 
Acceptance – Cognitive and Present-Moment Awareness – Self-as-Context. Moreover, 
the results show that the main variables responsible for a high level of PF during session 
two, across all participants, were Values and Committed Action. This is likely to be 
associated with the content of the early sessions, where goals and aspirations are explored 
explicitly. 
Psychological Flexibility and Clinical Outcomes27 
Within the current study, the results of exploration of the relationship between 
patterns of PF detected in participant talk and clinical outcomes were inconclusive. On 
the whole, after examining patterns of PF, researchers predicted that there would be no 
significant change in clinical outcomes, which was largely accurate. It was less clear, 
however, whether ‘directional predictions’ could be made reliably – this was especially 
evident in the case of P1, whose scores  on outcome measures indicated improvement, 
but the judges predicted there would be no change or deterioration. 
                                            
27 Please see section 4.3 of extended paper for a further discussion on PF and clinical outcomes  
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It is likely that some of the discrepancies between ‘trends in outcome predictions' 
and actual outcomes might be related to theoretical differences in CBT and ACT. For 
instance, activities such as thought challenging or distractions could be seen as examples 
of Experiential Avoidance, which is associated with negative outcomes from an ACT 
perspective but would be associated with a positive outcome from a CBT perspective. 
Additionally, ACT founders argue that ‘the control is the problem’ (Hayes et al., 1999), 
thus all participants’ attempts to control internal experiences would be considered a form 
of Experiential Avoidance. It has been suggested, however, that the process of 
Acceptance may be an alternative form of exerting control (Arch & Craske, 2008) and, 
therefore, it could be argued that ‘accepting' may actually be a form of cognitive 
restructuring. 
It is also worth emphasising that some participants appeared to be engaging in 
behaviours which are associated in ACT with Committed Action (e.g. watching 
something funny despite feeling low) but would not be categorised as such due to the 
‘lack of value’ component assigned to it by a participant. This observation raises a 
question as to whether Committed Action has to be viewed in the context of clearly stated 
Values. These types of nuance would be very difficult to detect while applying the coding 
framework to participant talk, without having any chance of clarifying what they mean 
by expressing certain thoughts.  
Additionally, it is currently unclear whether psychological flexibility and 
inflexibility represent two ends of a ‘flexibility continuum’ or whether they are in fact 
separate constructs. It has been hypothesised that problems associated with PI should be 
targeted by PF processes; thus, the increase in PF and decrease in PI would be expected 
to occur simultaneously (Hayes et al., 2006). This type of relationship would suggest that 
these constructs are at opposite ends of the continuum, and traditionally psychometric PF 
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measures have captured the relationship between PF and PI in that way (Stabbe, Rolffs, 
& Rogge, 2019). In this study, however, no clear change pattern for PF and PI was 
observed to support this hypothesis, which may suggest that PF and PI may be better 
understood as two separate psychological constructs (Stabbe et al., 2019). 
The specific nature of the final therapy session should also be taken into account 
when considering therapy outcomes. It has been suggested that the last session is 
frequently difficult for clients, and that they are likely to report a worsening of symptoms 
and/or no changes when completing outcome measures (Owen, Drinane, Adelson, & 
Kopta, 2017). The content of client talk may also be influenced by feelings related to the 
termination of therapy, as well as by the situational context. For instance, P3’s final 
session was indicative of crisis, which changed the focus of the session and led to a 
discussion of practical safeguarding solutions, decreasing the amount of therapeutic talk. 
Limitations and Further Research28 
The main limitation of this study is related to the lack of variability in participant 
outcomes. In order to further test whether detected PF patterns can indicate whether 
clinically significant change occurred, a sample where participants reported a clear 
improvement (or deterioration) would be advantageous. It is possible that clinically 
significant improvement (or deterioration) would be reflected in participant talk, allowing 
for patterns of change to be observed more easily. 
Moreover, in this study, we focused solely on participant talk; thus, therapist talk 
was omitted from the analysis. It is important to note, however, that the therapist who 
delivered therapy was a final-year trainee clinical psychologist who has undertaken 
extensive training and had an extensive knowledge of many different therapy models. 
                                            
28 Please see section 4.4 of extended paper for a further discussion on strengths, limitations and further 
research 
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The therapy was checked for fidelity and was assessed as adherent to the CBT model, but 
it was not checked to examine whether any other aspects more readily associated with 
other therapies were also incorporated. 
Consequently, it is possible that some aspects of PF were unintentionally targeted 
by the therapist, which could have influenced participant speech. A possible presence of 
this type of ‘mode drift’ has been acknowledged by Forman and Herbert (2019), who 
concluded that elements of acceptance and mindfulness-based therapies are likely to be 
incorporated in more traditional cognitive-behavioural treatments. This limitation can be 
addressed in future research by ensuring not only that CBT is adherent, but also that no 
concepts that are antithetical to CBT are introduced. 
Furthermore, it is important to emphasise that ACT is considered a ‘third wave of 
CBT’, and some authors suggest that there are more similarities than differences between 
these two approaches (Arch & Craske, 2008; Hofmann, 2008). In order to further explore 
whether PF is a trans-theoretical construct, further research should investigate whether 
PF processes could be detected in the talk of clients engaging in therapies which do not 
have clear cognitive and behavioural roots. 
Additionally, it has been noted that PF has been captured and defined in many 
different ways. This ‘operational versatility’ may be considered advantageous for 
understanding and ameliorating poor mental health. A lack of coherent and clear 
conceptualisation of the main psychotherapeutic change process may, however, 
undermine the cohesiveness of theory behind it and hinder gathering empirically valid 
evidence. Further research should address the theoretical inconsistencies currently 
existing in relation to the conceptualisation of PF. 
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Conclusions 
In this study we found that it is possible to reliably identify components of PF in 
the talk of participants who engaged in CBT. It is unclear, however, whether the 
predictions about clinical outcomes can be made based on the identified patterns of PF in 
participant talk. These findings contribute to the current debate about change processes 
underlying successful treatments and provide a platform for future research into the role 
of PF in facilitating psychotherapeutic change. 
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1. Extended Introduction 
In order to set a context for the current study, which explores whether psychological 
flexibility (PF) can be considered a trans-theoretical process of psychotherapeutic change, 
a brief overview of the current issues related to mental health and factors related to 
psychotherapeutic change and psychotherapy will be provided in the following section. 
1.1 Mental Health 
The increasing prevalence of common mental health difficulties is a growing 
concern for public health organisations worldwide (Mehta, 2013; Mental Health 
Foundation [MHF], 2016). The Global Burden of Disease (Institute for Health Metrics 
and Evaluation [IHME], 2013) study found that the most predominant mental health 
problems worldwide are depression, anxiety, schizophrenia and bipolar disorder. Poor 
mental health accounts for 21.2% of years lived with disability worldwide (IHME, 2013) 
and has a significant impact on the length and quality of life (MHF, 2016). It has been 
reported that, in the UK, one in six people over 16 years of age is likely to experience a 
‘common’ mental health difficulty (MHF, 2016). The National Institute for Health and 
Care Excellence’s (NICE, 2011a) list of common mental health problems includes 
depression, generalised anxiety disorder (GAD), social anxiety disorder, panic disorder, 
obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). The 
risk of attempting and completing suicide is elevated in individuals who are experiencing 
mental health difficulties (MHF, 2016). The reported figures suggest that over 90% of 
people who took their own life, or attempted to do so, were experiencing mental health 
problems (MHF, 2016). Friedli and Parsonage (2007) state that mental illness takes 
various forms and that no other health condition matches the prevalence, persistence and 
extensive impact of mental illness. The Centre for Mental Health (2010) outlined that 
mental illness not only has a human and social cost but also an economic one, with wider 
costs in England amounting to £105 billion a year (MHF, 2016). 
1.2 Aetiology 
In the Western world, causes of mental illness have been predominantly explained 
by the medical model, which conceptualises the nature and origins of psychopathology 
in terms of biochemical imbalances, genetic factors and pathophysiology of the brain 
(Lam, Salkovskis, & Warwick, 2005; Johnstone, 2000). Consequently, the medical model 
is used in the diagnosis and treatment of psychopathology. In line with this medical 
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approach, diagnostic frameworks have been developed (the Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders, 5th ed.; DSM-5; American Psychiatric Association [APA], 
2013; International Statistical Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems, 
ICD-10; World Health Organisation, 2004) to help practitioners identify problems and 
give diagnoses which inform treatment in an efficient manner. Additionally, diagnostic 
systems are considered to improve reliability and validity of diagnosis (Aboraya, Rankin, 
France, El-Missiry, & John, 2006; Hilsenroth et al., 2000). Mental health services are 
mostly set up to reflect the medicalised approach to mental illness, where treatment 
pathways mirror clusters of symptoms typically associated with particular diagnoses 
(NICE, 2011a). Although socio-economic factors are acknowledged in the medical 
model, the emphasis on the biological origin of psychiatric disorders gives the impression 
that people with mental health problems are fundamentally flawed and defective (Lam et 
al., 2005). As the causes of mental illness are often elusive, the focus of treatment has 
fallen on symptom relief, either in the form of medication or psychotherapy (Lam, et al., 
2005). 
Additionally, a medicalised hypothesis about the origin of mental illness leads to 
the responsibility for symptom reduction and recovery being placed on the individual 
person (Johnstone et al., 2018; Smail, 2001). The emphasis on personal responsibility in 
relation to symptom reduction and recovery has been reflected in many governmental 
programmes which aim to target mental health difficulties by introducing programmes 
such as the Improved Access to Psychological Therapy (IAPT; Layard, 2006; LSE Centre 
for Economic Performance, Mental Health Policy Group, 2006), which aims to improve 
access to individual, diagnostically led treatment.  
Over the years, psychological approaches have endeavoured to offer alternative 
models of understanding mental illness. It has been argued, for instance, that presenting 
emotional, cognitive and behavioural difficulties as symptoms of mental disorder and 
locating problems chiefly in people’s brains and bodies not only conceals the well-
evidenced, causal role of social and interpersonal factors in distress but also fails to 
outline what being ‘mentally healthy’ looks like (Friedli & Parsonage, 2007; Hayes, 
Strosahl, & Wilson, 1999). Various schools of psychology emphasise different factors of 
human functioning to explain the origins of psychopathology and propose different 
treatment models. Despite the heterogeneity in psychotherapeutic approaches to mental 
illness, it is commonly acknowledged that life experiences play an important role in the 
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development of mental health difficulties. Poor mental health has been found to correlate 
with exposure and vulnerability to adverse social, economic and environmental situations, 
such as low income, unemployment, poor physical health, poor social support and 
experiences of trauma (Friedli & Parsonage, 2007; MHF, 2016). In recent years, various 
alternatives to the medical understanding of mental health difficulties have been 
proposed, within which it is hypothesised that, in the majority of cases, human distress is 
an understandable reaction to a person’s difficult circumstances, history, belief system 
and biological capacities (Johnstone et al., 2018). Given the importance of mental health, 
treatment approaches developed in the last few decades, such as ACT (Hayes, et al., 1999) 
or Dialectical Behaviour Therapy (DBT; Linehan, 1993) have moved away from 
attempting to alleviate specific symptoms and focus on core processes which facilitate 
good mental health. 
1.3 Treatment 
Currently, there is a large number of psychological treatments available to support 
people who experience poor mental health and there is a great body of research supporting 
the notion that a number of well-established treatments produce similar outcomes across 
different presentations and populations (Munder et al., 2018; Smith & Glass, 1977; 
Tschacher, Junghan, & Pfammatter, 2014; Wampold et al., 1997). New psychological 
treatments which proclaim to offer novel approaches to therapy continue to be created, 
but their founders frequently fail to clearly explain the process of change that makes the 
therapy successful (Grawe, 1997; Villatte et al., 2016). These findings are at the heart of 
the ongoing debate about what processes mediate therapeutic outcome, with some 
researchers and clinicians supporting the ‘common factor’ model to explain 
psychotherapeutic change (Villatte et al., 2016; Wampold, 2001) and others favouring the 
‘specific factor model’ (Chambless & Ollendick, 2001). 
1.4 Common Factors 
Due to the fact that this study focuses on exploring the trans-theoretical nature of 
PF, in this section a ‘common factor approach’ to therapeutic change processes will be 
discussed in more detail. 
The main goal of the common factor approach is to identify, define and assess 
common ingredients across all treatments, regardless of their theoretical underpinnings 
(Lampropoulos, 2000). The idea of the presence of common factors was introduced by 
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Saul Rosenzweig (1936), who concluded that all psychotherapies are equally efficacious, 
(referred to as the ‘Dodo effect’). This expression refers to a well-known quote from 
Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland, when the Dodo declares, ‘Everybody has won and all 
must have prizes’, implying that if psychotherapies produce similar outcomes they ‘all 
must have prizes’. The presence of common factors has been widely discussed in the 
literature and many attempts have been made to understand how they may influence the 
outcome of therapy (Crits-Christoph, 1997; Kazdin, 2007; Lambert, 1992; Wampold et 
al., 1997; Weinberger, 1995).  
 After reviewing a large body of psychotherapy outcome research, Lambert (1992) 
proposed that 30% of the sources of variation in therapeutic outcomes can be attributed 
to common factors. The other factors identified by Lambert (1992) included: specific 
techniques, expectancy (placebo) and extra-therapeutic change (Figure 5). 
 
 
Lambert (1992) acknowledged that common factors can be conceptualised in many 
different ways and can be divided into three categories: Support Factors (e.g. therapeutic 
alliance, therapist expertness, warmth, respect, empathy); Learning Factors (e.g. advice, 
cognitive learning, rationale); Action Factors (e.g. cognitive mastery, facing fears, taking 
risks). This developmental sequence assumes that that the supportive factors, such as 
therapeutic alliance, precede any changes in the therapy (Lambert, 1992).   
Currently, there is little agreement on how many potential common factors exist, 
with some authors proposing the existence of as few as five (Laska, Gurman, & Wampold, 
Common factors
30%
Extra-therapeutic 
change 40% 
Techniques 15 %
Expectancy
(placebo)
15% 
Figure 5. Factors contributing to the effectiveness of psychotherapy (Lambert, 1992) 
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2013) and others as many as 22 (Tschacher, et al., 2014). Despite these differences, 
therapeutic alliance and experiential exposure have been consistently identified as 
common factor across most schools of psychotherapy and, as such, have received a great 
deal of attention (Castonguay, Constantino, & Grosse Holtforth, 2006; Chambless & 
Ollendick, 2001; Lambert, 1992). 
 The notion that therapeutic alliance is an important ingredient of therapy can be 
tracked back to Freud (1910), and most of the early research on this subject was conducted 
within the psychodynamic approach (e.g. Gitelson, 1962; Greenson, 1967). The 
importance assigned to a working alliance within the psychoanalytic tradition ranges from 
seeing it as significant (Brenner, 1982) to considering it to be a ‘vehicle for cure’ (Yalom, 
1980). Bordin (1979) suggested that ‘the working alliance between the person who seeks 
change and the one who offers to be a change agent is one of the keys, if not the key, to 
the change process’ (p. 252). Indeed, the importance of a good working alliance has been 
emphasised in various therapy approaches, such as CBT. It is, however, mostly 
considered to be a necessary, but not sufficient, ingredient for producing positive 
outcomes (Kazdin, 2007; Westbrook, Kirk, & Kennerley, 2011).  
Evidence suggests that the early development of a therapeutic alliance is important, 
because poorer reported alliances are a predictor of patient drop-out (Constantino & 
Wilson, 2002). Moreover, it has been found that clients of therapists who were able to 
develop stronger therapeutic relationship (on average) with their clients achieved more 
positive outcomes (symptom reduction) than clients of therapists who were less skilled in 
forming therapeutic relationships (Baldwin, Wampold & Imel, 2007).  A study which 
examined therapist characteristics which were conducive with a positive working alliance 
concluded that warmth facilitated by the therapist’s understanding, flexibility (which 
occurs through exploration) and confidence (demonstrated by accurate interpretations) 
correlated with an improved working alliance (Ackerman & Hilsenroth, 2003). 
Furthermore, research exploring which factors account for the most variance in 
therapeutic outcome found that, in addition to the quality of therapeutic alliance 
(Flückiger, Del Re, Wampold, & Horvath, 2018; Horvath, Del Re, Flückiger, & Symonds, 
2011),  client’s expectations of therapy and their psychological-mindedness were also 
associated with improved outcomes (Constantino & Wilson, 2002; Greenberg, 
Constantino, & Bruce, 2006). It should be noted, however, that meta-analyses have 
suggested that only around 5% of the variance in outcome can be explained by alliance 
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(Flückiger et al., 2018; Horvath & Bedi, 2002) and that, to date, all research that considers 
the relationship between working alliance and outcomes are correlational in nature 
(Flückiger et al., 2018, Horvath et al., 2011). 
 Another factor frequently considered a key ingredient of generating therapeutic 
change is experiential exposure, which is related to ‘confronting or facing a problem’ in 
service of reducing avoidance (Kleinke, 1994; Weinberger, 1995; Westbrook et al., 
2011). Lambert (1992) suggested that encouraging clients to face their fears is an 
important active factor across different therapies and that exposure is crucial in 
facilitating therapeutic outcome. The ability to acknowledge and tolerate one’s distressing 
private phenomena is also considered to be a crucial component of PF (Hayes et al., 1999; 
Kashdan & Rottenberg, 2010). 
Systematic explicit exposure has been mostly associated with behavioural therapy 
approaches, where methods of habituation and extinction are commonly used to help 
clients achieve their goals (see Section 1.7.1). Habituation can be achieved by applying 
techniques such as ‘graded exposure’ - a technique which aims to gradually reduce the 
physical sensations of anxiety. This is achieved through identification of a feared 
stimulant and gradual exposure to it (e.g. starting by looking at pictures of spiders in cases 
of arachnophobia). Depending on the needs of the client, exposure can be completed in 
vivo or may involve imaginary exposure (Davey, 2014; Lambert, 1992).  Exposure has 
been adopted as an important factor of change in CBT as well as ACT, where exposure 
to difficult thoughts and feared situations/object is facilitated (Arch & Craske, 2008), and 
some researchers argue that this behavioural component of CBT is what makes it 
successful (Jacobson et al., 1996). 
Exposure has been also suggested to be an important ingredient of psychodynamic 
treatment, where it is theorised that in order to avoid psychological pain, internal conflict 
or to suppress unacceptable impulses/feelings, people develop various defence 
mechanisms (Leiper, 2006; Lemma, 2015). Typically, defence mechanisms serve an 
adaptive function and protect people from experiencing inner conflict about unwanted 
feelings. At times when routine defences fail to manage the conflict, further, less adaptive 
measures may be employed. Seemingly effective in the short term, these may become 
unhelpful coping strategies that may lead to intrapsychic and interpersonal difficulties 
(Leiper, 2006; Malan, 1995). To address the issue of using ineffective coping strategies, 
clients are encouraged to acknowledge their ‘conflict-laden’ and frequently repressed 
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wishes, beliefs, thoughts and feelings (Lemma, 2015; Malan, 1995). The aim of the 
‘acknowledgement process’ is to lower clients’ resistance to attend to and express these 
private phenomena in order to make sense of the relevant anxiety-inducing content and 
to reduce clients’ reliance on defence mechanisms (Malan, 1995). It has been also 
suggested that other treatment approaches, such as Gestalt Therapy (Perls, Hefferline, & 
Goodman, 1951) and Eye Movement Desensitization and Reprocessing (EMDR;  
Shapiro, 1989) work through exposure processes (Dierick & Lietaer, 1990; Rosen & 
Davison, 2003). 
Another change process which has been considered important across many 
psychological approaches is psychological flexibility, a concept which this study focuses 
on and is discussed in more detail in the section below. 
1.5 Psychological Flexibility (PF) 
 In their meta-analysis, Kashdan & Rottenberg (2010) conclude that psychological 
flexibility (PF) refers to a number of dynamic processes which determine a person’s 
interactions with their environment. It has been suggested that PF can be defined the 
ability to (a) adapt to fluctuating environmental demands, (b) ‘rearrange’ mental 
resources, (c) take a different perspective, and (d) balance desires, needs and life domains 
(Kashdan & Rottenberg, 2010; p.866). After reviewing previous research in this area, 
Kashdan and Rottenberg (2010) suggested that PF has been extensively researched for 
around five decades under various labels such as ‘self-regulation’, ‘mindfulness and 
acceptance’, ‘executive control’, and ‘personality and developmental psychology’. 
Kashdan and Rottenberg (2010) also outline the nature, correlates and consequences of 
psychological flexibility. For instance, the importance of PF in personality development 
and in the ability to manage everyday challenges is emphasised by the construct of ‘ego-
resiliency’ (Block & Block, 2006). Ego-resiliency is defined by Block and Block (2006) 
as ‘the individual’s adaptive reserve, a dynamic ability to temporarily change from modal 
reaction or perceptual tendencies to reactions and precepts responsive to the immediately 
pressing situation and, more generally, to the inevitably fluctuating situational demands 
of life’ (p.318). 
Evidence suggests that ego-resiliency is strongly and positively related to identity 
development. Westenberg and Block (1993) found that young adults who reached further 
milestones of ego development (as conceptualised by Loevinger, 1987) demonstrated 
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higher ego-resiliency levels by showing more flexibility while responding to everyday 
challenges in multiple contexts than peers who were considered less mature. Individuals 
characterised as ego-resilient were observed to be flexible when responding to 
environmental contingencies – they demonstrated openness and curiosity, modified their 
behavioural responses to match the situational context and were able to behave in line 
with their long-term goals, rather than respond to everyday challenges impulsively by 
repetitively applying rigid, frequently ineffective, strategies (Block & Block, 2006; 
Kashdan & Rottenberg, 2010; Westenberg & Block, 1993).  
Psychological constructs of self-regulation, emotional regulation or coping 
flexibility (Carver & Scheier, 1998; Cheng & Cheung, 2005; Muraven & Baumeister, 
2000) also consider the significance of PF by emphasising the importance of adapting 
one’s responses to best match the situation. In their study, Tamir, Mitchell and Gross 
(2008) found that psychologically flexible individuals are more likely to regulate their 
emotions, thoughts and behaviour effectively to achieve the best possible results, 
depending on their situation. Additionally, these individuals demonstrated greater 
willingness and ability to tolerate ‘negative emotions’ (such as anger) in order to achieve 
valued goals (Tamir et al., 2008). Kashdan and Rottenberg (2010) indicated that a 
person’s sensitivity and responsiveness to their environment may be more important for 
their psychological well-being than pursuing the goal of ‘only experiencing positive 
emotions’. Furthermore, the evidence suggests that a person’s ability to navigate between 
enhancing or suppressing emotional expression, depending on situation, is a predictor of 
greater long-term adjustment (Bonanno, Papa, Lalande, Westphal, & Coifman, 2004). 
 There is also evidence that being psychologically flexible helps people to live 
more balanced lives and increases their quality of life. This has been attributed to an 
individuals’ ability to switch their attention from one life domain to another, as well as 
their ability to allocate their time flexibly (Block & Block, 2006; Kashdan & Rottenberg, 
2010). The ability to divide time flexibly and in accordance with personal values allows 
individuals to dedicate enough time to plan and work towards their goals but also allows 
them to enjoy leisure activities without feeling guilty. 
 Furthermore, it has been suggested that a person’s ability to flexibly switch 
between ‘time perspectives’ is an integral part of psychological well-being (Boniwell, 
Osin, Linley, & Ivanchenko, 2010; Flaxman, Blackledge, & Bond, 2011; Williams & 
Penman, 2011). Zimbardo (2002) suggests that ‘in an optimally balanced time 
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perspective, the past, present and future components blend and flexibly engage, 
depending on a situation’s demands and our needs and values’ (p. 62). Functioning on 
‘autopilot’, planning the future or reminiscing about past events are all functional actions 
which allow people to manage and enjoy their lives, and it is only a person’s inability to 
shift their attention from one time perspective to another in response to the particular 
context which may potentially lead to distress (Boniwell et al., 2010; Williams & Penman, 
2011). 
 The importance of PF has been also linked to executive functioning, which is an 
umbrella term comprising a variety of complex cognitive functions. Executive functions 
are associated with, among other things, the ability to sustain and shift attention, to self-
monitor, to plan and problem solve and to govern goal-directed action and adaptive 
responses (Chan, Shum, Toulopoulou, & Chen, 2008; Hart, Brockway, Fann, Maiuro, & 
Vaccaro, 2015; Wright, Day, & Howells, 2009). It has been found that impairment to any 
of the cognitive functions can have a negative impact on a persons’ ability to respond 
appropriately to suit the circumstances. A person’s inability to identify and monitor 
internal and external cues, to select and apply the most appropriate response to the 
situation, to monitor the outcome and to make adjustments means that they are frequently 
unable to achieve desirable outcomes. Cognitive inflexibility related to executive 
functioning may effect an individual in many ways, including their ability to develop and 
maintain relationships, to work, to live independently, etc. (Hart et al., 2015; Hughes, 
2013). 
 It is unsurprising, therefore, that a low level of psychological flexibility is 
considered to contribute to the development of psychopathology (Coifman & Bonanno, 
2010; Hayes et al., 1999), and extensive research has shown that there is a link between 
context-insensitive emotional, cognitive and behavioural responses and disorders such as 
depression or anxiety (Coifman & Bonanno, 2010; Kashdan & Rottenberg, 2010; 
Rottenberg, Kasch, Gross, & Gotlib, 2002). For instance, it has been noted that emotional 
responses displayed by individuals with depression are frequently less context 
appropriate, stereotypical and ‘inflexible’ (Bylsma, Morris, & Rottenberg, 2008).  
 The ability to flexibly respond to environmental contingencies is considered a 
crucial ingredient of psychological health and allows individuals to cope well with 
uncertainty and unpredictability in the world, where constant change is a rule rather than 
an exception (Block & Block, 2006; Bonanno, 2013; Kashdan & Rottenberg, 2010; 
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McCracken & Morley, 2014). Consequently, it has been proposed that treatments 
focusing on increasing flexibility have the potential to not only help people overcome 
their mental health difficulties but also achieve greater efficacy and fulfilment in their 
daily lives (Hayes et al., 1999; Kashdan & Rottenberg, 2010; McCracken & Morley, 
2014; Wersebe, Lieb, Meyer, Hofer, & Gloster, 2018). 
 In the last few decades, a new model of PF was proposed by the founders of ACT 
(Hayes, Strosahl, Bunting, Twohig, & Wilson, 2004; Hayes, Wilson, Gifford, Follette, & 
Strosahl, 1996). Within the ACT model it is hypothesised that a psychologically flexible 
person is able to be present in the moment and to change or persevere in behaving in 
certain ways if doing so is consistent with their values. Psychological inflexibility, on the 
other hand, results in individuals being more likely to relate to their private experiences 
and environmental contingences in a manner that is incoherent with their values and is 
considered to be a main source of psychopathology (Hayes, Luoma, Bond, Masuda, & 
Lillis, 2006; Hayes et al., 1999). 
Within the ACT model, PF comprises the following six processes (please also see 
Figure 1 in the journal paper): 
o Cognitive Defusion.  Cognitive defusion is the process of altering “the undesirable 
functions of thoughts and other private events, rather than trying to alter their form, 
frequency or situational sensitivity” (Hayes et al., 2006, p. 8). Cognitive defusion is, 
therefore, a learned ability to consider all private experiences as being ‘just 
experiences, not truths’, and contradicts the notion that private phenomena need to be 
acted upon. Cognitive defusion aims to reduce the literal quality of thoughts by 
disrupting the verbal rules which commonly link thoughts to overt behaviour (Hayes, 
Levin, Plumb-Vilardaga, Villatte, & Pistorello, 2013; Hayes et al., 2006). 
Consequently, cognitive defusion can lead to a reduction in believability and the 
‘reason-giving’ properties of private events, and can help person to develop a healthy 
scepticism about evaluative, reason-giving and literal language. 
 
o Acceptance. Acceptance is conceptualised as an alternative to Experiential Avoidance. 
It promotes willingness to embrace distressing private phenomena (without attempting 
to alter their frequency or content) when they are experienced in the context of 
behaving consistently with a person’s values. The process of acceptance contradicts 
the notion that the distressing symptoms must be controlled or avoided and that 
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aversive private phenomena need to be absent for meaningful therapeutic change and 
psychological health (Hayes et al., 1999). The willingness to practice acceptance is 
thought to commonly fluctuate from moment to moment, as experiencing distressing 
private events is naturally aversive. Consequently, it is not unusual that a person 
reverts to avoidance strategies at times, especially when their ability to engage in other 
ACT practices is compromised (Hayes et al., 1999). Developing an accepting stance 
is not an end goal in ACT - it is developed and applied to facilitate values-consistent 
change (Cullen, 2008). Ironically, even though symptom reduction is not the aim of 
ACT, it has been found that changing the functional meaning of distressing events 
commonly also changes their form and frequency, which may lead to symptom 
reduction. It is important to emphasise that acceptance is not an act of a passive 
tolerance or resignation – it does not encourage accepting aversive experiences ‘for 
the sake of it’ or because the person does not feel able to change unwanted experiences 
in their life (e.g. anxiety related to domestic abuse or bullying; Ciarrochi, Robb, & 
Godsell, 2005; Hayes et al., 1999). 
 
o Present-Moment Awareness. Present-Moment Awareness, or mindfulness, has been 
recognised by many psychological approaches as a crucial skill in achieving 
psychological well-being (Gilbert & Choden, 2015; Linehan, 1993). Twohig (2012) 
defines ‘being present’ as ‘flexible, fluid and voluntary attention to internal and 
external events as they are occurring, without attachment to evaluation or judgment’ 
(p. 503). The Present-Moment Awareness process enables a person to experience the 
environment more directly and, consequently, it promotes more flexible behavioural 
responses which are more likely to be consistent with a person’s chosen values. In 
order to develop and practice other ACT processes, a person needs to be able to note 
and describe private events without judgment and assign ‘reason-giving properties’, 
which is an essence of mindfulness skills. However, it is important to note that an 
increase in Present-Moment Awareness alone, particularly in relation to aversive 
private events, is not necessarily adaptive. Hayes et al. (2006) suggests that an increase 
in Present-Moment Awareness in the absence of acceptance may magnify Experiential 
Avoidance. Consequently, in ACT, an increase in Present-Moment Awareness is 
always facilitated in conjunction with acceptance to achieve positive therapeutic 
outcomes (Cardaciotto, Herbert, Forman, Moitra, & Farrow, 2008). 
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o Self-as-context. Self-as-context is a term that refers to a stable sense of self that 
observes the passing thoughts, feelings and other private phenomena which drift in 
and out of awareness. A person who has developed a sense of ‘self-as-context’ does 
not define self-identity with their private experiences but defines self as a ‘platform’ 
that is having or noticing these experiences (Atkins & Styles, 2016; Flaxman, et al., 
2011). 
 
o Values. Values can be defined as ‘chosen qualities of purposive action that can never 
be obtained as an object but can be instantiated moment by moment’ (Hayes et al., 
2006, p.9). In ACT, the core processes are not considered be ‘the end’ in itself – they 
serve the goal of pursuing a life that is consistent with one’s values. It is important to 
emphasise, however, that only meaningful, client-endorsed (not culturally endorsed) 
values are considered ‘useful’ in pursuing the goal of ‘valued living’ (Kashdan, Breen, 
& Julian, 2010; Kashdan & Mcknight, 2013; Sheldon & Elliot, 1999; Wilson & 
Murrell, 2004; Wong & Fry, 1998). Hayes, Villatte, Levin & Hildebrandt (2011b) 
proposed that, in conjunction with committed action, Values is an ‘activation process’ 
which motivates individuals to move towards their chosen life direction. 
 
o Committed Action. Hayes et al. (1999) defined committed action as ‘values-based 
action designed to create patterns of action that is itself values-based’ (p. 95). The 
Committed Action process involves choosing to behave in ways that are consistent 
with an individual’s values. The main aim of facilitating Committed Action is to help 
individuals gradually build patterns of sustainable, value-driven behaviour (Strosahl, 
Hayes, Wilson, & Gifford, 2004). Flaxman et al. (2011) conclude that elements of 
Committed Action are associated with: 1) behaving in accordance with a person's 
values (not just  with simply declaring that one will act in a certain way); 2) the ability 
to notice when behaviour has become values-inconsistent, followed by the 
modification of that behaviour in service of pursuing the values; 3) committing to act 
in a values-adherent way, despite being potentially exposed to some aversive private 
phenomena; 4) assuming an acceptance approach and taking advantage of 
opportunities to behave in a values-consistent manner in situations when efforts to act 
in a values-consistent way was unsuccessful; 5) publicly proclaiming  commitment to 
personal values in order to receive support from others when required; and 6) making 
plans which will move an individual toward their values by setting intermediary goals 
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and considering how to overcome potential obstacles. All PF processes are crucial in 
allowing a person to behave in a value-adherent manner. 
 
All six ACT processes have problematic manifestations which contribute to 
developing PI29 and to the development of psychopathology. The six components of PI 
are conceptualised as follows (please also see Figure 2 in the journal paper): 
o Cognitive Fusion. Cognitive Fusion is a result of verbal rules created and sustained by 
society which encourage the use of literal, reason-giving, problem-solving and 
evaluative language. Cognitive fusion refers to an excessive reliance on considering 
private events, such as thoughts or emotions, to explain their behaviour (Ciarrochi et 
al., 2005). A process of cognitive fusion ‘traps’ people into considering ‘the world in 
their mind’ as ‘the reality’, where they take their thoughts literally without taking any 
note of the cognitive processes (Hayes et al., 2013). As a result, humans respond to 
their thoughts as though they were ‘real’ and, in some instances, they respond to a 
thought of feared stimuli the same way as actual stimuli – by experiencing anxiety 
symptoms (Ciarrochi, Bilich, & Godsell, 2010). The presence of fusion is not 
necessarily detrimental to the person (and it can be very advantageous at times), but it 
becomes harmful when overextended (Hayes et al., 1999). As a result, a person is less 
likely to respond to contextual contingencies in a way that allows them to act in a 
manner consistent with their goals and values.  
 
o Experiential Avoidance. Experiential Avoidance is viewed as a potentially harmful 
process by a wide range of theoretical approaches, including Client-Centred Therapy 
(Rogers, 1961), the Gestalt approach (Greenberg & Safran, 1987) and Dialectical 
Behavioural Therapy (DBT; Linehan, 1993). This ubiquity may indicate that 
Experiential Avoidance is an important aspect of human functioning. Experiential 
Avoidance can be broadly defined as ‘the attempt to alter the form, frequency, or 
intensity of private experiences, such as thoughts, feelings, bodily sensations, or 
memories, even when doing so is costly, ineffective, or unnecessary’ (Hayes et al., 
2013; p.184). In line with the functional contextualism approach, there are many 
different factors that contribute to the development and maintenance of Experiential 
Avoidance, such as inappropriate and excessive over-extension of verbal rules, social 
                                            
29 Psychological inflexibility 
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modelling of experiential avoidance, social expectation for reason-giving (even if 
sources are difficult to identify) and experiencing positive short-term effects of 
avoidant behaviour (Hayes, et al., 1999). Arguably, in ACT, not all forms of 
Experiential Avoidance are considered to be damaging – it only becomes problematic 
when it is overextended and restricts a person’s ability to introduce changes required 
to live a values-driven life (Ciarrochi et al., 2005; Flaxman et al., 2011). It is 
hypothesised in ACT that a person’s tendency to assume that negatively evaluated 
private events can be changed in the same way as the external events (e.g. by avoiding 
them) leads to psychological suffering (Hayes, et al., 1996). Evidence suggests that 
employing avoidance coping strategies, such as thought suppression, substance abuse, 
developing rituals, etc. is not only often damaging to person’s well-being and health 
but also results in the increase of experiencing the unwelcome thought or feeling 
(Ciarrochi et al., 2005; Hayes et al., 1996). 
 
o Lack of Present-Moment Awareness. Lack of Present-Moment Awareness is 
characterised as a person’s inability or unwillingness to attend to the present moment, 
especially in the context of experiencing unwanted private phenomena. A lack of 
contact with the present moment often results in living on ‘autopilot’, without paying 
attention to thinking processes or noticing what a person reacts to and reduces a 
person’s ability to respond to environmental contingencies. This further contributes to 
psychological inflexibility by strengthening the ‘controlling powers’ of the 
conceptualised past and future over a person’s behaviour (Hayes, et al., 1999). It is not 
suggested that a person should be permanently in state of ‘mindful awareness’, this 
would not be very practical (Kashdan & Rottenberg, 2010). It is argued, however, that 
appropriate mindful practice is a key ingredient to increasing psychological flexibility 
(Hayes et al., 2013). 
 
o Attachment to Conceptualised Self. Attachment to Conceptualised Self (or ‘Self-as-
Story’; Atkins & Styles, 2016) can be defined as a person’s fused, judgmental and 
inflexible narrative about themselves. The process of attachment to the conceptualised 
self contributes further to a person’s psychological inflexibility due to the lack of 
responsiveness to context. People who are strongly attached to their ‘self-as-story’ 
narrative are more likely to engage in unhelpful and ineffective avoidant strategies and 
are less able to notice and appreciate that human behaviour, including their own, is 
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context-dependant. As a result, they are less likely to notice and appreciate behaviours 
they display that are inconsistent with their conceptualised view of self (Hayes, et al., 
1999; Moran, Almada, & McHugh, 2018). 
 
o Lack of Values Clarity. In accordance with the ‘workability criterion’ postulated in 
functional contextualism, all behaviours are assessed in relation to the adherence to a 
person’s values; thus, in this context, values govern the criteria for the application of 
workability (Hayes et al., 2006, 1999). In ACT, processes associated with 
psychological inflexibility limit a person’s ability to change or persist in behaviour 
which is consistent with their chosen values. Lack of Values Clarity is particularly 
evident when a person is unable to specify what the most important value in their life 
is, when personal values are heavily influenced by society instead of truly personal 
choices or when values are conceptualised in terms of avoidance. Values which are 
externally imposed rather than self-integrated are problematic as the behaviours 
consistent with these values do not have naturally appetitive consequences for the 
individual and are frequently difficult to maintain (Sheldon & Elliot, 1999). 
 
o Lack of Committed Action (Inaction, Impulsivity or Avoidant Persistence). In ACT, 
this set of behaviours is thought to limit a person’s ability to commit to value-driven 
behaviour. This is frequently demonstrated when a person selects achieving short-term 
goals, which often offer immediate gratification (e.g. drinking alcohol, avoiding 
anxiety-provoking situations), over behaviours that are consistent with long-term 
appetitive qualities of life. As a result, the person’s behavioural repertoire narrows and 
focuses mainly on alleviating psychological pain, rather than living a fulfilling and 
meaningful life (Flaxman et al., 2011; Hayes, et al., 1999). 
1.6 Specific Factors 
Specific factors refer to components clearly outlined by proponents of a specific 
therapy as the active processes of psychotherapeutic change. Supporters of the specific 
factors approach propose that the use of techniques specific to each particular theoretical 
orientation in psychotherapy are responsible for achieving psychotherapeutic change in 
clients. Chambless and Ollendick (2001) argue that some specific models of 
psychotherapy show superior outcomes for particular difficulties. For instance, research 
suggests that particular treatments, including CBT, behavioural and psychodynamic 
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therapies lead to superior outcomes in treating depressive symptoms in adults (Cuijpers, 
van Straten, Andersson, & van Oppen, 2008; Tolin, 2010). Likewise, Borkovec and 
Costello (1993) found that CBT was significantly superior to non-directive therapy for 
generalised anxiety disorder (GAD) among adults. CBT, in particular, has been 
considered a very effective evidence-based treatment and, as such, has been 
recommended as a first treatment option for various disorders (NICE, 2011b, 2018). It 
has been noted, however, that CBT is considered more structured in comparison to less 
explicitly directive therapies, such as psychodynamic therapy, making it easier to 
measure. Consequently, the outcomes cited in the literature may be skewed towards CBT. 
Furthermore, Butler and Strupp (1986) argue that the specific/common factors dichotomy 
is artificial, as common factors such as working alliance are so profoundly entangled with 
the techniques delivered in particular psychotherapy models that separation is impossible. 
1.7 Therapy Approaches Relevant to This Study 
In the current study, PF was conceptualised from an ACT perspective but examined 
in the context of CBT. In order to better understand differences and similarities between 
these two approaches, both CBT and ACT will be briefly discussed in this section. 
1.7.1 Cognitive Behavioural Therapy (CBT). Cognitive behavioural therapy 
(CBT) was developed by incorporating two influential therapeutic approaches: 
behavioural therapy (BT; Wolpe & Lang, 1964) and cognitive theory, (Beck, 1976). 
Behavioural therapy. Traditionally, the focus of behavioural therapy was placed on 
observable behaviours which could be directly targeted for treatment purposes (Davey, 
2014). From the behavioural perspective, all adaptive and dysfunctional behaviours 
displayed by the person were considered a result of the interaction between their learning 
history, biology and current context (Skinner, 1976). Within the behavioural approach, it 
has been proposed that all behaviour is functional and that it can be learnt and maintained 
in two different ways: through classical and/or operant conditioning (Pierce & Cheney, 
2013). In short, classical conditioning takes place when a person learns to associate that 
a particular stimulus (the conditioned stimulus) predicts the occurrence of another 
particular stimulus (the unconditioned stimulus) (Pavlov, 1902). In contrast, Skinner 
(1937) introduced the idea of ‘operant conditioning’, which explains the learning of a 
specific behaviour in context of this behaviour resulting in reinforcing consequences. 
Behavioural changes are considered to be the main goals in behavioural therapy, and there 
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is a great body of literature evidencing behavioural techniques as being successful when 
applied across different populations and presentations (Davey, 2014). A crucial aspect of 
BT is a collaborative and person-centred approach when working with a client. The 
therapy is required to understand which of the person’s unique experiences resulted in 
their current difficulties and to select the most appropriate set techniques to address them.  
Behavioural techniques, such as exposure, target processes of classical conditioning by 
exposing clients to the feared stimuli. In order to target behaviours shaped by operant 
conditioning, techniques such as ‘token economy’ (receiving tokens for displaying 
desirable behaviours, which can be exchanged for reinforcing items) or ‘response 
shaping’, which entails reinforcing rarely occurring desirable behaviours (Davey, 2014). 
Another behavioural intervention which aims to target behaviours shaped by operant 
conditioning is behavioural activation (Westbrook et al., 2011). Behavioural activation 
consists of various therapeutic strategies aiming to alter the environmental contingencies 
which impact on low mood and associated behaviour (Dimidjian et al., 2006). 
Behavioural activation techniques are currently an integral part of therapy for depression 
rooted in behavioural tradition (Dimidjian, Barrera, Martell, Muñoz, & Lewinsohn, 2011; 
Westbrook, et al., 2011). 
Cognitive theory (CT). A purely behavioural approach to understanding and treating 
mental health difficulties has been critiqued for not acknowledging the complexity of a 
person’s inner life and ignoring important mental processes, such as beliefs, thoughts and 
appraisals (Beck, 1967). As a result, in the 1970s, cognitive theory became an influential 
approach aiming to explain and treat mental health difficulties (Davey, 2014). According 
to the main CT principle, an individual’s appraisal of the event, and not the event itself, 
is the source of distress. Beck (1976) proposed a distinction between cognitions, 
emotions, behaviour and physiological sensations and suggests that these components 
interact with each other. Beck’s (1976) model emphasises the primacy of cognitions by 
hypothesising that feelings and behaviour are fundamentally governed by the way that 
events are interpreted. Beck’s (1976) cognitive model of emotional disorder emphasises 
the significance of early life experiences in people’s development. It theorises that 
childhood experiences contribute to the development of an individuals’ core beliefs about 
the world, others and themselves. Additionally, early life experiences influence the 
development of a person’s ‘rules for living’ that govern their behaviour. Most individuals 
develop a combination of positive and negative core beliefs and ‘rules for living’. 
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Furthermore, they adopt various cognitive and behavioural strategies to manage everyday 
difficulties and to protect themselves from activating negative core beliefs. It has been 
hypothesised that mental health difficulties are likely to emerge when existing coping 
strategies become ineffective in the event of a ‘critical incident’. The critical incident may 
be described as a ‘one-off event’ or an accumulation of many stressful minor events which 
trigger negative core beliefs and evoke a negative emotional state (Westbrook, et al., 
2011). In order to cope with crisis, individuals are likely to employ additional coping 
strategies which are frequently helpful in the short term (e.g. avoidance of feared 
situations) but may become problematic in the long term (e.g. being unable to go 
shopping) or when applied in different contexts. By continuing to employ a dysfunctional 
pattern of behaviour, individuals create a ‘maintenance cycle’ that aims to reduce or avoid 
the distress, but often perpetuates the problem (Greenberger & Padesky, 1995). Within 
CT, it has been suggested that the majority of individuals develop ‘cognitive biases’ 
(thinking errors), which serve as thinking shortcuts and help people make sense of the 
world. These biases usually reflect an individual ‘thinking style’ and only become a 
problem when the bias is exaggerated or chronic (e.g. black-and-white thinking, 
catastrophising; Westbrook et al., 2011). A more extreme version of cognitive bias is 
likely to be triggered at times of heightened emotional arousal, which often diminishes a 
person’s ability to attend to and accept evidence that counters their way of thinking, thus 
strengthening their unhelpful beliefs and reducing their opportunities to make changes 
(Beck, 2011). 
Cognitive Behavioural Therapy (CBT). From their early days, CT and BT 
continued to develop and influence each other, resulting in the emergence of the treatment 
model commonly known as Cognitive Behavioural Therapy (CBT; Westbrook et al., 
2011). CBT quickly became an attractive choice for clinicians as behavioural techniques 
proved to be more economical and effective than traditional psychotherapy and, at the 
same time, mental processes were put at the heart of therapy (Beck, Rush, Shaw, & 
Emery, 1979; Westbrook et al., 2011). In accordance with the cognitive perspective, in 
order to reduce distress, an individual needs to alter the way they think. From the 
cognitive approach, treatment strives to restructure a person’s unhelpful cognitive 
patterns, as it is hypothesised that enabling people to appraise their cognitions in a more 
realistic and adaptive way will lead to reducing their distress. In order to achieve this goal, 
cognitive and behavioural techniques, such as thought challenging and/or behavioural 
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experiments, are recommended and employed by the founders of this approach (Beck et 
al., 1979). CBT postulates that intervention should always be based on conceptualisation 
of a problem presented by individual client and that this formulation should inform what 
approach and techniques are chosen during the course of treatment (Beck, 2011). In order 
to achieve long-lasting improvement of a person’s mental health and psychological well-
being, CB therapists aim to identify and modify that person’s core beliefs about 
themselves, others and the world. The National Institute of Clinical Excellence (NICE, 
2009, 2011b, 2018) recommends CBT for several psychiatric disorders (e.g. anxiety, 
depression, PTSD) and number of meta-analyses have found that CBT is an efficacious 
treatment across various populations and presentations (Butler, Chapman, Forman, & 
Beck, 2006; Gaudiano, 2010; Hofmann, Asnaani, Vonk, Sawyer, & Fang, 2012; Warwick 
et al., 2017). In the last few decades, however, there has been growing dissatisfaction with 
the CBT model. The idea of cognitive restructuring being a process of change in CBT has 
been challenged by research showing that behavioural rather than cognitive techniques 
were responsible for the majority of the outcomes (Burns & Spangler, 2001; Dobson & 
Khatri, 2000). To address the shortcomings of CBT, a plethora of acceptance and 
mindfulness-based therapies, such as ACT, have been developed.  
1.7.2 Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT). ACT is deeply grounded in a 
comprehensive ‘post–Skinnerian’ contextual behavioural theory of language acquisition 
and cognition, named Relational Frame Theory (RFT; Hayes, Barnes-Holmes, & Roche, 
2001; Hayes et al., 1999). A main goal of ACT is to alter the way the person relates to 
their private events, without attempting to alter the content or frequency of those events 
(Hayes et al., 2006). Techniques used in ACT target the six core therapeutic processes 
described in Section 1.5 to increase a person’s level of PF. ACT introduces the idea that 
helping people to ‘live well’ is not always synonymous with symptom reduction, and the 
emphasis on symptom reduction can in fact maintain and promote psychological suffering 
(Hayes et al., 1999). 
One of the fundamental ACT suppositions is that ‘the core of human language and 
cognition is the learned and contextually controlled ability to arbitrarily relate events 
mutually and in combination, and to change the functions of specific events based on their 
relations to others’ (Hayes et al., 2006, p. 5). In ACT, an inflexible and overgeneralised 
use of language is hypothesised to lead to human suffering (Hayes et al., 1999). ACT 
subscribes to the philosophy that in life, pain is inevitable, but suffering is optional, and 
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it has been proposed that human suffering is maintained by engaging in processes of 
experiential avoidance and cognitive fusion (Hayes, et al., 2004; Hayes et al., 1999). It 
has been suggested that humans learned to relate to and make sense of their private events 
in the same way as they would relate to and understand external events and, consequently, 
they assume that they can control their cognitions and feelings in the same way they can 
control the external events (Hayes et al., 1999). In order to control or eliminate unpleasant 
private phenomena, individuals may engage in behaviours that are potentially damaging 
to their well-being (e.g. drinking excessively), and which prevent them from living the 
life they desire (Hayes et al., 1999). In essence, any behaviour that functions to reduce 
the visceral qualities of experience could be categorised as experiential avoidance.  
1.7.3 ACT treatment.  In order to demonstrate how PF is traditionally facilitated 
in ACT, a brief outline of some common techniques used in ACT will be presented in 
this section.  
There is no specific protocol or restricted collection of therapeutic techniques that 
inform ACT intervention. As a functional approach, ACT should be flexibly applied to 
individual clients by taking into account their learning history and current context 
(Hayes et al., 2013). A key aim of ACT is to increase clients’ levels of PF, which is 
considered to be a process of change.  
In ACT, the therapeutic process begins with the therapist learning what strategies 
have previously been employed by their client to solve the presenting difficulty. This is 
followed by a ‘workability assessment’, which explores the client’s experience of using 
these strategies to solve the problem. In ACT, workability is viewed as a degree to which 
a particular behaviour is moving a client towards what they value in life (Hayes et al., 
1999). The purpose of this is to help clients realise that the strategies they have utilised 
in the past, although they may have helped solve different prior problems, are not working 
to solve the presenting problem. This is usually followed by a process of ‘creative 
hopelessness’, which refers to creating a space for attempting new approaches by letting 
go of unhelpful strategies. The process of creative hopelessness is followed by various 
techniques that mirror the core ACT process. ACT therapists use a number of techniques 
to facilitate PF processes. 
Acceptance is targeted by the use of metaphors and mindfulness techniques. Clients 
are encouraged to re-live private experiences, such as anxiety, in the moment, instead of 
trying to control the frequency or intensity of such experiences occurring (Cullen, 2008). 
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Clients are familiarised with a concept of acceptance early on in therapy, as the practice 
of acceptance facilitates other PF processes.  
The most common technique used to target defusion in ACT, the ‘word repetition 
technique’, has been traditionally used in Gestalt therapy. This technique involves 
repeating a word until its semantic meaning is no longer dominant and is consequently 
‘defused’ (e.g. ‘milk, milk, milk’; Flaxman et al., 2011). It is hypothesised that, when 
applied to ‘distressing’ thoughts, this technique will decrease a client’s attachment to the 
literal meaning of the unwanted thoughts (Masuda, Hayes, Sackett, & Twohig, 2004), and 
has been shown to be more effective than distraction (Masuda, Feinstein, Wendell, & 
Sheehan, 2010). More specifically, defusion exercises aim to increase attention to the 
process of thinking and reduce the tendency to be governed by aversive internal 
experiences, such as self-deprecating thoughts.  
Various mindfulness techniques (e.g. ‘eating a raisin’; Kabat-Zinn, 1990) and self-
as-context interventions (e.g. chessboard metaphor; Hayes et al., 1999) are frequently 
employed and introduced together to facilitate present-moment awareness, to help clients 
flexibly shift their attention and to assist disentangling from distressing private events 
(Hayes et al., 1999).  
ACT therapists employ a range of techniques to help clients to uncover and clarify 
their values and to assist them in (re)gaining a sense of life direction (Strosahl et al., 
2004). The ‘epitaph exercise’, which aims to elicit a client’s values by asking them to 
think about what they would like to be written about them on their tombstone, is a 
technique frequently used in ACT. Thus, traditional aspects of behaviour change 
procedures, such as goal setting, are incorporated into therapy, and barriers (in the form 
of challenging thoughts, emotional reactions and other difficulties) are prepared for and 
worked through. Any type of behavioural intervention, which might include exposure 
exercises and skills training, is incorporated at this stage, maintaining consistency with 
ACT processes and principles (Twohig, 2012). 
It is crucial to acknowledge that all six core therapeutic processes are key to 
producing change, and that a selection of the therapeutic techniques used to target them 
should be informed by individual formulation (Hayes et al., 2004), including metaphors, 
stories, mindfulness and defusion techniques (e.g. ‘milk, milk, milk’) to break literal 
meaning of thoughts and promote commitment to leading a values-driven life.  
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1.8 Psychological Flexibility as a Process of Change in ACT 
The followng section will provide an overview of studies which focus on 
exploring the relationship beween PF and distress, as well as on examinining the impact 
of ACT on levels of PF. 
In recent years, a number of meta-analyses have shown that ACT is an effective 
treatment across several different difficulties and populations (A-Tjak et al., 2016; Bluett, 
Homan, Morrison, Levin, & Twohig, 2014; French, Golijani-Moghaddam, & Schröder, 
2017; Öst, 2014). It has been proposed that ACT is successful because it targets common 
core processes of therapeutic change which PF comprises (Villatte et al., 2016). 
 There is a growing body of evidence from cross-secional studies that supports the 
hypothesis that numerous mental health difficulties can be understood in the context of a 
person’s psychological inflexibility (Ciarrochi et al., 2010). For instance, Masuda, Price, 
Anderson, Schmertz, and Calamaras (2009) discovered that PF mediates the relationship 
between psychological distress and stigmatising attitudes in individuals who were 
stigmitised, as well as in ‘stigmatisers’. Additionally, research exploring the relationhip 
between child abuse and psychological distress in young people concluded that 
individuals who engaged in persistent avoidance strategies following the abuse were more 
likely to develop mental health difficulties than those who did not (Marx & Sloan, 2002). 
Bardeen and Fergus (2016) found that individuals who scored highly on cognitive fusion 
and experiencial avoidance may be particularly susceptible to experiencing symptoms of 
depression, anxiety, stress and PTSD. Additionally, it was noted that a positive 
relationship between cognitive fusion and symptoms of all measured difficulties were 
significantly stronger in the presence of high experiencal avoidance scores. It was 
concluded that the interaction between high levels of experiential avoidance and cognitive 
fusion may be particularly problematic in the context of experiencing psychological 
distress (Bardeen & Fergus, 2016). 
 It is important to emphasise, however, that the cross-sectional design used in these 
studies can limit a researcher’s ability to derive the direction of causality – it is impossible 
to know whether low PF contributes to the development of psychological distress or 
whether psychological distress leads to psychological inflexibility (Ciarrochi et al., 2010). 
 In recent years, a considerable amount of literature examining the process of 
change in ACT therapies has been published (Twohig, Vilardaga, Levin, & Hayes, 2015). 
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These studies have shown that changes in ACT processes are related to changes in 
outcomes. For instance, in their study of ACT for tinnitus distress, Hesser, Westin, Hayes, 
and Andersson (2009) found that increased levels of cognitive defusion and acceptance 
predicted long-term symptom reduction. A meta-analysis of laboratory-based component 
studies conducted by Levin, Hildebrandt, Lillis, and Hayes (2012) showed that the 
components of PF are ‘psychologically active’ and play an important role in producing 
desired outcomes. 
 Twohig et al. (2015) reported that, when a temporal relationship between levels of 
PF and symptoms of OCD was examined, changes in PF levels predicted changes in 
symptoms of OCD better than changes of OCD symptoms predicted changes in PF level 
(Twohig et al., 2015). Similar findings were reported by Dalrymple & Herbert (2007), 
who found that early changes in PF predicted changes in severity of GAD. Lundgren, 
Dahl, & Hayes (2008) reported that psychological flexibility mediates changes in quality 
of life, length of seizures and psychological well-being when ACT is used as 
psychological treatment for epilepsy. Aforementioned findings support the hypothesis 
that PF mediates therapeutic change in therapies which target it directly (Villatte et al., 
2016). 
1.9 Psychological Flexibility as a Process of Change in Other Treatments 
 As previously discussed, PF is considered to be an important process which 
contributes to theraputic outcomes, when targeted directly (Villatte et al., 2016). In this 
section, the existing literature that examines changes (or lack of) in PF during treatments 
other than ACT will be briefly discussed.  
 Arch et al. (2012) found that PF largely increased as a result of both ACT and CBT 
intervention for mixed anxiety disorders. Similar findings were reported when the 
outcomes of ‘mindfulness and acceptance-based’ and traditional CBT group therapies for 
social anxiety disorder were compared (Kocovski, Fleming, Hawley, Huta, & Antony, 
2013). Moreover, it has been reported that emotional acceptance and time spent engaging 
in valued action increased as a result of acceptance-based behaviour therapy for GAD 
(Hayes, Orsillo, & Roemer, 2010; Roemer & Orsillo, 2007). 
 In their early articles, Forman et al. (2012) and  Forman, Herbert, Moitra, Yeomans 
& Geller (2007) argued that the evidence from research that compared ACT and CBT for 
depression and anxiety suggested that CBT and ACT achieve therapeutic change using 
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distinct mediational processes. In their recent publication, however, Forman and Herbert 
(2019) concluded that both treatments utlised principles of classical and operant 
conditioning and that aspects of the ACT approach were becoming more prominent in 
traditional cognitive and behavioural interventions. 
1.10 Research Rationale 
In this section, previously discussed key concepts are summarised to outline the 
rationale for conducting the current study. 
As indicated in the Introduction, mental health difficulties have a significant impact 
on quality and length of life worldwide (IHME, 2013; MHF, 2016). Currently, there is a 
plethora of psychotherapeutic approaches which are effective in alleviating symptoms of 
mental illness (Laska et al., 2013; Luborsky et al., 2002), and it has been suggested that 
identifying and promoting processes of change which are common across various 
successful types of therapy could lead to increasing the effectiveness of available 
treatments (Kazdin, 2006). Consequently, the effectiveness of psychotherapy could be 
improved by either focusing on ‘what works’ in the existing treatment approaches or by 
developing a ‘modular treatment’, which encompasses all elements of therapy which are 
thought to produce therapeutic change (Kazdin, 2007; Villatte et al., 2016).  
Over the years, various therapeutic processes have been labelled as ‘common 
factors’ and were considered to largely contribute to the therapeutic outcome (Tschacher 
et al., 2014; Weinberger, 1995), and there is an abundance of evidence to suggest that 
factors such as quality of working alliance or exposure techniques contribute to 
therapeutic outcome (Lambert, 1992; Laska et al., 2013). One change process which has 
generated much interest and research in the last few decades is the concept of 
psychological flexibility (Hayes et al., 2013; Hayes, et al., 2011b; Kashdan & Rottenberg, 
2010). Psychological flexibility has been considered an important ingredient of 
psychological health across various psychological approaches (Kashdan & Rottenberg, 
2010) but is currently mostly associated with ACT (Hayes et al., 1999). 
There is growing evidence that an increase in PF is associated with a decrease in 
distress across a range of diagnoses, which suggests that PF is a trans-diagnostic concept. 
It is unclear, however, whether other successful therapies also operate through the process 
of PF. Consequently, this study aimed to examine whether PF can be detected in the talk 
of participants who engage in therapy which does not explicitly target PF. Furthermore, 
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it aimed to explore whether changes in detected levels of PF are related to clinical 
outcomes. 
This study will contribute to existing understanding of change processes in 
psychological treatment and will potentially inform further research aiming to develop 
the most effective treatment models. The first step will be to explore whether PF can be 
identified and quantified across therapies. Additionally, in order to investigate its 
relationship to outcomes, future research can then seek to replicate findings using an 
established framework. 
2. Extended Methodology 
2.1 Epistemology 
Potter (1996) suggested that epistemology is an important consideration in research 
as it shapes how studies are designed, conducted and interpreted. The epistemological 
position adopted in this study is functional contextualism, which is situated with the 
paradigm of behavioural pragmatism (Biglan & Hayes, 1996; Hayes et al., 1999), which 
emphasises psychological epistemology over ontological claims (Vilardaga, Hayes, 
Levin, & Muto, 2009). Within the functional contextualism approach, the process of 
scientific analysis is considered to be a process of creation, rather than discovery. 
Consequently, instead of focusing on uncovering impressive ontological truths, it focuses 
on analysing the relationship between behaviour and the context it occurs in (Biglan & 
Hayes, 1996). 
In this approach to science, the truth is determined pragmatically, meaning that if 
an analysis leads to the achievement of analytic goal, then it meets the truth criteria of 
‘successful working’ (Hayes, 1993).  Furthermore, truth and meaning are related to ‘…the 
prediction and influence, with precision, scope, and depth, of whole organisms interacting 
in and with a context considered historically and situationally’ (Hayes et al., 2013, p.181). 
The core analytical unit of analysis in functional contextualism is ‘act-in-context’. In 
order to predict and influence any behaviour, a variable that allows for that behaviour to 
be predicted needs to be identified and evaluated for its ability to influence the outcome 
when manipulated (Biglan & Hayes, 1996). The aim of scientific examination in 
functional contextualism is to identify rules and theories that can prove useful to the 
development of basic and applied theories and the measurement of theoretically important 
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processes and their effectiveness over a broad range of levels of analysis (Gifford & 
Hayes, 1999; Hayes et al., 2013). 
In adherence with the truth criterion of ‘workability’, all scientific analyses are 
considered to be valid if there is an analytic goal to give direction and to declare which 
features of the context are, pragmatically, most significant (Gifford & Hayes, 1999). The 
aim of this approach to science is not to illustrate how ‘the world is functioning’ but to 
find useful ways to guide effective action. The analytic goals are always arbitrary and 
enable analysis; they are not the result of the analysis itself (Biglan & Hayes, 1996). The 
functional contextualism paradigm does not attempt to disqualify principles of other 
epistemological positions, as long as they are able to demonstrate utilitarian value and do 
not prescribe any particular methodology.   
The analytic goals of this study are to determine whether PF can be identified in the 
talk of participants who engage in therapy which does not target PF directly, and to 
examine whether changes in detected levels of PF are related to clinical outcomes. In 
adherence with the truth criterion, it has been acknowledged that PF may not be ‘a real 
construct’ in the ontological sense, but it appears to be a useful way of understanding the 
processes of therapeutic change. 
2.2 Methodology 
Functional contextualism allows for many analytic goals and, as such, does not 
require any particular research methodology (Biglan & Hayes, 1996). The analytic goal 
of this study was to establish whether PF processes can be identified in participant talk 
during therapy that does not overtly target PF.  
After reviewing relevant literature, the researchers decided that an exploratory 
study design was the most appropriate to achieve the aims of this study. Qualitative 
research design is frequently used to study novel under-researched areas or when the 
field's major concepts, hypotheses, issues, processes and stages are unknown (Bryman, 
1984). Exploratory research design allows for novel concepts to be explored flexibly and 
leads to better understanding of the studied idea (Maxwell, 2009; Robson & McCartan, 
2015). Exploratory studies frequently provide ‘a platform’ for future research or may help 
to determine that further research on the chosen phenomena is not worth pursuing. This 
approach is useful within this research to generate appropriate data to answer the 
hypotheses and achieve the outlined goals. 
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The current study is deeply rooted in pre-existing data and literature on PF, with a 
particular emphasis on PF defined within ACT. Although evidence supports the notion 
that PF is an important process of change in ACT, currently, very little is known about 
whether it also plays an important role in producing change in other successful therapies. 
In order to explore whether PF processes can be detected in other therapies, a coding 
framework was developed to aid the process of identifying PF processes in the talk of 
participants in the context of CBT therapy. 
Although no quantitative measures were used in this study, the quantitative 
outcomes of therapy accumulated in the original study were considered in order to 
establish whether the identified variables of PF could predict the outcome of therapy (see 
journal paper for more details). The process of attempting to predict the therapy outcomes 
has been included in the research design to further explore the ‘workability’ criteria of 
the truth assumed by the functional contextualism philosophy. 
2.3 Data 
The data used in this study were collected as a part of a separate doctoral research 
project. In the original project, there were five clients who each attended eight sessions30 
of CBT for depression. Consent for data to be used for secondary analysis was given by 
three participants. 
2.4 Participant Demographics  
Table 14 provides the demographic information for the three participants who 
consented to their data being used for secondary analysis. Ages ranged from 35 to 60 
(mean age 44.6 years); one participant was retired and two were unemployed.  
Table 14. Additional Participant Demographics  
Participant Number Marital Status Occupation 
1 Married Unemployed 
2 Married Retired 
3 Separated Unemployed 
                                            
30 One participant attended nine sessions due to disclosing some safeguarding issues addressing which 
took priority over the routine therapeutic activity. 
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2.5 Data storage and security31 
The audio recordings of the sessions for the three participants who consented for 
their data to be used in further studies were transferred and saved onto an encrypted USB 
stick. Recordings of sessions chosen for analysis were securely transferred via ‘Send This 
File’ to the transcriber, who signed a confidentiality agreement (Appendix D). The 
transcribed data were stored securely on the encrypted USB stick. Upon the completion 
of the study, data will be securely stored for seven years and then destroyed. 
2.6 Procedure 
2.6.1 Coding procedure. In this section, the decision-making process of assigning 
a specific PF category to examples of participant talk (presented in Table 12 of the 
journal paper) is outlined in detail. 
Acceptance 
‘Yeah, and just, yeah. I think, well, this is me and that’s it isn’t it?’ 
This statement has been coded as Acceptance, as it illustrates participant’s 
willingness to accept herself as she is, with all positive and unpleasant internal 
experiences. This was a shift from her expressing that wanted to be ‘normal’ and believing 
that in order to live a fulfilling life she needed to be free from all the aversive internal 
experiences. During the conversation, this participant mentioned that she was introducing 
new activities into her life, which were concordant with her values, despite feeling low in 
mood. A link between acceptance and committed action is very important to consider as 
an act of acceptance not accompanied by a clear commitment to behave in particular 
value-based manner can be conceptualised as a resignation (Hayes et al., 1999). 
Acceptance – Experiential Avoidance (Neutral)  
 ‘It’s just hard [to feel this way].’ 
 This statement was coded ‘neutral’ as it could potentially fit within the 
‘Acceptance’ or ‘Experiential Avoidance’ category – there is currently not enough 
information to assign the directional coding. If the above statement was expressed in the 
context of accepting that one can have a good quality of life despite experiencing 
unpleasant private events, it would be coded as ‘Acceptance’. If, on the other hand, the 
participant described avoidant strategies she employed to manage these private 
                                            
31 Please see Appendices A, B, and C in relation to ethical approval obtained for this study.  
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phenomena, such as suppression, distraction etc., the statement would be categorised as 
‘Experiential Avoidance’.   
Experiential Avoidance  
 ‘I mean, I can have… I can have the radio on in the morning, like, and I’ll be 
singing literally to the songs so that my mind don’t think about anything else; and, no, 
they’re still there.’ 
 In this example, the participant clearly describes utilising avoidant strategies to 
suppress her thoughts. She reports that she was trying to make sure that she was not 
thinking about anything else than the activity she was engaging in, but quickly discovered 
that attempts to suppress the unwanted thoughts were unsuccessful, which is congruent 
with the literature on thought suppression (Hayes, 2016; Wegner, 1994).  
Cognitive Defusion 
‘It’s a feeling, it can’t hurt me. That's what I tell myself all the time.’ 
The above statement is an example of person recognising that private events can 
be observed in non-literal way – as just ‘thoughts’ or ‘feelings’; and that they do not have 
to be acted upon. This participant defuses herself from the feeling by just noting it, 
without assigning any ‘casual power’ to it, and without trying to change anything.  
Cognitive Defusion – Cognitive Fusion (Neutral) 
 ‘I do, yeah, I do feel like it’s too much, but I think that’s because of my mental 
state. But then is my mental state this way because I’ve taken on too much? That’s what 
I think.’ 
The above statement is directionally ambivalent because, on one hand, the 
participant describes a causal relationship between mental state and feelings (Cognitive 
Fusion), but, on the other hand, she recognises that she may be just responding to the 
demands of her current context (Cognitive Defusion).  
Cognitive Fusion 
‘If my head would switch off for five minutes I’d be fine, but it’s like I went to bed 
last night quarter past ten, quarter past one… I was still awake.’ 
In the above statement, the participant is outlining that having thoughts going 
through her mind is keeping her from being ‘fine’ and furthermore, it’s keeping her from 
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being able to sleep. A code of Cognitive Fusion was assigned to this statement, as it shows 
that this participant relates to her thoughts in ‘a reason-giving way’.  
Present-Moment Awareness 
 ‘I would say I was between angry and upset.’ 
 This participant described a recent event in her life that resulted in a strong 
emotional reaction. She demonstrated that she was able to connect with her feelings at 
that moment, which is an important step in the direction of becoming psychologically 
flexible (Hayes et al., 2010; Wright et al., 2009). 
Present-Moment Awareness – Lack of Present-Moment Awareness (Neutral) 
 ‘It was like when you said, “I’ve been down there and up there but I’ve never been 
in the middle”. Well I must’ve been.’ 
 In this statement, the participants reports that she has never noted being ‘in the 
middle’ in terms of her mood, which suggests that her self-awareness skills were not very 
well developed. At the same time, she does consider the possibility that she might have 
just not noticed when she was ‘in the middle’, which would indicate that she may be 
becoming more self-aware.  
Lack of Present-Moment Awareness  
‘I don’t feel anything, honest, I wish I did, any emotion will do. I mean, who can 
watch Long Lost Family and not cry?’ 
In this statement, the participant indicates that she is not experiencing any emotions 
or feelings – the inability to connect with one’s private events is associated with a lack of 
present-moment awareness and frequently signals that an individual finds experiencing 
these private events intolerable and hence engages in various forms of experiential 
avoidance.  
Self-as-Context 
No examples identified in participants’ talk.  
Self-as-Context - Self-as-Story (Neutral) 
‘I mean, some days I don’t think… I don’t think I’m the best mum, but I don’t 
think I’m the worst mum. But then, other days, I remember situations and I think, “Oh, 
that was terrible,” and I feel like I’m still waiting to be a good mum.’ 
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In this example, the participant recognises that a ‘sense of self’ is a fluid concept 
by reporting that her sense of being a good or bad mum fluctuates. She does not, however, 
consider herself to be a ‘platform’ from which her experiences can be observed, she is 
waiting to assume the identity of a ‘good mother’. Additionally, the participant reports 
frequently feeling like she is ‘a terrible mum’, which she then views as a self-defining 
characteristic. 
Self-as-Story 
 ‘Nobody else is a doolally tap like me then.’ 
 In this example, the participant describes herself as a ‘finished product’ which has 
been defined and is no longer sensitive to changes in context. These type of ‘global’ and 
rigid views of self are hypothesised to reduce a person’s ability to attend to situational 
cues which could disconfirm these beliefs; thus, people who are attached to a 
conceptualised self may find it challenging to make changes. 
Values 
 ‘I love my family. I feel guilty for anything bad I've said about any of my family. 
I’ve become more loving because I think, “God, I love you so much”.’ 
 The above statement is a good example of person having clear values – in this 
case, family. It is hypothesised that having clear values gives individuals a life direction 
to follow. In the case of this participant, the love for her family would be hypothesised to 
help her select and persist in behaviours which would ultimately lead to positive outcomes 
for the family members.  
Values – Lack of Values Clarity (Neutral)  
 ‘And then in an afternoon I’d probably sit and do some knitting or go and see 
my friend.’ 
 From this statement, it could be inferred that the participant values spending time 
with her friends, but she does not express this clearly, hence the statement has been coded 
as neutral.  
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Lack of Values Clarity 
 ‘I want a life, but I don’t know what I want.’ 
 This participant indicates that, currently, she is not sure what her values are and 
what type of experiences she would like to repeatedly encounter throughout her life. A 
lack of values clarity has been associated with difficulties in pursuing a good quality of 
life, as an individual will find it difficult to know when their behaviour and experiences 
are reflecting what is important to them in life. 
Committed Action 
 ‘Well, I let, I don’t like ironing about. I thought “I’m going to iron them few bits”. 
That was the other day and then, yesterday, I did all my granddaughter’s washing.’ 
 In this statement, a participant describes engaging in the value-consistent 
behaviour of ironing and washing her granddaughter’s clothes. She had outlined 
previously that ‘family’ was one of her values and that she considered supporting them a 
very important aspect of her life, despite the fact that some forms of that support may be 
less appealing than others.  
Committed Action – Lack of Committed Action (Neutral)  
 ‘Just didn’t feel right. Tried meditating… everything was going wrong.’ 
In the example above, the participant reports that she made an effort to look after 
herself by trying to meditate, which would be considered a committed action. At the same 
time, however, she reported to be unable to persist in that behaviour which would be 
classed as a lack of committed action. 
Lack of Committed Action 
‘I have to go on a diet. I had a warm fudge brownie…’ 
This participant provided a good example of engaging in behaviour which was 
inconsistent with her values. She reported on many occasions that her physical health was 
important to her and that her weight was a concern. She found it very difficult, however, 
not to act on impulse (e.g. having cake or chocolate), which was moving her away from 
achieving her value-consistent goals.   
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2.6.2 Procedure for calculating percentage of PF components. In this section, the 
process of calculating the percentage of identified PF components will be described. 
Participant’s and therapist’s talk within the session equates to 100% of talk during 
the session: (% participant talk) + (% therapist talk) = 100% of talk during the session. 
Table 15 outlines the percentage of each PF component identified in participant talk in 
the whole session. 
In this study, the researchers were only interested in participant talk; hence, the 
following equation was used to calculate what proportion of participant talk each 
identified PF component equated to: x = (a / b) × 100 (a = percentage of identified PF 
component; b = percentage of participant talk per session; x = percentage of PF identified 
in participant talk per session). For instance, the percentage of Experiential Avoidance 
for P1 during session one was calculated as follows (see Table 15 data sources): 
(1.84 ÷ 68.51) × 100 = 2.69 
The results of all calculations are outlined in Table 16. 
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100% of 
talk per 
session 
A 
A-
EA 
EA CD 
CD -
CF 
CF PMA 
PMA 
-
LPM
A 
LMP
A 
CA 
CA - 
IIAP 
IIAP SC 
SC-
SS 
SS V 
V - 
LVC 
LVC 
P1S2 
P1 and 
therapist 
0 2.4 1.84 0.01 1.45 5.7 0.2 0.86 0 4.75 6.03 5.65 0 0.61 1.17 5.73 9.29 0.39 
P1S4 
P1 and 
therapist 
0.33 1.74 1.7 0 1.22 2.83 0.16 0.18 0 5.99 3.02 6.5 0 1.8 0.06 8.3 0.57 1.94 
P1S9 
P1 and 
therapist 
1.1 5.52 7.88 0.89 3.83 3.13 0.89 2.03 2.01 0.83 0 0 0 1.72 0 1.97 0.24 0 
P2S2 
P2 and 
therapist 
0 0.47 5.79 0 0.29 1.17 0.31 1.12 2.29 7.52 1.1 0.68 0 0.3 0.14 5.14 1.32 0 
P2S4 
P2 and 
therapist 
0 0.32 0.89 0 0 1.49 0 1.09 0.9 5.02 0.19 1.32 0 0.44 0.11 1.54 0.44 0.47 
P2S8 
P2 and 
therapist 
0.22 1.57 1.23 0 0.79 0.83 0.06 0.09 0.23 2.71 0.34 0 0 0.2 0.19 0.64 0.29 0 
P3S2 
P3 and 
therapist 
0 0.59 2.33 0 1.99 0.57 0.1 0.78 2.89 6.15 1.63 0.56 0 0.12 0.07 6.68 4.19 0.71 
P3S4 
P3 and 
therapist 
0 0.29 0.82 0.1 0.92 0 0 0.08 0.18 2.03 5.29 2.11 0 0.25 0.13 4.14 3.08 0 
P3S8 
P3 and 
therapist 
0 0.28 2.17 0 0 0.6 0.05 0.08 0 1.88 1.09 0.61 0 0.13 0 1.88 1.42 2.59 
Table 15. Percentage of each PF component identified in participants’ talk in the whole session (% of participant talk and % of therapist talk per 
session equals 100% talk). 
Note:  A- Acceptance, A –EA – Acceptance and  Experiential Avoidance Neutral,  EA- Experiential Avoidance, CD- Cognitive  Defusion, CD – CF - Cognitive  
Defusion   and Cognitive  Fusion  Neutral, CF-Cognitive Fusion, PMA –Present Moment Awareness, PMA – LPMA - Present Moment Awareness and Lack of Present 
Moment Awareness Neutral,  LPMA- Lack of Present Moment Awareness, CA- Committed Action, CA – LCA – Committed Action and Lack of Committed Action 
Neutral,  LCA- Lack of Committed Action, SC- Self –as-Context, SC – SS – Self-as-Context and Self-as-Story Neutral, SS- Self-as-Story, V-Values, V- LVC – Values 
and Lack of Values Clarity Neutral,  LVC- Lack of Values Clarity.  
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% of 
participa
nt's talk 
per 
session 
A A-EA EA CD 
CD -
CF 
CF PMA 
PMA 
-
LPM
A 
LMP
A 
CA 
CA - 
IIAP 
IIAP SC 
SC-
SS 
SS V 
V - 
LVC 
LVC 
P1S2 68.51 0.00 3.50 2.69 0.01 2.12 8.32 0.29 1.26 0.00 6.93 8.80 8.25 0.00 0.89 1.71 8.36 13.56 0.57 
P1S4 57.08 0.58 3.05 2.98 0.00 2.14 4.96 0.28 0.32 0.00 10.49 5.29 11.39 0.00 3.15 0.11 14.54 1.00 3.40 
P1S9 51.84 2.12 10.65 15.20 1.72 7.39 6.04 1.72 3.92 3.88 1.60 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.32 0.00 3.80 0.46 0.00 
P2S2 63.84 0.00 0.74 9.07 0.00 0.45 1.83 0.49 1.75 3.59 11.78 1.72 1.07 0.00 0.47 0.22 8.05 2.07 0.00 
P2S4 60.19 0.00 0.53 1.48 0.00 0.00 2.48 0.00 1.81 1.50 8.34 0.32 2.19 0.00 0.73 0.18 2.56 0.73 0.78 
P2S8 61.74 0.36 2.54 1.99 0.00 1.28 1.34 0.10 0.15 0.37 4.39 0.55 0.00 0.00 0.32 0.31 1.04 0.47 0.00 
P3S2 58.31 0.00 1.01 4.00 0.00 3.41 0.98 0.17 1.34 4.96 10.55 2.80 0.96 0.00 0.21 0.12 11.46 7.19 1.22 
P3S4 67.66 0.00 0.43 1.21 0.15 1.36 0.00 0.00 0.12 0.27 3.00 7.82 3.12 0.00 0.37 0.19 6.12 4.55 0.00 
P3S8 39.06 0.00 0.72 5.56 0.00 0.00 1.54 0.13 0.20 0.00 4.81 2.79 1.56 0.00 0.33 0.00 4.81 3.64 6.63 
Note:  A- Acceptance, A –EA – Acceptance and  Experiential Avoidance Neutral,  EA- Experiential Avoidance, CD- Cognitive  Defusion, CD – CF - Cognitive  
Defusion   and Cognitive  Fusion  Neutral, CF-Cognitive Fusion, PMA –Present Moment Awareness, PMA – LPMA - Present Moment Awareness and Lack of 
Present Moment Awareness Neutral,  LPMA- Lack of Present Moment Awareness, CA- Committed Action, CA – LCA – Committed Action and Lack of Committed 
Action Neutral,  LCA- Lack of Committed Action, SC- Self –as-Context, SC – SS – Self-as-Context and Self-as-Story Neutral, SS- Self-as-Story, V-Values, V- LVC – 
Values and Lack of Values Clarity Neutral,  LVC- Lack of Values Clarity.  
 
Table 16.  Percentage of each PF component identified in participants’ talk per session. 
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3. Extended Results 
As the journal paper provides an overview of the key findings of this study, this 
section outlines a small number of additional findings. 
3.1 Identifying PF Processes in Participant Talk 
The cumulated percentage of each PF domain identified in every session for all 
participants was presented and discussed in the journal paper. The means of percentages 
of identified PF domains for each individual participant are outline in Table 17. 
Table 17. Means and Standard deviations of percentages of coded talk for individual 
participants (including text coded as PF, neutral, and PI). 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
P1 
Committed 
Action 
Values 
Acceptanc
e 
Cognitive 
Defusion 
Present-
Moment 
Awareness 
 
Self-as-
Context 
M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD 
17.6 13.9 15.2 9.7 13.6 12.5 10.9 4 3.9 4.9 3.1 0.4 
P2 
Committed 
Action 
Acceptanc
e 
Values 
Present- 
Moment 
Awareness 
 
Cognitive 
Defusion 
Self-as-
Context 
M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD 
10.1 4.9 5.6 3.9 5.2 4.4 3.3 2.6 2.5 0.2 0.7 0.1 
P3 
Values 
Committed 
Action 
Acceptanc
e 
Cognitive 
Defusion 
Present- 
Moment 
Awareness 
 
Self-as-
Context 
M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD 
15.2 4.6 12.5 2.9 4.3 2.4 2.5 1.7 2.4 3.5 0.4 0.1 
Note: The processes are ordered from the most (1) to the least (6) frequently 
identified. P1 – Participant 1; P2 – Participant 2; P3 – Participant 3. 
  
3.2 Double and Triple Coding 
As discussed in the journal paper, participant talk could be coded as belonging to 
more than one domain, and some parts of text were double or triple coded. Double coded 
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talk accounted for 18% of total coded utterances, across all participants. Triple coded talk 
accounted for 3% of total coded utterances, across all participants. The analysis suggests 
that the most frequently double-coded domains across all participants were the 
Acceptance and Cognitive Defusion domains (7% of coded talk), followed by the Values 
and Committed Action domains (6% of coded talk). The other pairs were as follows: Self-
as-Context / Values (2%), Cognitive Defusion / Present Moment Awareness (1%), 
Acceptance / Present-Moment Awareness (1%), Committed Action / Cognitive Defusion 
and Cognitive Defusion / Values (1%).  
4. Extended Discussion 
4.1 PF Patterns in Participant Talk 
Although the discrepancies in distribution of PF components across the whole sample 
was discussed in the journal paper, it is important to emphasise that there are also 
idiosyncratic differences in the frequencies of identifying PF components among 
individual participants (Table 17). Even though these differences are relatively small, 
they highlight an important issue in relation to PF, comprising six interlinked processes. 
Namely, does the configuration of the PF components on individual level matter? In 
accordance with ACT theory, all PF processes are highly interlinked, and developing all 
PF processes is crucial to achieving positive outcomes in therapy. This would suggest 
that scores indicating levels of PF components should be relatively equally distributed 
(e.g. low scores across all domains). However, it was observed in this study that patterns 
of specific PF components fluctuated across the sessions, with some changing more than 
others, which would not be captured if levels of PF were reported as a ‘cumulated result’. 
Presenting levels of PF process as a whole limits understanding of what sub-processes 
may have been mainly associated with psychotherapeutic change (Levin et al., 2012). The 
variability in patterns of PF components may, of course, be a consequence of many 
factors, such as variability in the content of the sessions, with some sessions being more 
likely to consider topics related to values and goals, and others concentrating on a 
person’s relationship with their private experiences. There is, however, a body of 
evidence which suggests that specific PF components may correlate with specific 
outcomes. For example, Villatte et al. (2016) reported that intervention targeting 
Acceptance and Cognitive Defusion processes resulted in overall reduction in symptom 
severity and that intervention targeting Values and Committed Action was associated 
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with greater quality-of-life improvements. Both interventions overlap in terms of sharing 
Present-Moment Awareness and Self-as-Context processes, which are considered to 
facilitate development of other PF processes. These findings are consistent with the 
literature which explores the relationship between values and well-being (Kashdan et al., 
2010; Kashdan & Mcknight, 2013; Wilson & Murrell, 2004; Wong & Fry, 1998).  
Likewise, a number of studies have examined the impact of Acceptance and Defusion 
processes on symptom reduction (Bardeen & Fergus, 2016; Hesser et al., 2009). This 
raises a question whether all PF components are equally important in producing 
therapeutic change and whether they actually complement each other to form a cohesive 
model of PF or if they should be treated as individual processes.  
The results of this study suggest that it is possible to identify specific components 
of PF in the talk of participants who engaged in CBT and indicates that particular domains 
of PF may be more interlinked than others, which is consistent with previous literature. 
Additionally, the findings highlight that some PF domains are less readily identifiable 
than others, suggesting that some processes may be (1) less commonly considered in 
everyday conversations; (2) redundant in the process of generating psychotherapeutic 
change or (3) better conceptualised as part of another process (e.g. Self-as-Context).  
4.2 Double Coding  
Due to the fact that PF processes are considered to be highly interlinked, it was 
not surprising that some of the talk attracted double and triple coding labels. As outlined 
in Section 3.2, the most frequently identified ‘coding pairs’ were Acceptance and 
Cognitive Defusion, as well as Values and Committed Action, which maps onto the 
conceptualisation of PF as three dyadic processes (Hayes et al., 2011) and is consistent 
with patterns in frequency of specific processes being identified in participant talk, which 
was discussed in the journal paper. 
4.3 Psychological Flexibility and Clinical Outcomes  
As discussed in the journal paper, it was found in this study that it was difficult to 
ascertain whether patterns of PF detected in the participants’ talk could indicate the 
occurrence of psychotherapeutic change. Apart from a very small variability in clinical 
outcome across the participants, which has already been discussed, this phenomenon 
may be related to various other factors, including the nature of the relationship between 
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PF patterns and reported clinical outcomes which were assessed using psychometric 
tests. 
As discussed previously, the aim of increasing PF in ACT is to reduce Experiential 
Avoidance in service of increasing values-consistent behaviours, and allowing individual 
to live well, despite experiencing symptoms of poor mental or physical health (Hayes, 
Strosahl & Wilson, 2011; Hesser et al., 2009; Kemani, Hesser, Olsson, Lekander & 
Wicksell, 2016). It has been noted, however, that in many cases, the secondary effect of 
increasing PF is symptom reduction (Arch et al., 2012; Fledderus, Bohlmeijer, Fox, 
Schreurs, & Spinhoven, 2013). On the other hand, the main aim of CBT intervention 
(analysed in this study) is to reduce the symptoms of distress (Beck, 2011; Westbrook et 
al., 2011). 
The relationship between patterns of changes in PF and clinical outcomes in this 
study is unclear. Although clinically significant changes in participant symptomology and 
quality of life was mostly correctly predicted by the researchers,32 the predictions of the 
trend towards improvement or deterioration were less accurate. It was especially evident 
in the case of Participant 1 – her clinical outcomes suggested a reduction in symptoms 
(not clinically significant) and improvement in quality of life (clinically significant). 
These findings were, however, not reflected in the predictions made by the researchers, 
who suggested that PF patterns indicated that there would be no change in symptomology 
and/or quality of life, or that there would be no clinically significant trend toward 
deterioration. This discrepancy may be related to a number of issues, such as differences 
in the theoretical underpinning of CBT and ACT,33 issues associated with self-report 
or/and extra-therapeutic factors. 
Self-report may not be the most reliable source of information due to social 
desirability bias (Van de Mortel, 2008), which refers to participants’ tendency to give 
‘socially accepted’ answers and, more importantly, to answer questions to please the 
researcher (Coolican, 2014). Considering that the identified PF patterns indicated possible 
deterioration rather than improvement, it could be hypothesised that Participant 1 reported 
an improvement on the outcome measure to please her therapist. Additionally, self-report 
is also sensitive to ‘mood-congruent’ bias, which involves the enhanced encoding and/or 
                                            
32 see ‘outcome prediction’ section of the journal paper for details 
33 Please see ‘Psychological Flexibility and Clinical Outcomes section of journal paper for discussion 
related to potential implications of theoretical differences between considered therapy approaches  
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retrieval of material whose affective valence is congruent with ongoing mood (Blaney, 
1986; Matt, Vazquez, & Campbell, 1992). This tendency to remember and report details 
which are consistent with an individual’s mood might have played an important role in 
providing answers on self-reported measures. On the other hand, it is also possible that 
the changes demonstrated on outcome measures were results of processes other than PF 
or were caused by extra-therapeutic factors such as reduction of life-stress, improved 
relationship with family, etc.  
4.4 Strengths, Limitations and Further Research 
One of the strengths of this study was that it used a secondary data analysis method 
to examine data which was already collected for purposes of independent study. Using 
data which was already collected allowed researchers to be more objective, as they had 
no personal investment in the data-gathering process, had not formed relationships with 
participants and had no influence on the outcomes of therapy. Moreover, participants 
were not in any way influenced by researcher expectations, which made the analysed data 
more naturalistic. Another strength of conducting secondary data analysis is related to 
ethical considerations; for instance, it reduces the burden on potential participants and 
allows for replicability of study findings and, therefore, greater transparency of research 
procedures and integrity of research work. 
The limitations of conducting secondary data analysis are related to lack of 
opportunity to introduce additional outcome measures which would potentially enrich the 
findings, such as outcome measures specifically targeting PF (e.g. CompACT; Francis, 
Dawson, & Golijani-Moghaddam, 2016). Additionally, analysing personal data always 
carries a risk of unintentional breach of confidentiality, especially when some participants 
present with very distinct features. In the current report, this risk has been minimised by 
reporting only a limited amount of raw data, which does not contain any readily 
identifiable details. 
The inclusion of final therapy sessions in the analysis was also identified as a 
limitation of this study. It has been already acknowledged in the main article that the final 
therapy session can be difficult for clients (Owen, Drinane, Adelson, & Kopta, 2017) and 
that completing outcome measures frequently reduces the amount of ‘therapeutic talk’. 
The research team decided to analyse the final session mainly because one of the relevant 
outcome measures, CORE-OM, was only completed pre- and post-therapy. This 
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limitation could be addressed in future research by administering all relevant outcome 
measures in every session, which would allow comparison of gathered quantitative data 
with patterns of PF identified in participant speech on a session-by session basis. 
Including PF-specific psychometrics would also allow examination of whether the PF 
patterns detected in participant talk correlate with scores on self-reported measures, which 
could potentially help establish whether patterns of PF identified in speech can be utilised 
to predict outcomes or to assess a person’s level of PF. 
In the current project, participant talk was coded as flexible, inflexible or neutral 
for every PF component. It was noted, however, that some examples of coded talk were 
possibly signalling a greater amount of change (in any direction) than others, and the 
research team reflected that, in the future, it would be valuable to capture these variations 
by, for instance, introducing the ‘extensiveness scale’. This scale was previously used in 
the study conducted by Hesser et al. (2009) to rate the ‘depth or meaningfulness’ of the 
statements identified as Acceptance and Defusion in ACT therapy for tinnitus. 
Introducing this scale in future research could help to determine whether detected PF 
patterns can predict clinical outcome by outlining the extensiveness of change observed 
in participant talk. 
The main strength of this study is its exploratory design, which allowed for a 
psychological concept of PF to be examined in a novel context. The initial findings of 
this study provide a platform for further research on trans-theoretical processes of change 
in psychotherapy, which have important clinical implications (see Section 4.5 for further 
details). 
4.5 Clinical Implications 
As noted previously, the epistemological position and scientific model of functional 
contextualism promotes the idea that research should be conducted on multiple levels of 
analysis and result in integration of the findings (Hayes et al., 2013). The current study 
adds to a wider body of literature about change processes in psychological therapy, as 
well as to discussion about the construct of psychological flexibility considered from the 
ACT perceptive. 
Understanding which processes are relevant to producing psychotherapeutic change 
also has important clinical implications. The widely promoted model of therapists as 
‘science-practitioners’ assumes that therapists use the most up-to-date knowledge to 
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inform their practice (Shapiro, 2002). Consequently, gaining better understanding about 
which therapeutic processes are the most effective in producing change should encourage 
practitioners to focus on these processes while delivering therapy, regardless of which 
school of psychology they subscribe to. This, in turn, should lead to better outcomes for 
individuals who engage in therapy. Alternatively, gaining better understanding about 
which therapeutic processes are the most effective in producing change could lead to the 
development of a ‘modular treatment’, which would focus solely on targeting change 
processes which are known to produce psychotherapeutic change.  
In order to share the results of this study with a wider community of researchers 
and clinicians, a journal paper included in this report will be submitted to the Journal of 
Contextual Behavioural Science for publication and will, hopefully, instigate some 
interest which may lead to further exploration and scientific progress. 
5. Reflections 
5.1 Reflections on Motivation and Project Development 
Initially, I felt overwhelmed by the choice of research topics and it took me a while 
to narrow my interest. I was committed to choosing a topic which was not only interesting 
to me but also clinically relevant and would allow me to develop my research skills. In 
the first year of the DClinPsy programme, we were introduced to a number of different 
psychotherapeutic approaches, and I became especially interested in ACT and the concept 
of psychological flexibility due to its emphasis on promoting good quality of life. During 
the teaching sessions and in conversations with my clinical supervisors, I frequently 
reflected on what makes the therapy effective. 
While discussing potential research topics with the research supervisors on the 
programme, it became apparent that there was an opportunity to combine my interests by 
exploring whether psychological flexibility, as defined by ACT, could be considered a 
common factor which contributes to psychotherapeutic change.   
My original project aimed to explore if psychological flexibility was a trans-
therapeutic process of change by asking participants who were undertaking psychological 
therapy other than ACT to complete a number of psychometric questionnaires which 
measured levels of distress, quality of life and level of psychological flexibility. 
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Unfortunately, I was not able to pursue that project due to difficulties in obtaining 
NHS ethical approval. I found the whole process very frustrating due to inconsistencies 
in requirements which were placed on me by different ethics committees. I was also 
disappointed to find that there was no committee member on either of the two ethics 
committees I presented my project to whose professional background was related to 
psychology or social care. This was especially apparent when the issue of asking 
participants whether they were experiencing suicidal thoughts was discussed (one of the 
items on the questionnaire which measures distress). The committee members were 
concerned that the participants would be triggered by this question and that they would 
be more likely to complete suicide as a result. I did explain that all participants would be 
attending therapy and that their risk of completing suicide would be regularly assessed 
but this appeared to be a very contentious issue which was difficult to resolve. Although 
I understand the concerns of committee members over participant safety, I felt that this 
type of concern could be addressed more meaningfully if at least one of the members had 
a professional understanding of mental health issues and associated risks and how these 
can be managed. This experience made me wonder how many clinically important studies 
are never conducted due to similar misconceptions. 
The difficulties I encountered with obtaining the ethical approval made me consider 
other research options which would allow me to answer the research question within the 
timeframe of the clinical doctorate. After reviewing the relevant literature and consulting 
my supervisors, I decided that the most appropriate way of examining a well-established 
concept in a new context was to adapt a qualitative, exploratory research design. 
Researching whether psychological flexibility could be considered a 
psychotherapeutic change process was a very interesting and complex task, even if I felt 
very overwhelmed at times. On many occasions, I found it challenging to focus solely on 
the aims of this study, as further questions and ideas occurred throughout the research 
process, and I had to accept that some of these ideas would offer opportunities for further 
research in this area. 
5.2 Reflections on the Research Process 
Conducting a research project at the doctoral level definitely has its challenges, but 
one of the aspects that I enjoyed throughout was reading relevant literature and gathering 
background information for my research project, which allowed me to expand my 
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knowledge base not only in relation to theoretical aspects of psychological factors which 
may contribute to therapeutic change, but also in relation to new ways of promoting 
mental health and well-being. 
As mentioned earlier, conducting secondary data analysis has its strengths and 
limitations and, after the initial excitement related to the fact that I could start conducting 
the research without having to go through the process of applying to the NHS Ethics 
Committee, it became apparent that the task of analysing a large set of data was going to 
be very challenging in many ways. For instance, I decided to listen to the recordings of 
the therapy sessions in order to familiarise myself with the material, which was very time-
consuming and, frequently, emotionally difficult. I also underestimated the time and 
effort required to transcribe audio-recordings, which eventually led me to use an external 
transcribing service. 
I found the process of analysing data very interesting but, once again, 
overwhelming at times. Although the criteria for coding were clearly defined in the 
coding framework, I was frequently unsure whether I captured all components of 
psychological flexibility which were present in text, which meant that I went through the 
whole material multiple times. I was also worried that I had identified ‘false positives’ in 
the text - both of these concerns were addressed by inter-reliability checks. Additionally, 
analysis of the data confirmed for me the complexity of human beings, which is frequently 
lost in quantitative research. For instance, a ‘value clarification’ is considered to be an 
important part of pursuing a valued life. In some cases, however, it felt that, by 
committing an act in accordance with one identified value, a participant was behaving 
inconsistently with another identified value. This observation influenced my clinical 
practice by encouraging me to not only help clients to prioritise their values but also to 
consider prioritising which value they were most committed to and able to currently 
pursue. 
I found the data interpretation to be a very interesting but challenging process. One 
of the most challenging tasks was finding a way to convey my findings clearly and 
meaningfully. I considered various options, including presenting my findings purely as 
‘total number of how many times a particular PF component was coded in participant 
speech’, and decided that the current way of presenting data would be the most 
transparent. Despite the challenges, I really enjoyed the process of interpreting findings 
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of this study, as it made me feel that I am truly contributing something valuable to the 
existing knowledge about the change processes.  
5.3 Reflections on Epistemology  
The purpose of declaring the epistemological position is to outline the researcher’s 
beliefs about how knowledge is acquired. I have always found philosophical concepts 
difficult to understand; hence, I spent a long time reading about and discussing various 
philosophical stances towards scientific enquiry. I found the pragmatic approach to the 
truth criterion proposed in Functional Contextualism very refreshing, especially in the 
context of designing my study. I personally believe that all behaviour should be 
considered in context, and that a person’s learning history plays a crucial role in the 
understanding of their current situation, which meant that Functional Contextualism was 
an ‘easy’ epistemological position for me to adopt. While conducting my research, I 
realised, however, that some postulates of Functional Contextualism can make data 
analysis challenging. For instance, the focus on the ‘event as whole’ created some 
challenges in relation to coding procedure. Due to my familiarity with the material, I had 
good knowledge of all the participants, which allowed me to understand the participants’ 
learning histories. At the same time, this understanding increased the chances that some 
instances of coding would be based on inference, rather than on a participant’s clear 
statements. This also potentially made it more difficult for secondary raters to understand 
the rationale for some coding applied to text – and this was especially true for the ‘Values’ 
concept, which is not clearly defined, as there are individual differences in terms of what 
‘valued life’ means to different people. 
During my supervision, I also reflected upon the fact that nobody could really fully 
comprehend any person as a ‘whole event’, as we can only learn some aspects of their 
learning history, and that many factors which influence a person’s behaviour would never 
be identified or understood. I do recognise, however, that this has been considered within 
Functional Contextualism by applying a pragmatic approach to science, and accepting 
that there is a limit to our ability to gather and functionally link information (Hayes et al., 
1999). 
While conducting my research, I also reflected that there are elements of theoretical 
incoherence within the Functional Contextualism approach to science, where the unit of 
analysis is ‘the whole event’, but the whole is divided into parts to be analysed and 
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frequently these parts are studied ‘out of context’. This is, however, recognised as an 
integral challenge faced by all psychological research and has been tolerated in order to 
achieve the pragmatic aims of this study. 
5.4 Reflections on Challenges  
Given my experiences in completing bachelor’s and master’s degrees in the UK, I 
was aware that completing a doctoral degree in a language that is not my mother tongue 
would be challenging. I did, however, underestimate how challenging it was going to be. 
Although my passive vocabulary grew throughout the duration of the programme, I found 
that using that vocabulary actively was very difficult for me, especially at times when I 
was anxious. I also found that writing assignments took me much longer than normal, as 
I was worried about making grammatical and semantic mistakes. I have overcome this 
challenge by asking my peers to proofread my work and offer feedback. I have also used 
online tools and a professional proofreading service to make sure that my assignments 
are well-written. 
Completing this project provided me with some insight into the challenges related 
to conducting research whilst also working clinically. At times, it was difficult to manage 
all the pressures related to conducting the research and completing other assignments, 
with only one day a week dedicated to independent study. Even though I planned my 
work commitments in advance, at the beginning, I frequently underestimated the amount 
of time a particular task was likely to take me to complete. Consequently, I began to pay 
more attention to how much time specific activities, such as the initial literature searches, 
were taking me on average, and I adjusted my future planning accordingly; for instance,  
by starting the literature search a couple of weeks before I started to write the assignment
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Appendix A 
 
A detailed outline of searched terms. 
 
Thursday, July 27, 2017 5:56:52 AM  
 
#  Query  Limiters/Expanders  Last Run Via  Results   
S29  
S21 OR S22 OR 
S23 OR S24 OR 
S25 OR S26  
Limiters - Peer 
Reviewed  
Narrow by 
Language: - english  
Search modes - 
Boolean/Phrase  
Interface - 
EBSCOhost Research 
Databases  
Search Screen - Basic 
Search  
Database - PsycINFO  
118   
S28  
S21 OR S22 OR 
S23 OR S24 OR 
S25 OR S26  
Limiters - Peer 
Reviewed  
Search modes - 
Boolean/Phrase  
Interface - 
EBSCOhost Research 
Databases  
Search Screen - Basic 
Search  
Database - PsycINFO  
132   
S27  
S21 OR S22 OR 
S23 OR S24 OR 
S25 OR S26  
Search modes - 
Boolean/Phrase  
Interface - 
EBSCOhost Research 
Databases  
Search Screen - Basic 
Search  
Database - PsycINFO  
224   
S26  S1 AND S20  
Search modes - 
Boolean/Phrase  
Interface - 
EBSCOhost Research 
Databases  
Search Screen - Basic 
Search  
Database - PsycINFO  
50   
S25  S2 AND S20  
Search modes - 
Boolean/Phrase  
Interface - 
EBSCOhost Research 
Databases  
Search Screen - Basic 
Search  
Database - PsycINFO  
1   
S24  S3 AND S20  
Search modes - 
Boolean/Phrase  
Interface - 
EBSCOhost Research 
Databases  
Search Screen - Basic 
16   
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Search  
Database - PsycINFO  
S23  S4 AND S20  
Search modes - 
Boolean/Phrase  
Interface - 
EBSCOhost Research 
Databases  
Search Screen - Basic 
Search  
Database - PsycINFO  
155   
S22  S5 AND S20  
Search modes - 
Boolean/Phrase  
Interface - 
EBSCOhost Research 
Databases  
Search Screen - Basic 
Search  
Database - PsycINFO  
13   
S21  S6 AND S20  
Search modes - 
Boolean/Phrase  
Interface - 
EBSCOhost Research 
Databases  
Search Screen - Basic 
Search  
Database - PsycINFO  
17   
S20  
S7 OR S8 OR S9 
OR S10 OR S11 
OR S12 OR S13 
OR S14 OR S15 
OR S16 OR S17 
OR S18 OR S19  
Search modes - 
Boolean/Phrase  
Interface - 
EBSCOhost Research 
Databases  
Search Screen - Basic 
Search  
Database - PsycINFO  
1,111   
S19  "fire raiser"  
Search modes - 
SmartText Searching  
Interface - 
EBSCOhost Research 
Databases  
Search Screen - Basic 
Search  
Database - PsycINFO  
1   
S18  "fire raiser"  
Search modes - 
Boolean/Phrase  
Interface - 
EBSCOhost Research 
Databases  
Search Screen - Basic 
Search  
Database - PsycINFO  
1   
S17  "fire starting"  
Search modes - 
Boolean/Phrase  
Interface - 
EBSCOhost Research 
Databases  
Search Screen - Basic 
Search  
Database - PsycINFO  
6   
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S16  "fire starters"  
Search modes - 
Boolean/Phrase  
Interface - 
EBSCOhost Research 
Databases  
Search Screen - Basic 
Search  
Database - PsycINFO  
4   
S15  "fire starter"  
Search modes - 
Boolean/Phrase  
Interface - 
EBSCOhost Research 
Databases  
Search Screen - Basic 
Search  
Database - 
MEDLINE  
1   
S14  "fire raisers"  
Search modes - 
Boolean/Phrase  
Interface - 
EBSCOhost Research 
Databases  
Search Screen - Basic 
Search  
Database - 
MEDLINE  
2   
S13  "fire raising"  
Search modes - 
Boolean/Phrase  
Interface - 
EBSCOhost Research 
Databases  
Search Screen - Basic 
Search  
Database - PsycINFO  
13   
S12  "fire setter"  
Search modes - 
Boolean/Phrase  
Interface - 
EBSCOhost Research 
Databases  
Search Screen - Basic 
Search  
Database - 
MEDLINE  
9   
S11  "fire setters"  
Search modes - 
Boolean/Phrase  
Interface - 
EBSCOhost Research 
Databases  
Search Screen - Basic 
Search  
Database - 
MEDLINE  
30   
S10  "fire setting"  
Search modes - 
Boolean/Phrase  
Interface - 
EBSCOhost Research 
Databases  
Search Screen - Basic 
Search  
97   
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Database - 
MEDLINE  
S9  arson*  
Search modes - 
Boolean/Phrase  
Interface - 
EBSCOhost Research 
Databases  
Search Screen - Basic 
Search  
Database - 
MEDLINE  
1,736   
S8  fire set*  
Search modes - 
Boolean/Phrase  
Interface - 
EBSCOhost Research 
Databases  
Search Screen - Basic 
Search  
Database - 
MEDLINE  
349   
S7  fire set  
Search modes - 
Boolean/Phrase  
Interface - 
EBSCOhost Research 
Databases  
Search Screen - Basic 
Search  
Database - 
MEDLINE  
124   
S6  desire*  
Search modes - 
Boolean/Phrase  
Interface - 
EBSCOhost Research 
Databases  
Search Screen - Basic 
Search  
Database - 
MEDLINE  
89,849   
S5  rational*  
Search modes - 
Boolean/Phrase  
Interface - 
EBSCOhost Research 
Databases  
Search Screen - Basic 
Search  
Database - 
MEDLINE  
142,821   
S4  motiv*  
Search modes - 
Boolean/Phrase  
Interface - 
EBSCOhost Research 
Databases  
Search Screen - Basic 
Search  
Database - 
MEDLINE  
137,322   
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S3  urge*  
Search modes - 
Boolean/Phrase  
Interface - 
EBSCOhost Research 
Databases  
Search Screen - 
Advanced Search  
Database - CINAHL 
Complete  
24,600   
S2  justification*  
Search modes - 
Boolean/Phrase  
Interface - 
EBSCOhost Research 
Databases  
Search Screen - 
Advanced Search  
Database - CINAHL 
Complete  
2,643   
S1  reason*  
Search modes - 
Boolean/Phrase  
Interface - 
EBSCOhost Research 
Databases  
Search Screen - 
Advanced Search  
Database - CINAHL 
Complete  
70,556   
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Appendix B 
A final version of ethics application. 
PSY181917 
Have you included the following? 
1. Psychology Ethics Form        ☒ 
2. EA1/EA2/EA3 Form         
 ☒ 
The EA3 form should be filled whether an animal is used as ‘participant’ or as part of 
the study design (e.g. dog intervention) 
3. (Appendices) Participant Information Sheet      
 ☐ 
This MUST include the following: 
a. Title 
b. Introduction 
- Justification for the study 
c. What will I be asked to do if I take part? 
- Information about exactly what participation entails.  
d. Will my data be confidential? 
- Information about how and where data will be stored, how it will be processed 
(e.g. anonymously or pseudo-anonymously), who will have access and what you 
will do with the analysed data (e.g. publications, presentations etc.). 
- N.B. Suggested wording for Info sheet that aligns with GDPR “Data will be 
treated confidentially and any publication resulting from this work will report 
only data that does not identify individual participants. Participants' anonymised 
responses, however, may be shared with other researchers or made available in 
online data repositories”. 
e. Do I have to take part? 
- Explanation that participants can withdraw at any point (usually 2 weeks, 
without having to give a reason, and that they can withdraw after taking part up 
until either publication, or anonymization of the data-Under GDPR we can no 
longer state the standard “two weeks” if the data is personal and not 
anonymised). Withdrawal procedure must also be provided here – giving 
SOPREC contact details for data withdrawal. 
- If participants have been referred or approached rather than volunteering, you 
will also need to include information about why these individuals have been 
asked to participate specifically. 
f. Where can I obtain further information if I need it? 
- Contact details of the researchers and any support organisations in case of any 
issues arising as a result of research participation. 
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g. PIS must end with the phrase:  
This project has passed Ethical Review by the School of Psychology Research 
Ethics Committee: soprec@lincoln.ac.uk 
 
 
4. (Standard Appendices) Consent Form      
 ☒ 
If you are collecting any form of personal data, participants must opt in. Consent should 
cover all processing activities to be carried out for the same purpose. If there is more 
than one purpose, consent should be sought for each of them individually. Consent must 
also be sought separately for secondary analysis, data sharing or archiving. 
5. (Standard Appendices) Debrief Form      
 ☐ 
Information about how results will be disseminated. Contact details of the researchers 
and any support organisations (both telephone and email) in case of any issues arising 
as a result of research participation. If information has been withheld until the end of the 
study, participants must be made aware of this.  
6. (Standard Appendices) Advertisement/Recruitment Information  
  ☐ 
The wording and any visuals of your advertisements (for example on SONA and/or 
social media) must be included here, as well as details of where adverts will be posted. 
7. (Standard Appendices) Stimuli/Questionnaire Measures    
 ☐ 
All stimuli that have not already been approved must be included. If a stimulus set or 
questionnaire has already been validated/published, then the references MUST be 
provided, otherwise the stimuli and questionnaires will also be reviewed and may be 
rejected.  If you are including IAPS images please refer to the separate IAPS SOPREC 
policy. 
8. Signature           ☒ 
Applicant and/or member of staff submitting the application on behalf of a student. 
Additional documents required for specific studies 
9. (Additional Appendices) Permission       
 ☐ 
If you need permission from an organisation to recruit specific participants or conduct a 
study on premises (e.g. a specific charity or school) you need to provide the latter/email 
granting this. 
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10. (Additional Appendices) Risk assessment form     
 ☐ 
A risk assessment form for the researcher(s) should be completed for all studies physically 
conducted outside of the University of Lincoln (e.g. public space, shelters and zoo).  This 
does not apply to online studies. 
 
11. (Additional Appendices)  Disclosure and Barring Service (DBS)    
 ☐ A Disclosure and Barring Service should be obtained and showed to the 
administration office for any research focusing on children. 
 
12. (Additional Appendices) Insurance requirement     
 ☐  
(Please contact Zoe Mead if you are unsure if you need this). 
 
 
 
EA1 
[doc version 09.02] 
 
Ethical Approval Form:  
Library/Desk/Lab/Studio-based 
Research Projects 
 
 
 
 
 
 This form must be completed for each piece of research activity whether conducted 
by academic staff, research staff, graduate students or undergraduates. Applications 
by students must be endorsed by an academic member of staff acting as Principal 
Investigator/supervisor. The completed form must be sent to the designated Ethics 
Committee within the College. 
Please complete all sections.  If a section is not applicable, write N/A.  
1 Name of 
Applicant 
 
Monika Panczak - Abrahams 
2  School  
 
School of Psychology 
3  Position in the 
University 
 
Trainee Clinical Psychologist 
4 Role in relation 
to this research 
Principal researcher  
PLEASE SEND THIS CHECKLIST ALONGSIDE YOUR ETHICS FORM (all as one document - 
including appendices) DIRECTLY TO SOPREC@LINCOLN.AC.UK 
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5 Name(s) of 
collaborators/co-
workers and their 
relationship to the 
project (e.g. 
supervisor, 
assistant etc.) 
Name, and role in project: 
1. Dave Dawson, supervisor 
2. Mark Gresswell, supervisor 
Nima Moghaddam, supervisor 
 
6 Brief statement 
of main Research 
Question or 
Project Title 
 
Is Psychological Flexibility a trans-theoretical mechanism 
of psychotherapeutic change? 
7 Ethical checklist  
Does the research involve living human participants, or 
human tissue?   Yes    No  
    If you answered “yes”, submit form EA2 for Ethical 
Approval. 
 
Does the research involve living animals, or animal tissue?                      
Yes    No  
If you answered “yes”, submit form EA3 for Ethical 
Approval. 
 
Does the research involve confidential data, or data not in 
the public 
domain?                                                                                                      
Yes    No  
 
Does the project potentially put you or your collaborators at 
physical or 
psychological risk?                                                                                      
Yes    No  
 
Could the topic or results of this research be seen as illegal, 
or attract 
legal action against the University from an outside agency?                       
Yes    No  
 
Could the topic or results of this research attract unwelcome 
media 
attention, or affect the reputation or standing of the 
University?                 Yes    No  
 
Could the topic, results or conduct of this research be 
regarded as 
offensive, immoral or destructive by some reasonable 
people?                  Yes    No  
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Does this research need to be undertaken under a relevant 
professional 
code of conduct?                                                                                          
Yes    No  
 
Are there any potential conflicts of interest in conducting 
this research, 
including financial gain for the researchers, or for 
individuals or external 
organizations affiliated with the researchers?                                              
Yes    No  
 
Are there any factors inhibiting the application of the 
University’s  
ethical guidelines,  including those on proper treatment of 
data, 
research design and publication of results?                                                 
Yes    No  
 
Does the research require the approval of any external 
body?                    Yes    No  
 
If the answer to all questions above is “No”, you  may 
complete section 8 to certify 
that there are no ethical issues, submit this form to the 
relevant Ethics Committee, 
and proceed with the research immediately. You accept 
professional responsibility 
for this decision, and if unsure should instead submit to 
the Committee. 
If the answer to any of the above questions is “Yes”, 
complete the rest of the form, 
submit to the relevant Ethics Committee, and await 
approval before proceeding  
with the research. Answering “Yes” does not necessarily 
imply that the research is 
problematic, only the Ethics Committee needs to consider 
the research to ensure 
that it can proceed, and that the research design conforms 
to best practice. 
                
8 Self certification 
of Ethical Review 
Having reviewed the ethical implications of this research, I 
certify that there are no issues 
requiring Ethical Approval. I certify that the research will 
be carried out in compliance with 
the University’s ethical guidelines for 
library/desk/laboratory/studio-based research, 
with Health and Safety regulations, and with all other 
relevant University policies and 
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procedures. If there are any changes to the research 
requiring ethical clearance, I 
shall apply for such clearance before continuing with the 
research. 
 
Signed: 
 
 
Principal Investigator 
 
Note. This section must be endorsed by the member of 
academic staff responsible for 
the project. In the case of research by students, the 
supervising member of  
academic staff must sign. The signed form should then be 
submitted to the relevant 
Ethics Committee within the College, and the research may 
proceed.  
 
9 Does the 
research comply 
with the 
 University’s key 
ethical principles 
 for 
library/desk/lab/stu
dio-based 
 research ? 
 
Yes       No    
 
 
If “No”, provide an ethical justification for your project and 
explain why you wish to continue with the research in 
breach of normal ethical principles:- 
 
 
10 If applicable, 
please state the 
relevant 
professional 
code(s) under 
which the 
research is being 
conducted and 
confirm 
compliance 
 
The British Psychological Society (2014). Code of Human 
Research Ethics. Retrieved from 
https://www1.bps.org.uk/system/files/Public%20files/inf18
0_web.pdf 
These guidelines will be adhered to at all times.  
 
 
11 Does this 
research require 
the 
 approval of an 
external body ? 
 
Yes     No  
 
If “Yes”, please state which body:- 
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12 Has ethical 
approval already 
been 
 obtained from 
that body ?  
 
N/A  Yes    -Please append documentary evidence 
to this form. 
 
 No    
 
If “No”, please state why not: 
Please note that any such approvals must be obtained 
and documented before the project begins. 
13 If there are any 
other ethical 
issues, to which 
the attention of 
the approving 
committee 
should be drawn, 
please state them 
in this section, 
and explain how 
you have taken 
the issues into 
account, so that 
the research 
should be 
approved. Please 
consult the 
University’s 
ethical guidelines 
for advice. 
 
Please also 
include here, or 
attach 
separately, a 
brief description 
of the research, 
to allow the 
approving 
 
The data used in this study is from a previous study (REC 
17/EM/0070, SOPREC PSY1617276, Hannah Daniels) for 
which consent for secondary data analysis was provided by 
participants. No further contact between the researcher of 
this project and the participants of the previous study is 
necessary. 
 
Given that consent has previously been provided for use of 
this data in further research, no additional personally 
identifiable information will be available to the researcher, 
and there will be no contact with participants, no further 
ethical issue have been identified.  
The external transcription service will be used to process 
the data. The University of Lincoln Data Protection Policies 
will be adhered to at all times. A Transcriber 
Confidentiality Agreement will be signed with the 
appropriate service (see Appendix B). The researcher will 
ensue that the chosen transcription service has a secure 
system for data transfer, access, and storage to maintain 
data confidentiality. 
Please see the School of Psychology Ethics Approval Form 
for more information. 
 
 
 Page 190 of 203 
 
committee to 
reach judgement. 
 
 
APPLICANT SIGNATURE 
I hereby request ethical approval for the research as described above.  
I certify that I have read the University’s ethical guidelines for 
library/desk/laboratory/studio-based research. 
        14.09.2018 
_____________________________________   ________________ 
Applicant Signature       Date 
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FOR STUDENT APPLICATIONS ONLY – 
Academic Support for Ethics 
Academic support should be sought prior to submitting this form to the designated 
Ethics Committee within the Faculty. 
. 
 
 Undergraduate / Postgraduate 
Taught application 
Academic Member of staff nominated by the 
School (consult your project tutor) 
 
 Postgraduate Research 
Application 
Director of Studies 
 
I support the application for ethical approval 
 
   
Academic / Director of Studies Signature                Date: 14.09.18 
 
Dave Dawson 
PRINT NAME 
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
---------------------------------------------------------- 
FOR COMPLETION BY THE DESIGNATED ETHICS COMMITTEE WITHIN 
THE COLLEGE 
 
Please select ONE of A, B, C or D below: 
 
  A. Ethical approval to this research. 
 
  B. Conditional ethical approval to this research. 
     
 
10 Please state the 
condition (inc. 
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 date by which condition 
must be 
 satisfied if applicable) 
 
 
 
 
 
  C. Ethical approval cannot be given to this research but the application is 
referred on to the University Research Ethics Committee for higher level 
consideration. 
     
 
11 Please state the reason 
 
 
      
 
 
 
 
  D. Ethical approval cannot be given to this research and it is recommended 
that the research should not proceed. 
     
 
12 Please state the reason, 
bearing in mind the 
University’s ethical 
framework, including the 
primary concern for 
Academic Freedom. 
 
 
      
 
 
 
 
Signature of the Chair of the designated ethics committee within the College 
 
Signature: 
________________________________________Date:__________________________
_________________ 
 
Chair of_______________________________________________ 
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Key ethical guidelines for library/desk/laboratory/studio-based research 
 
The University of Lincoln has drawn up the following key principles for researchers 
engaged in library/desk/laboratory/studio-based projects in order to promote high 
professional standards. They should be read alongside the University’s Ethical Principles 
for Conducting Research with Humans and Other Animals, and operate as part of the 
University’s Ethical Framework. 
 
 Non-falsification of data: Researchers have an ethical obligation to refrain from 
tampering with data. Thus questionnaire responses, experimental observations and 
data analyses should not be fabricated, altered nor discarded. In addition, researchers 
have a responsibility to exercise reasonable care in processing data to ensure no errors 
affect the results. 
 Ethics of reporting research: Researchers are obliged to give full and proper 
attribution of ideas: presenting the words, data or ideas of another person as your own 
without properly citing them amounts to plagiarism. This is not only misconduct but 
can also be an infringement of copyright, amounting to theft of intellectual property.  
 Ethics and research design: Researchers should be open to a range of methods: failure 
to consider and evaluate alternative methods and tools for the collection of data may 
be regarded as too overtly biased. All appropriate steps should be taken to ensure that 
no samples are obtained from unethical sources e.g. illegal databases; unregistered 
suppliers of samples from humans or other animals.  
 Authorship credit: Only those researchers who are significant contributors to a 
research project should be given authorship credit. A “significant contributor” might 
be described as a person playing a major role in conceptualising, analysing or writing 
the final document. Ideally, all those involved in the research project should decide 
upon the order of authorship. Usually, the first author is the one who has made the 
biggest contribution. 
 Conflict of interest: Researchers should be aware of the potential influence of personal 
or commercial interests on their work and take all practical measures to ensure that 
information is presented without distortion. 
 The principle of beneficence: Researchers are required to protect individuals by 
seeking to maximise anticipated benefits and minimise possible harms. It is therefore 
necessary to examine carefully the design of the study and its risks and benefits 
including, in some cases, identifying alternative ways of obtaining the benefits sought 
from the research. Research risks must always be justified by the expected benefits of 
research.  
 Professional codes: Researchers should undertake research legally and in accordance 
with any relevant professional codes of conduct.  
 Personal  information: Researchers should anonymise information which relates to 
individuals when they have not obtained informed consent, unless there is a clear 
justification to the contrary. They should also be aware of the impact of wider public 
dissemination of their work and the impact this might have on any individual or group 
of individuals. If it is anticipated that it might cause distress, it is essential to 
demonstrate that the benefits outweigh this risk. 
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SCHOOL OF PSYCHOLOGY ETHICAL APPROVAL FORM 
FOR HUMAN PARTICIPANTS 
 
Tick relevant   STAFF Project    x POSTGRADUATE Project                          
TRACK A    
 boxes:          UNDERGRADUATE Project                                                 
TRACK B 
                  X ROUTINE EXTENSION TO STUDY   PSY181917 
 
Title Of Project: Is Psychological Flexibility a trans-theoretical mechanism of 
psychotherapeutic                                           change? 
 
Name of researcher(s)            Monika Panczak Abrahams 
 
Name of supervisor (for student research) David Dawson           Date 14.09.2018 
 
  YES NO N/A 
1 Will you describe the main procedures to participants in 
advance, so that they are informed in advance about what to 
expect? 
  X 
2 Will you tell participants that their participation is voluntary?   X 
3 Will you obtain written consent for participation?   X 
4 If the research is observational, will you ask participants for 
their consent to being observed / taped? 
  x 
5 Will you tell participants that they may withdraw themselves 
or their data from the research at any time, that no reason 
needs to be given, and that they can do so without losing any 
rewards (if applicable)? 
  X 
6 Will you give participants the option of declining to give 
information they do not want to give (e.g., not filling out all 
questions in a questionnaire)? 
  X 
7 Will you tell participants that their data will be treated with 
full confidentiality, and stored securely (for 7 years at the 
  X 
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minimum) and that, if published, it will not be identifiable as 
theirs? 
8 Will you debrief participants at the end of their participation 
(i.e. give them a brief explanation of the study)? 
  X 
If you have ticked No to any of Q1-8, but have ticked box A overleaf, please give any 
explanation on a separate sheet. (Note: N/A = not applicable) 
 
  YES NO N/A 
9 Will your project involve deliberately misleading participants 
in any way? 
  X 
10 Is there a realistic risk of any participants experiencing either 
physical or psychological distress or discomfort? If Yes, give 
details on a separate sheet and state what you will tell them to 
do if they should experience any problems (e.g. who they can 
contact for help). 
  x 
If you have ticked Yes to 9 or 10 you should normally tick box B overleaf; if not, 
please give a full explanation on a separate sheet. 
 
  YES NO N/A 
11 Do participants fall into any 
of the following special 
groups? If they do, please 
refer to the appropriate BPS 
guidelines, and tick box B 
overleaf. 
Please note that you may 
also need to gain 
satisfactory CRB clearance 
or equivalent for overseas 
participants. 
School children (under 18 
years of age) 
  x 
People with learning or 
communication difficulties 
  x 
Patients   x 
Those at risk of 
psychological distress or 
otherwise vulnerable 
  x 
People in custody   x 
People engaged in illegal 
activities (e.g. drug taking) 
  x 
 
There is an obligation on the lead researcher to bring to the attention of the School’s  Ethics 
Committee projects with ethical implications not clearly covered by the above checklist. 
 
 
 Page 196 of 203 
 
PLEASE TICK EITHER BOX A or BOX B BELOW AND PROVIDE THE DETAILS 
REQUIRED IN SUPPORT OF YOUR APPLICATION, THEN SIGN THE FORM. 
              Please tick: 
 
A. I consider that this project has no significant ethical implications to be 
brought 
before the Departmental Ethics Committee. 
X 
In less than 150 words, provide details of the study including the rational, the number 
and type of participants, methods and tests to be used (i.e. the procedure). 
 
The data used in this study is from a previous study (REC 17/EM/0070, SOPREC 
PSY1617276, Hannah Daniels) for which consent for secondary data analysis was 
provided by participants. No further contact between the researcher of this project and 
the participants of the previous study is necessary. 
 
A Template Analysis will be used to code this transcribed data for evidence of 
‘Psychological Flexibility’ – a potential key mechanism in therapeutic change 
(Hayes, Strosahl, & Wilson, 1999). The findings will contribute to the knowledge of 
processes that mediate therapeutic change, and may help to facilitate the future 
development of more targeted psychological therapies.   
 
The external transcription service will be used to process the data. The University of 
Lincoln Data Protection Policies will be adhered to at all times. A Transcriber 
Confidentiality Agreement will be signed with the appropriate service (see Appendix 
B). The researcher will ensue that the chosen transcription service has a secure system 
for data transfer, access, and storage to maintain data confidentiality. 
 
This form (and any attachments) should be submitted to the school’s Ethics 
Committee where it 
will be considered by the Chair before it can be approved. 
 
B. I consider that this project may have ethical implications that should be 
brought before the Departmental Ethics Committee, and /or it will be carried 
out with children or other vulnerable populations. 
 
Please provide details of the project on an EA2 University Ethics for Human 
Participants, taking into account the following advice: 
 
1. Be clear about the purpose of the project and its academic rationale. 
2. Briefly describe the methods / measurements and parties involved / affected. 
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3. Be clear about recruitment methods, numbers used, age, gender, 
exclusion/inclusion criteria, handling procedures for field experiments, etc. 
4. Include concise statements of the ethical considerations raised by the project 
(including care and aftercare) and how you intend to deal with them. 
5. Include all relevant materials, such as consent form, participant information 
form, debrief, questionnaire / stimulus materials, letters /posters to recruit, etc. 
 
This form should be submitted to the School’s Ethics Committee for consideration. 
If any of the above information is missing, your application will be returned to you. 
 
I am familiar with the BPS Guidelines for ethical practices in psychological research, and the 
University Regulations for Ethical Research (and have discussed them with other researchers 
involved in the project or my supervisor) 
 
Signed………………………………………….………            Print Name…Monika Panczak 
Abrahams.  
 
Date 14.09.2018                                 Email 07078791@students.lincoln.ac.uk 
 
(UG/PG Researcher(s), if applicable)  
 
 
Signed:  Print Name: D Dawson    Date: 14.09.18 
(Lead Researcher or Supervisor)  Email: ddawson@lincoln.ac.uk 
 
 
STATEMENT OF ETHICAL APPROVAL 
 
This project has been considered using agreed Departmental procedures and is now approved. 
 
 
Signed…………………………………………….Print 
Name……………………………………………..Date……………….. 
(Chair, Departmental Ethics Committee) 
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Below is a copy of the consent form from the previous study, for which secondary data 
use permission was provided.  
 
 
Additional Consent Form 
 
Title of Study: Exploring the impact of psychological formulation on working alliance: 
a mixed methods, repeated single case investigation   
 
REC Ref: 221260 
 
Name of Researcher:  Hannah Daniels 
 
Name of Participant: 
 
I confirm that I have read and understood the information sheet, version number 2, 
dated 01.03.2017 for the above study and had the opportunity to ask any questions.   
 
 
I confirm that I have provided verbal and written consent using the consent form, 
version number 2, dated 01.03.2017 prior to taking part in this study. 
 
I confirm that I give my verbal and written consent for my anonymised data, 
including audio recordings of my therapy sessions, post therapy interviews and 
outcome measures to be used for secondary data purposes.  This means that the data 
might be used in future research projects.   
 
 
………………………….               ……………..                ……………………….. 
    Name of Participant                     Date                                  Signature 
 
…………………………                ……………..                ……………………… 
Name of Person Taking Consent    Date                                   Signature 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
When completed, copies for: 1 for participant; 1 for researcher site file; 1 to be 
kept in medical notes 
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Appendix C 
Email from the SOPREC representative confirming ethical approval for the current 
study. 
 
Subject  RE: Amendments to PSY181917  
Link to Outlook Item  Click here  
From  Soprec  
To  Monika Panczak-Abrahams (07078791)  
Sent  15/10/2018, 11:31:22  
  
  
Hi Monika,  
   
Your amendments have been sent to the chair and they have approved them.   
   
Kind Regards  
Katie  
   
     
 Mrs. Katie Rushbrook | Administrator  
  
College of Social Science  
University of Lincoln. Brayford Pool, Lincoln, Lincolnshire. LN6 7TS  
  
  
  Tel: 01522 835521  
     
   
From: Monika Panczak-Abrahams (07078791)   
Sent: 12 October 2018 11:57  
To: Soprec <Soprec@lincoln.ac.uk>  
Subject: RE: Amendments to PSY181917  
   
Hello Katie,   
   
Thank you for your email –  can I just double check: does it mean that you sent it to the 
Chair or that Chair has approved the amendments?  
   
Kind regards,  
   
Monika  
   
Sent from Mail for Windows 10  
   
From: Soprec  
Sent: 12 October 2018 10:52  
To: Monika Panczak-Abrahams (07078791)  
Subject: RE: Amendments to PSY181917  
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Dear Monika,  
   
Chairs Action has been approved on your ethics amendments.  
   
Kind Regards  
Katie  
   
     
 Mrs. Katie Rushbrook | Administrator  
  
College of Social Science  
University of Lincoln. Brayford Pool, Lincoln, Lincolnshire. LN6 7TS  
  Tel: 01522 835521  
     
   
From: Monika Panczak-Abrahams (07078791)   
Sent: 12 October 2018 10:07  
To: Soprec <Soprec@lincoln.ac.uk>  
Subject: Amendments to PSY181917  
   
Dear Committee,  
   
Please consider approving the amendments to my research project – highlighted in 
yellow, as required.  
   
I look forward to hearing from you,  
   
Kind regards,  
   
Monika Panczak  
   
   
   
Sent from Mail for Windows 10  
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  Appendix D 
General Data Protection Regulation Confidentiality Agreement for transcribers 
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